El Alamein

by Bryn Hammond

  Of greater concern was the situation regarding casualties.1 The Army’s estimated casualties from the evening of 23 October until dawn on 26 October were about 6,140 killed, wounded and missing with 4,640 coming from XXX Corps. Of the last figure, nearly 2,000 were from 51st Division. Particular issues arose from those suffered by the Dominion infantry units with approximately 1,000 Australians, 1,000 New Zealanders and 600 South Africans.2 The problem was that there were very few replacements for the New Zealand and South African formations. Montgomery, mindful that this was as much a political issue as a question of reserves, saw that ‘he would have to go carefully with his infantry’.3

  The third area of concern for Montgomery ought to have been the expenditure of artillery ammunition. Brigadier Sidney Kirkman, Eighth Army’s Commander, Royal Artillery (CRA), had originally estimated that 150 rounds per gun per day would allow continuation of the battle for up to three weeks. However, the severe nature of the fighting now meant that Kirkman, when discussing the matter with Montgomery that day, needed to revise his calculations:

  I [Kirkman] said to him, ‘I’ve been going into the ammunition situation and it’s very difficult to find out how much ammunition there is in the Middle East. But as far as I can find out we can go on with this battle for ten days at the present rate – but we can’t go on indefinitely.’ Monty replied: ‘Oh, it’s quite all right, absolutely all right, don’t worry about ammunition. This battle will be over in a week’s time. There’ll be no problem.’ We argued a bit. I said, ‘Well it wouldn’t be a bad thing if we cut XIII Corps down to 40 rounds per gun per day anyway.’ And he said, ‘All right, we’ll do that.’4

  Later in the war, with his persona as a confident, assertive commander firmly established in Eighth Army’s collective consciousness, Montgomery could not display doubts even to his immediate subordinates, but as an unproven army commander his decision-making on 26 October was a more collegiate process paying due attention to the views of his more senior staff officers.

  Montgomery decided to regroup his army to create a reserve with which to resume the offensive in a different sector. This reserve would consist of the New Zealand and 10th Armoured Divisions and 9th Armoured Brigade. Guingand had also suggested that 7th Armoured Division might be available if 21. Panzer-Division was sent to the northern battle front. This reorganization was to be completed, with minor exceptions, by dawn on 28 October. The burden of operations between that date and the launch of his next major attack in the coastal sector was to fall on 9th Australian Division. These decisions were the origins of Operation Supercharge – which Montgomery hoped would ‘bring about the disintegration of the whole enemy army’.5

  In deciding on this course of action, Montgomery effectively abandoned the corps de chasse concept, falling back instead on the abilities of the man he considered to be his best divisional commander, Bernard Freyberg, and his New Zealand Division staff to plan for, and effect, the breakthrough.6 Montgomery’s decision was probably precipitated by information received from Kirkman concerning Lumsden’s X Corps, leading the Army Commander to believe that Lumsden was not maintaining good liaison with his Corps CRA and that, like other ‘RAC [Royal Armoured Corps] Generals’, he did ‘not understand the co-operation of all arms in battle.’7

  As a consequence of its low strength and lack of immediate reinforcements, the New Zealand Division was in no shape to conduct an operation of the type envisaged – a point Freyberg was keen to stress to Leese, his Corps Commander, even doing so in writing with statistical information in support of his assertions. Montgomery’s solution placed two brigades of British infantry (151st and 152nd) under New Zealand command for the operations. This was both ‘elegant and effective’8 but went against Montgomery’s ‘earlier assertions that he would fight divisions as divisions and not piecemeal.’9 Freyberg’s staff needed time to prepare and the attack was scheduled for the night of 31 October–1 November.

  For the Panzerarmee with Rommel now back in charge, decisions had to be made concerning Eighth Army’s main focus. Clearly, it was not in the south where the efforts of XIII Corps were now recognized as a bluff. Rommel therefore ordered 21. Panzer-Division and half his artillery to what was obviously the offensive’s Schwerpunkt* in the north.10 Here they would be used to make a major counter-attack in combination with units from 15. Panzer-Division, 164. Infanterie-Division and Divisione ‘Littorio’.

  Rommel indulged in post facto exaggeration of certain aspects of the Panzerarmee’s situation after his return on 25 October.11 Fuel was a case in point. His German tank forces had at least enough petrol for their immediate operational needs, thanks to an undisclosed reserve accumulated by the Afrika Korps quartermaster, Major Otto. The real shortage was fuel for transport for the wider Panzerarmee – especially the artillery and infantry. Rommel also claimed that his opponents had apparently inexhaustible stocks of ammunition (perhaps forgivable given the effectiveness of Eighth Army’s artillery) and that the Sherman tank ‘showed itself to be far superior to any of ours’.12 This last remark contrasted sharply with the radically revised opinions of British tank crews. Ian King observed:

  It had now been realised that the Sherman was not the super-tank it had been supposed to be. The armour was no protection against the German 88mm; and its high octane fuel meant that it caught fire readily and burned with a life-threatening ferocity and intensity.13

  There is no doubt that the Panzerarmee now faced an exceptional crisis but its possible defeat was certainly not a study in inevitability yet.

  Montgomery’s plans did not affect operations already in train. On the night of 26–27 October 1st Armoured Division ordered 7th Motor Brigade to capture two positions approximately 3,000 yards west of the northern minefield corridor. The two locations (on the extreme right of 51st Division’s front) were known as ‘Woodcock’ and ‘Snipe’ and were respectively about a mile north-west and a mile south-west of a kidney-shaped ring contour marked on Eighth Army maps and, consequently, termed ‘Kidney Ridge’.14 ‘Approximately’ and ‘about’ – there was complete disagreement between the two divisions over the location of all three positions. Nor was ‘Kidney Ridge’ a ridge; it was a slight depression with raised lips.

  The dispute over ‘Aberdeen’ (or the ‘Kidney feature’) – 1st Gordons’ final objective for the initial attack – which had first arisen on the morning of 24 October – had festered. In Wimberley’s view it was a product of ingrained prejudice:

  I think the Armoured Commanders thought as we were new troops our map reading in the desert was sure to be wrong. Also, as they had not achieved the first night what was expected of them … the wish that we were not on ‘Aberdeen’, to justify their halting so far short of their night’s objective, may well have unconsciously affected their opinion.15

  Two battalions – 2nd King’s Royal Rifle Corps (KRRC) for ‘Woodcock’ and 2nd Rifle Brigade for ‘Snipe’– would attack at 2300hrs. The artillery of two corps would support the attack. A feature of the battle which presaged the ‘Montgomery method’ throughout the remainder of the war was the heavy reliance placed on the Royal Artillery – which since late 1917 had attained the reputation of being the most tactically adept and technologically progressive branch of the British Army. At dawn on 27 October, 2nd and 24th Armoured Brigades would advance using the captured positions as ‘pivots of manoeuvre’. Alf Flatow attended a briefing:

  At about 11:00 hrs [26 October] we were called to RHQ where the Colonel had just returned from Brigade with new orders for a move. The gist of what the Colonel told us was the two Sherman squadrons were to advance to a feature called ‘SNIPE’ after the area had been recce’d by Squadron and Troop Commanders and the tanks were to be dug in and be sort of pill boxes.16

  The tank crews, already fatigued from a combination of sleep deprivation and their heavy involvement in the Lightfoot fighting, were now experiencing side-effects from Benzedrine they had been given. Flatow continued:

  By now we had taken our second
and third doses of ‘Pep’ tablets and I was feeling very queer – I suffered in a slight way from hallucinations. I kept seeing things which didn’t exist; others experienced the same thing. As for the Colonel he saw the sky all divided up by grid lines like a map. This lasted quite a time. Giving orders the next day the Colonel kept thinking ‘Willie’ Williamson was Bill Watson and at night I suddenly saw a man riding a bicycle coming straight for me – in the middle of the Desert! We all wished we hadn’t taken the darned things.17

  The night assembly of 41st and 47th RTR of 24th Armoured Brigade was chaotic:

  During the small hours of the morning the Provost section of Brigade came forward and marked the centre line of the 41st and 47th Battalions but when first light came there was no sign of them and we got rather worried. However, they approached at last and in my opinion a greater military shambles was never before witnessed. Two separate lines of tanks went over the ridge, they lost the centre line, part of the 41st got mixed up with the 47th and I myself was responsible for dashing over to ‘Tiger’ Slater, a Squadron Leader of the 41st and put him on the right track.18

  For the infantry attack, 2nd KRRC’s commander, Lieutenant-Colonel William Heathcoat-Amory, chose to make a ‘motorized’ advance with carriers in front of lorries carrying infantry, machine guns and the anti-tank portees at the rear. The carriers ‘bumped’ a small German position before coming under small-arms and anti-tank gun fire from close range. Rather than dismounting, the lead company drove on to reach what was thought (in the darkness and under fire in an almost featureless landscape) to be ‘Woodcock’, capturing six anti-tank guns and almost a hundred prisoners in the process. They dug in to the south-east of Pt 33, east of ‘Woodcock’. The battalion’s unorthodox approach had achieved a measure of success on which an armoured advance could develop and, during the day, they were largely untroubled by the Germans and Italians.

  The 2nd Rifle Brigade, with Royal Engineers and 239 Anti-Tank Battery accompanying them, made a more conventional dismounted advance with their carriers moving in front. Supporting artillery fire seemed, however, to be falling on a different compass bearing i.e. further south than expected.19 Lieutenant-Colonel Victor Turner decided to advance towards the shell fire. Meeting little opposition and having advanced sufficiently far to consider themselves on ‘Snipe’, they moved to consolidate for all-round defence in the undulating ground – as per their instructions. This included the deployment of the anti-tank guns by the anti-tank company commander. Major Tom Bird of the 2nd Rifle Brigade, recalled:

  I accompanied my Colonel in the attack so that I would be there to meet the guns when they arrived and allot them their fields of fire. After we had done the 2,000 yards, the Colonel called for a round of smoke which landed within 100 yards and I remember the Colonel saying ‘Well, here we are and here we will stay’. We sent for the guns which were pulled behind their portees. We dug them in as best we could in the middle of the night and sent the portees away.20

  The consolidation was covered by aggressive reconnaissance by the carrier platoon, as 2nd Rifle Brigade’s Lieutenant Dick Flower described:

  Having attacked and occupied a position, it was quite normal for the Bren gun carriers to be sent forward – not only to reconnoitre forward of the position which we were defending but also to cover the digging-in of the guns and the riflemen in the position.21

  Helped by bright moonlight, Flower and his men navigated through a minefield gap and, beyond it, took a number of prisoners before discovering a leaguer of what Flower estimated was fifty or more tanks:

  It became quite clear that these German tanks were in the process of being replenished and they had a number of lorries there. Quite clearly they were filling up with petrol and being replenished with food and water and ammunition. So we decided this was a super target in view of the fact that we could see about 200 or 300 yards. We started firing with our Bren guns at these replenishment lorries. Being soft-skinned vehicles with no armour round them, a number of them very soon caught fire, which was very satisfying. As a result of this, of course, the German tanks started to open up. They weren’t quite sure where we were or who we were but they managed to locate us and started firing mainly high explosive shells at us but also machine-gun fire from the gun turrets.22

  After this remarkable display of aggression, the carrier platoon hastily retired.

  The events that followed should not obscure an important point regarding the infantry’s continued faith in the armour. In disclosing its positions the battalion was relying on 1st Armoured Division’s arrival at dawn.23 This faith was by no means based on new tactical principles occasioned by Montgomery’s arrival but lay in Eighth Army tactical doctrine that had existed under Auchinleck, Ritchie and even before. It remained to be seen whether it was misplaced.

  The first counter-attack arrived in the shape of tanks of 15. Panzer-Division and Divisione ‘Littorio’ appearing approximately 200 yards from the battalion position. Flower continued:

  Our anti-tank guns with their 6-pounder guns got their first shoot of the – I was going to say day – of course it was still night – and they let loose at very short range and managed to knock out I think it was three in that little action, three German tanks which caught fire. The German tank crews dived out of their turrets and, as they dived out of their turrets, the machine-gunners were able to train their guns on these turrets and, in many cases, kill the German crews as they bailed out.24

  It was the first time the anti-tank gunners had used the 6-pounders in action and there had been doubts concerning their efficacy, but Sergeant Joe Swann felt these had been dispelled:

  Well, as far as I could see, everybody was quite happy. The guns were scoring and stopping them. I think this was the biggest morale booster. I think if some of these tanks had come straight on after being clouted by two or three shells, we’d probably all have been saying ‘Get back out of it’.25

  This was another example of the morale-boosting effects of the new equipment Eighth Army units were now receiving. Another unexpected opportunity for the 6-pounders to wound their opponents arrived when, at first light, two groups of tanks emerging from the leaguer offered exposed flanks and prime targets. The British claimed six Panzers, eight M14s and two Semoventi destroyed and two other Panzers hit.26

  There was an unfortunate ‘friendly fire’ incident at 0730hrs when the riflemen were shelled by tanks of 24th Armoured Brigade27 whose cautious advance had been dictated by a lack of knowledge of the dispositions. Shermans and Crusaders from 41st RTR led the advance and found the ground ‘very unfavourable for the Regiment to fight on and littered with anti-tank guns – 50mm, 7.62cm and 88mm. Heavy shelling made visibility difficult and our artillery was not able to silence the enemy guns.’28 Alf Flatow observed 41st RTR’s attack:

  The place was alive with A/T [anti-tank] guns including some 88mms and it certainly was no fit country for tanks to advance over. The 7th Motor Brigade had put in an attack on our right that morning and it was presumed that all A/T guns had been put out of action by them. This was certainly the case as far as the two which had been firing across our flanks were concerned but there were many others, and many a Lancashire lad was killed that day, many of them officers.29

  Unable to gain close contact with the Rifle Brigade, and considering it ‘useless to attempt to secure [their objective] – a feature which did not exist’, the tank units withdrew to hull-down positions.30 This caused some panic amongst 24th Armoured Brigade’s reserve unit, as Alf Flatow remembered:

  And then the atmosphere changed – something happened that made our bowels cling and our mouths dry up – some Shermans appeared over the ridge in front of us, some reversing, some facing us, some in flames – they were odd tanks of the 41st and 47th Battalions retreating, coming out of it. Some stayed with us, blocking our view, getting in our way, others passed through us and went away. The shelling increased, the Colonel’s voice boomed over the air, ‘The Regiment will not retire one yard but w
ill stand and fight where it is’. Cheerful words! How I cursed everything.31

  German use of the unit’s wireless frequencies compounded the demoralization:

  Then the wireless – my wireless – went loud and a voice talking a mixture of Lancs and Yorks started to pump out propaganda, in this form: ‘Aye, it’s the 45th, 41st and 47th Regiments, they came from Lancashire and Yorkshire. We’d be much better at home in our gardens with our wives. We can’t do anything against the German artillery. These 88mms are so accurate I don’t know what we’re fighting for.’ It was all in that strain, two soldiers talking to each other. To make matters worse I got it over my I.C. as well as my ‘A’ set and I couldn’t get hold of the RHQ at all – it just blotted the whole thing out. After stopping a little it came on again, much louder, obscene words were thick in the dialogue and believe me it was incredibly demoralising. I switched off my set so my crew couldn’t hear it – as it was they were rather windy.32

  In the face of seeming disaster, Flatow was fatalistic:

  The horrible thing was we couldn’t see why it was that the other two regiments had retreated and we expected German tanks to come into view at any moment. When the Colonel gave out his momentous speech before the propaganda started, I really felt it was the end and I just resigned myself to meet it. It was a most peculiar feeling and one I don’t want to have again.33