El Alamein
Page 27
But further disaster did not ensue and the tanks held firm against this major Axis counter-attack. Consequently, Lumsden decided to bring up 133rd Lorried Infantry Brigade to reinforce 7th Motor Brigade during the night and planned a further advance.
Meanwhile, 2nd Rifle Brigade was continually subjected to attacks from German and Italian armour and artillery. Now its war experience showed its significance, as Dick Flower described:
A lot of one’s actions are automatic. I was lucky enough to be in a regular battalion of the Rifle Brigade largely composed at that stage of the war of regular soldiers who’d had extremely good training, had had a lot of experience in the desert. The battalion was in the desert from 1940 onwards so we’d had 2 years’ experience of the desert and I think as a result of the splendid training we’d received a lot of these actions were automatic.34
Also of significance for morale was the feeling of ‘winning’, as Sergeant Joe Swann made clear:
We realized we were cut off because on two or three occasions our own Sherman tanks had come through from the rear – our rear – and on one occasion three Sherman tanks more or less got to our position. I’m afraid the German 88s opened up and they were finished within about half a minute and three tanks had disappeared. Also our own wounded were lying about. The thing is the morale of the men, who knew we were fighting to the finish. But we were scoring and this is the big thing: we were winning.35
The fact that for much of the day many Axis units were unaware of 2nd Rifle Brigade’s presence does not diminish its achievements. Nor did it prevent vigorous armoured assaults. The Italian carristi (tank crew men) demonstrated the incredible courage needed to fight with their inferior tanks and self-propelled guns. The regimental commander of 133o Reggimento Carri, Colonnello Amoroso, ordered an attack for 0700hrs in close collaboration with the Stiffelmaier Kampfgruppe. Capitano Costanzo Preve of XII Battaglione Carri, 133a Divisione Corazzata ‘Littorio’, told the story:
The 12th Battalion attacks. In spite of the violent enemy fire and the resultant initial losses of tanks and men, the battalion advances firmly, keeping a certain distance from the anti-tank guns, which are extremely well dug-in and camouflaged. Suddenly there is violent fire from a further eight or ten anti-tank guns hidden on our left and located in depth. Their fire claims a number of victims and the battalion advance comes to a halt. Enemy fire becomes more and more violent. The survivors then give incredible proof of valour. Second-Lieutenant Camplani from the outside of his vehicle urges his tanks on to the attack, and at their head drives his own machine at full speed at the most advanced anti-tank gun. A belt of mines halts him and then a shell breaks its tracks. The vehicle commanded by Second-Lieutenant Stefanelli is hit and explodes; that of Lieutenant Pomoni is struck as he advances at the head of his company; Lieutenant Bucalossi’s tank is hit and set on fire. At 11:30 hours Colonel Teege orders a withdrawal back to the start line. The vehicles that have been brought back are dispersed in a wadi and the damaged ones, except the burnt-out ones, recovered.36
The losses reported were: tanks – 9 burnt, 3 hit and immobilized but recovered. Personnel – 4 dead, 11 wounded.
Increasingly desperate, 2nd Rifle Brigade’s defence depended on its 6-pounders and especially on its sergeants, the gun team leaders. According to Joe Swann:
There was three or four tanks coming through and no gun could engage them so I stood up and shouted out to Sergeant Miles to ‘take on’, but then I was told that Sgt Miles had been hit. I decided that I had better go across myself. So I stood up and started to run – I had about 50 yards to run – and as I did so, the German tank opened up – I expect with a machine-gun. I straight away went to ground and crawled 30 or 40 yards on my stomach. When I got to the gun, I found there was no available ammunition so I scouted around and found a box with 3 or 4 rounds in it. I then took one of these rounds out, put it up the gun – at the same time noticing that the German tank was searching for me. He’d seen me go down somewhere. And I thought ‘Well, I’ll go and move this gun quick before he can get one out at me. I swivelled the gun round and let him have one over open sights. It hit the tank and jammed his turret. I then put another gun [round] up the breach and put this into him, causing casualties because two or three chaps jumped out leaving one man in there badly wounded who was screaming out for help. I then got the rest of the crew up on to the gun at this stage and I went back to my own platoon.37
Prominent among the defenders was Colonel Vic Turner, who led by example, manning a gun himself at a critical point in the fighting and suffering a severe head wound in the process. At this time the 6-pounder’s superior range over the Italian tanks’ 47mm guns enabled it to account for five M14/41s and a Semovente da 75/18. However, the gun was only as good as the training of the men who operated it, and when coolness under fire was at a premium, it came from being well trained. Men like sergeants Charles Calistan (who destroyed three M14/41s with successive shots) and Joe Swann demonstrated this fact, whilst the whole action illustrated the excellent morale of this long-established and experienced Eighth Army battalion.
During the fight, Tom Bird was wounded whilst in the thick of the action:
I’d gone up to see one of the platoon commanders, Jack Toms, and we were discussing how to re-arrange his remaining men and guns when a shell landed just beside us. He was hit in the hand and I was hit in the head. I kept going for a bit but in due course with the heat and exhaustion I passed out. After dark, the Colonel and I were sent off in a jeep with a driver. Neither of us was up to much. After a bit we were both asleep and I remember being woken up by the driver who said ‘I think we are in the middle of a minefield’. Not very welcome news.38
Fortunately, the driver was either mistaken or the jeep’s occupants’ luck still held out and the wounded colonel and major were treated at a New Zealand dressing station.
The battalion was mistakenly withdrawn but had now knocked out an estimated twenty-two German and ten Italian tanks. Sergeant Calistan’s reaction on withdrawal epitomized that of many of the unit: ‘[I] did something you may think rather stupid – I went back and kissed my gun’.39 Tom Bird was conscious of his unit’s achievement but more acutely aware of its losses:
I knew that we had knocked out a lot of enemy tanks and it was regarded as a great victory but at the time it didn’t seem to me like much of a victory. All I could think of was that we had lost all our guns and all my officers had been killed or wounded.40
The sequel to the ‘Snipe’ action was unfortunate. Lumsden’s decision to bring up 133rd Lorried Infantry Brigade as reinforcements was prejudiced from the beginning by the continuing problems with map locations. A description of the advance as ‘ill-conceived’41 was a masterly understatement. Private Eric Laker of 4th Royal Sussex Regiment, 133rd Lorried Infantry Brigade, recounted:
Almost from the start the manoeuvre was a fiasco – unfortunately for us! We arrived at the appointed starting line at approximately 22:15 hrs, apparently 45 minutes late, for the preliminary barrage by the Corps Artillery had ceased at 21.15 hrs. Another barrage had started and been cut short again because we were still not there. Absolute chaos reigned. Officers were dashing here, there and all over the place, trying to put their men ‘in the picture’ but, owing to the rush, instructions were perforce of a very much abridged nature.42
Further mishap occurred in the advance, as Douglas Wimberley observed:
Due to faulty map reading, as to where the 1st Gordons on ‘Aberdeen’ were in position, the 4th Sussex actually began to fire into them from the rear, thinking the Jocks were enemy… Luckily for us, little damage was done, but this incident did not enhance our opinion, at the time, of the Armoured Divisions.43
Eric Laker witnessed the scene soon after:
In the distance I could see a bright glow which as we approached turned out to be one of our English 3-tonners. It was the ration truck of the Gordon Highlanders, set on fire by our forward companies. Apparently the chaps had not been told to
expect any of our own troops in front of them, in fact they had been told to shoot up anyone they came across. Consequently when they came up to a company of the Gordons they opened fire on them and inflicted severe casualties until the error was realised.44
Co-ordination between armour and infantry also broke down. Eric Laker continued:
Forward again, passing a derelict tank out of which I got a grand little automatic. We then came to some Italian trenches and stopped there. It was now about dawn and we heard the tanks warming up in the distance. (Wed 28 Oct). We then saw a couple of Crusaders come up and lay a perfect smoke screen, but when it had cleared all our tanks had WITHDRAWN under cover of it. We did not worry unduly, however, thinking they were perhaps going through in a different place, but concentrated on keeping well down as the stuff was now coming thick and fast. MG fire was singing about in goodly quantities also.45
Eventually the battalion occupied positions east of ‘Woodcock’ where their lack of desert (and combat) experience was soon cruelly exposed by the inevitable counter-attack of 15. Panzer-Division. Private ‘Dusty’ Ayling, also of 4th Royal Sussex Regiment, recalled:
Apart from lack of sleep in this rather noisy affair, all went well from our point of view, until 8.30 a.m. on the following Wednesday morning, when a German 50mm armour-piercing shell went through my bren-carrier, catching it on fire. We had to hop out quickly, as a carrier has two ten gallon petrol tanks, and sixteen gallons reserve. The two members of the crew, apart from getting burned badly, were both injured, one was shot through the foot, and the other in the stomach, by small-arms fire centred upon us as we baled out. Part of my clothing was on fire, but I managed to throw it off. I was most fortunate, being the driver, in also being the only one uninjured, but was however, put quickly and expeditiously, ‘into the bag’ just the same. So here we were, miles from anywhere, with no transport, and no chance of a getaway, for the German Mark IV tanks which had ranged upon us, were upon us in numbers, but they had ceased firing I am glad to say. They came up and took us prisoners.46
For Eric Laker, it was ‘the shock of our lives’:
We were contentedly playing with our automatics when I looked up and saw some of the fellows climbing out of their slit trenches with their hands up! One even had a white handkerchief tied to his rifle. I blinked and then looked round. I saw a tank that had come over the ridge with others on the right of it. A fellow was sitting on the top with a nasty looking LMG which he was waving around in a most unfriendly manner, and walking beside the tank was another chap with a revolver. He was waving his hands around him indicating to our fellows that they were to come to him and surrender. Then to my horror I saw a black cross on the front of the tank.47
The rapid counter-attack was enough to overcome the battalion: forty-seven were killed, 342 taken prisoner before any armour could intervene. This ‘local’ reverse ‘during a battle which is nevertheless being steadily won’48 was startling in being unique in Second Alamein. It was reminiscent of some of the July losses when Auchinleck commanded. But the circumstances were very different.49 Although not possessing 2nd Rifle Brigade’s considerable experience of desert fighting, 4th Sussex had, like all 44th Division, had considerable training in Montgomery’s period as commander. Despite this, its performance was almost naïve. The same could be said about some of the Territorial armoured units (24th Armoured Brigade, for example, which demonstrated great courage and endurance but was tactically raw) at this time. Taken as a whole these were not ringing endorsements for the Army Commander’s ‘thorough’ preparations.
Doubts about Montgomery’s abilities had existed in the minds of several British politicians even prior to his appointment as Eighth Army commander. Simmering beneath the surface, they suddenly re-emerged when news of his abandonment of the corps de chasse and the reorganization of his reserves was received by members of the Cabinet in London. On 29 October, Alan Brooke awoke to a crisis occasioned by a late-night drink and conversation between Churchill and Foreign Secretary Anthony Eden.
His subsequent meeting with Churchill showed the worst of the Prime Minister’s character. Brooke’s handling of the matter equally illustrated the latter’s enormous importance in managing British politico-military relations:
I was met by a flow of abuse of Monty. What was my Monty doing now, allowing the battle to peter out (Monty was always my Monty when he was out of favour!). He had done nothing now for the last three days, and now he was withdrawing troops from the front. Why had he told us he would be through in seven days if all he intended to do was to fight a half-hearted battle? Had we not got a single general who could even win one single battle? etc. When he stopped to regain his breath I asked him what had suddenly influenced him to arrive at these conclusions. He said that Anthony Eden had been with him last night and that he was very worried with the course the battle was taking, and that neither Monty nor Alex was gripping the situation and showing a true offensive spirit.50
At a later meeting, Brooke defended his Monty (it cannot be denied that Montgomery was Brooke’s protégé) with support from the South African Premier, Field Marshal Jan Smuts. He also made effective reference to Eden’s own service in the Great War to support his somewhat off-the-cuff analysis of Montgomery’s actions:
I said since the Foreign Secretary had been a Staff Captain* in the last war he must be familiar with administrative matters. (Winston was always drawing my attention to the fact that Eden had been a Staff Captain and therefore familiar with military matters!) Had he not observed that Monty’s attack had advanced the front several thousand yards, did he not remember this entailed a forward move of artillery and the establishment of new stocks of ammunition before another attack could be staged? Finally the Foreign Secretary accused Monty of withdrawing formations. Had he forgotten that the fundamental principle of all strategy and tactics lay in immediately forming new reserves for the next blow? I then went on to say that I was satisfied with the course of the battle up to the present and that everything I saw convinced me that Monty was preparing for his next blow.51
Brooke’s analysis combined an expounding of the principles of ‘bite and hold’ (a concept well understood by many of those present who had experience of warfare on the Western Front, especially in 1917) and a robust display of confidence in his subordinate general.
When Brooke and Churchill met again late that evening, the Prime Minister was charm personified, at pains to smooth over any ill-feeling that might remain from their earlier dispute:
This forged one more link between him and me! He is the most difficult man I have ever served with, but thank God for having given me the opportunity of trying to serve such a man in a crisis such as the one this country is going through at present.52
After a year as Chief of the Imperial General Staff, Brooke was learning how to deal with confidence with the capricious and impetuous Churchill. He had struggled with his responsibility ‘to enforce in stubborn argument the compulsion of strategic facts upon Churchill’s restless genius without losing its astonishing impetus and fertility’53 but was now mastering his role. His position was never again seriously under threat. It was not without cost. The arguments with Churchill and the Prime Minister’s erratic hours were tremendously wearing. Regarding the battle in Egypt, Brooke remained dependent on Montgomery and Eighth Army achieving military success. His own doubts remained:
On returning to my office I paced up and down, suffering from a desperate feeling of loneliness. I had, during that morning’s discussion, tried to maintain an exterior of complete confidence. It had worked, confidence had been restored. I had then told them what I thought Monty must be doing, and I knew Monty well, but there was still just the possibility that I was wrong and that Monty was beat. The loneliness of those moments of anxiety, when there is no one one can turn to, have to be lived through to realize their intense bitterness.54
Despite tempering Churchill’s ire, Brooke could not prevent Eden from contacting Richard Casey, the Minister of Sta
te responsible for the Middle East, and persuading him to visit Eighth Army Tactical Headquarters in company with Alexander and McCreery on the morning of 29 October. Once again, Montgomery’s outward portrayal of confidence was important in reassuring his visitors but by now it was based on more concrete information that the Axis forces were struggling. The support of his Chief of Staff and the expectation of Brooke’s support for their approach were of great assistance. Guingand practically threatened Casey if he interfered. Alexander and McCreery were also bullish. The crisis of confidence passed.
Whilst McCreery and Alexander were at Montgomery’s Tactical Headquarters, an important meeting took place at which they, Montgomery, Guingand and Leese were all present. There is some controversy over the decision resulting from that meeting.55 However, the outcome was that an initially unwilling Montgomery was persuaded to change the attack front for Supercharge from the coast road to a point further south believed to be a boundary between German and Italian units. Guingand’s arguments with reference to the morning’s intelligence reports were probably the decisive factors, but Alexander, McCreery, Guingand and Eighth Army’s Intelligence staff all seem to have been in agreement about the virtues of the change. Brigadier Edgar ‘Bill’ Williams, Montgomery’s Chief of Intelligence, even went so far as to observe that: ‘It wasn’t a specially brilliant idea because I mean it was a fairly obvious thing to do.’56
Most importantly, the change of plan negated Rommel’s efforts (known to Williams and his team) in reorganizing his forces so that 90. leichte-Afrika-Division was responsible for the coastal sector, with 21. Panzer-Division in reserve north of Tell el Aqqaqir and Divisione ‘Trieste’ occupying the positions previously held by the Panzer division. To Rommel, however, the obvious thing for the British to do was attack north-westwards along the coast towards Sidi Abd el Rahman and he had deployed his few remaining reserves accordingly.