El Alamein

by Bryn Hammond

  Of crucial importance to the success of Supercharge were the continued efforts of the Australians at the northern end of the line. It was essential to keep up pressure on the Axis forces and allow them no respite. Accordingly, on the nights of 28–29 October and 30–31 October ambitious attacks threatening to turn Rommel’s left flank or cut off part of Panzergrenadier-Regiment 125 were launched. In the first, originally intended as a precursor to Montgomery’s planned thrust along the coast road, 2/13th and 2/15th Battalions attacked under what the Germans described as ‘the heaviest artillery fire which had so far been experienced’57 and ‘reminiscent of Great War days’.58 This was a consequence of the use of 360 guns from four divisions and three medium regiments.

  The attack started at 2200hrs when the Australian battalions, which were both already considerably depleted and tired by their involvement in the previous fighting,59 went forward supported by 40th RTR’s Valentines. Both took casualties from artillery and machine-gun fire but reached their objectives. Local opposition was subdued and the battalions dug in. Both battalion commanders were wounded, whilst 2/13th’s headquarters staff were almost all killed or wounded.60 Yet even with their leaders gone and very weak in numbers – there were about 100 men left in 2/13th’s rifle companies – the Australians mounted a gritty and determined resistance in the face of counter-attacks and shelling.61 Already true of the fighting since July, this was to be their story for the next four days.

  In the next phase, 2/23rd Battalion and 46th RTR were to establish a base for a further advance by 2/32nd, 2/48th and 2/24th Battalions. The infantry and tank units had previously trained together – usually an important factor in effective co-operation in battle. It could not counter an alert opponent and inadequate opportunities for proper prior reconnaissance. When the attack did commence, some of the infantry rode on the Valentine tanks or in carriers but both vehicles and men were soon under fire. The infantry disembarked and all co-operation broke down when the tank regimental commander and most of his squadron commanders were wounded.

  As the Australian official account pithily observed: ‘The operation was developing into the type of muddle for which there were several derisive epithets in common army parlance.’62 The decisive action of 2/23rd Battalion’s commander in leading about sixty to seventy men in the capture of the key German position that were holding out, snatched some success from the chaos. The Australians had suffered over 200 casualties whilst only eight tanks of 46th RTR remained in running order and these were withdrawn.63

  The defence of the captured ground throughout the next day was facilitated by the Germans having no clear idea of the Australian positions; some strayed into these and were consequently captured. One thing was certain and of great concern; the Germans still held the dominating strongpoint known as ‘Thompson’s Post’. Four successive attacks were made by 90. leichte-Afrika-Division against the dogged Australian defenders but all were defeated. This gave 9th Australian Division’s staff breathing space to prepare the next attack, scheduled for the night of 30–31 October.

  Although this next assault featured very thorough preparatory work from the Desert Air Force with a total of 150 aircraft participating and eighty-five tons of bombs being dropped on the Axis forces and defences,64 otherwise the attack’s misfortunes and complications were of a type frequently encountered in the Great War. Despite concentrated artillery support from the same 360 guns which had been available for the previous attack, overcrowding in the assembly areas and a delay in moving off meant that the lead battalion (2/32nd) ‘lost’ the artillery barrage. These ‘traditional’ difficulties aside, a bulldozer intended for use in clearing a gap in the railway embankment that ran across the line of advance also failed to appear.65 For this task the Australians fell back on their own resources, using their entrenching tools instead. The work took three hours but was eventually completed and sufficient progress was made to allow the next stage of the attack.

  The 2/48th Battalion was simply too weak in numbers and its ‘tremendous’ task (a four-phase operation with three sequential advances in different directions and the whole advance totalling 6,600 yards) too much for a battalion whose total strength in its four rifle companies was 213 men. The battalion had already ‘been fighting strenuously for six days during which it has launched two major attacks and withstood several strong counter attacks.’ Its commander, Lieutenant-Colonel Heathcote Hammer, described how:

  At Zero (01:00 hrs) our artillery barrage began and many shells fell on and near the start line, causing slight disorganization and some casualties. Our artillery fire seemed to lack the accuracy which characterized its previous support for the battalion in the earlier attack – this was due to the difficult task of firing a receding barrage with guns at all angles to the task.66

  The ‘receding barrage’ in which the gunners were reducing the range at each lift was necessitated by the direction of the infantry advance which was towards their own gunners i.e. eastwards along the coastal highway into the rear of the defenders. Much of the artillery support’s benefit was lost because the advancing infantry had to keep 600 yards back from the fire-beaten zone.67

  In spite of these early problems, considerable progress was made by both 2/48th and 2/24th Battalions though they could summon only about 450 men between them. They succeeded in trapping elements of Panzergrenadier-Regiment 125 in the vicinity of Thompson’s Post but could not capture the strongpoint itself. A subsidiary action by 2/3rd Australian Pioneer Battalion was also unsuccessful. All three units were left so weak that a German–Italian breakthrough was considered a serious possibility.

  To counter this threat on 31 October the Desert Air Force made vigorous efforts in support of the Australians throughout the day, repelling Stuka attacks and bombing Axis troop concentrations. In the late morning thirty-two Valentines of 40th RTR took up hull-down positions just in time to meet an attack by Kampfgruppe Pfeiffer – a typical ad hoc armoured formation formed by the Afrika Korps for the specific task. It comprised approximately half of 21. Panzer-Division’s tanks and self-propelled anti-tank guns with Flak, medium and heavy artillery support. The Valentines would be no match for Mark III and Mark IV tanks; hence their deployment hull-down. A Rhodesian anti-tank battery bolstered the defence further.68 They and 2/3rd Anti-Tank Regiment were equipped with 6-pounders which could tackle these tanks (given favourable circumstances).

  Rommel personally ordered this counter-attack but, puzzlingly (not least to the man chosen), put Thoma in charge, though it meant he ‘had to leave his main front … to direct a counter-attack on an unfamiliar front some distance away’.69 Thoma used Kampfgruppe 361 in support of the tanks.70 The courage of both Australian infantry and Valentine crews cannot be underestimated in this, and subsequent, counter-attacks delivered that day. Equally important were the efforts of what the Australians termed the ‘football teams’* of Desert Air Force bombers. However, for Rommel the crucial factor in the successful defence was ‘concentrated artillery fire’.71 Again and again the Australian ‘bite and hold’ attacks were perfect opportunities for 7th Medium Regiment (RA) to use the ‘stonk’ against ‘targets of opportunity’. Lieutenant Robert Foulds of 107 Battery recalled:

  We had much more idea at Alamein as to what was going off in front of [us] than we had previously during the war. We kept on getting nice things said about us – how true they were I don’t know because there was so much firing but I suspect it did break up a lot of the German counter-attacks – especially the ‘stonk’ – that tremendous weight of material brought down on one spot. It must have been terrifying to have been underneath it.72

  From their coastal positions, the regiment’s 5.5-inch guns were in an ideal situation to influence the Australians’ dogfight. Lieutenant Charles Laborde, from 107 Battery, describes their use:

  The one that affected us most of course was the ‘stonk’ because if that came through, whatever you were doing you had to stop and fire it. The same of course applied to the DF lines that w
ere put down in front of the infantry. Defensive Fire could be very efficient. The Germans assaulted the Australians just in front of us and we got wireless back to battery to put down this Defensive Fire and ten rounds gunfire from the eight guns completely destroyed the attack.73

  Naturally, because of the numbers deployed and their superiority in armour and weaponry, German tank losses were significantly less than the twenty-one Valentines eventually destroyed.74 However, what mattered to the numerically superior Eighth Army was the result of the actions: steadily weakened Axis forces forced to make continual local attacks on unfavourable terms in what was, by this time, a mistaken belief that this was the critical sector.

  Giving up the ground gained was anathema to Morshead, the Australian commander.75 Orders were issued for the surviving infantry to be relieved by 2/28th and 2/43rd Battalions. The 2/28th had been rebuilt in strength and morale after its July disaster. Amongst its numbers was Lieutenant Leo Lyon:

  We went over the railway line about Tel el Eisa station. We went south driving along at very low speed. We turned west. We came into where apparently there had been a breakout attempt by armoured formations. Unsuccessful. There were burning tanks, burning vehicles, exploding ammunition – all very eerie and rather depressing for us. We skirted that. We weren’t in any way fired on. We turned north and we moved into a position replacing the 24th Battalion.76

  There were immediate problems trying to get about 450 men under cover in positions previously held by less than 150 men:

  We only had about 3–4 hours to get dug in and in co-operation with the other two battalions it was finally worked out that each battalion would have two companies north of the line and two companies south of the line. We just hoped that when daylight came we’d be able to put up some sort of co-ordinated fireplan to hold onto what was obviously a very important bit of ground. This area of ground was known as the ‘Saucer’.77

  The Germans and Italians lost little time in launching their first attack and contact with Panzergrenadier-Regiment 125 was re-established:

  Soon after first light, the German tanks appeared along the desert road. They appeared in the dead ground beyond the desert road and they would come along turret high and observe what was going on. They then commenced to shell us and machine-gun us. This went on all day. They had the opportunity to move along the desert road along the whole of the Saucer which was about 600 metres long. So at various times during the day they would appear at various points, engage us, disappear and appear again a few hundred metres further along. They were far out beyond our range. They generally only gave us a turret to fire at – it’s quite useless firing at a turret of a tank which is completely armoured – and so all we could do was lay low and hope. They also kept a continual barrage along the railway line. I went forward to the railway line to see if I could get across there only to find the area was covered by machine-gun fire. So this was hopeless.78

  Once again, for the Australian infantry it was a matter of grimly holding on to their positions and ‘sticking it’. Throughout the day they endured attacks by tanks, self-propelled guns and field artillery, Stukas and mortars, small-arms fire and 88mm guns – the last firing the much-feared and dreaded airburst. The value of this determined defence in laying the basis for Eighth Army’s eventual success cannot be overstated, although it remains insufficiently appreciated. Night brought little respite although the defenders did get a hot meal. From about 0230hrs to the south an intense artillery barrage raged throughout the rest of the night. No one was under illusions concerning what the next day might bring in their own battered sector.

  Throughout this fighting, Rommel had had insufficient fuel for his tanks and transport to make any attempt at breaking through the Australian front. The losses to shipping bringing his vital fuel supplies had grown increasingly significant since Alam Halfa. Now the sinking on 26 October of the Prosperina carrying 3,000 tons of fuel and the Tergestea with a further 1,000 tons assumed their most deadly import for the front-line units. However, it was receipt of news of the loss of the Louisiano with its 1,459 tons of petrol that shattered Rommel’s own morale on 29 October.79 This was followed later by information (which subsequently proved false) that two British divisions had advanced through the Qattara Depression to positions south of Mersa Matruh.80 The full consequences of his personal ambition in attempting to seize Alexandria and Cairo by a coup de main and, most particularly, the failure to overcome Malta must now have been obvious. Those who praise Rommel’s ‘genius’ cannot ignore his responsibilities in this regard. For all the plaudits Rommel has received as a military commander, committing his forces to this offensive without securing his supply lines was military suicide. It was precisely the type of situation against which, in the British High Command, Alan Brooke worked as a bastion.

  Meanwhile 2nd New Zealand Division’s preparations for Supercharge proceeded rapidly. The changes agreed by Montgomery and Guingand meant an attack front of about 4,000 yards, with an equivalent depth of advance.81 The infantry would assault first with powerful artillery support and the Valentine tanks of 8th and 50th RTR of 23rd Armoured Brigade. Routes would once again be cleared through the minefields. Then 9th Armoured Brigade would break through the enemy gun line advancing a further 2,000 yards beyond it. The Durham Light Infantry and Highland infantry brigades (151st and 152nd under Brigadiers George Murray and Jocelyn Percy respectively) were told of their task on 30 October. Freyberg was to reserve his New Zealand infantry for the pursuit which would follow. Except for the initial twenty minutes of counter-battery fire, the New Zealand CRA, Brigadier ‘Steve’ Weir, was responsible for preparing and controlling the artillery plan. Once again, he turned to the creeping barrage – an old technique perhaps but an entirely appropriate methodology for the circumstances of Supercharge.82

  On 30 October details of the attack plan were explained to officers at a 151st Brigade conference. For one experienced, though perhaps biased critic, Lieutenant-Colonel Fred Baker of 28th (Māori) Battalion, 5th New Zealand Infantry Brigade, the brigade planning was well below the standards of the New Zealanders:

  This conference was the most unsatisfactory Brigade or other conference I have ever attended. There was no orderly presentation (as we had been used to) of either information or of the job that had to be done, or who was to do what. My recollection of the conference was that it commenced with a discussion of whether hot tea should be supplied to the men at the start line, recognition signals, success signals and a password (finally resolved by adopting the word ‘Joss’ which we were given to understand was the Brigade Commander’s name). On matters of more concern to unit commanders the orders were very indefinite and the only definite information given, viz., the means of getting to the Brigade start line proved later to be inaccurate.83

  Baker subsequently discovered that the Australians occupying the area of the start line knew nothing of the attack.84 Nevertheless, according to Lieutenant-Colonel William Watson of 6th DLI, 151st Brigade, key details were explained:

  The objectives would be the Sidi Abd El Rahman track which was way ahead in the enemy’s positions. That track was very conspicuous because it was on sight lines and it had telephone poles running all the way down it. It ran from the sea or from the coast road, down towards the Qattara Depression.85

  Captain Ian English of 8th DLI was also present:

  It was thought that if we could get onto that then we would have got through the last of the German defences and the tanks would be able to get out into open country… We were all issued with maps and we were told that the artillery support was going to be on a scale which was greater than anything so far in the war. Two brigades were to be supported by a barrage provided by thirteen field regiments and four medium regiments* and this was of course in addition to preliminary counter-battery work and concentrations elsewhere. The barrage was to move forward a hundred yards in two and a half minutes. So it was going to go on for several hours. Having reached our objective, 9th Armoured Brigade
which was also under the command of the New Zealand Division was to pass through.86

  The narrower front meant a greater concentration of artillery fire. There would be nearly one 25-pounder to every twenty yards of front; the medium regiments would add further weight.87

  The advance required an unusual change of direction at the halfway point. For 6th DLI, the turning point was a line of seven disabled Italian armoured vehicles, as William Watson described:

  Bofors guns were to fire tracer down each flank to guide us. There were to be twenty-two lifts before you might say ‘half-time’. At half-time, there’d be a lull for half an hour, after we’d got about halfway. The role of the 6th Battalion was in reserve. The 8th and 9th were to be the leading battalions and when we got to the line of seven dug-in self-propelled guns or tanks we were to do a right-hand swing and face northwards and we were to be the north side – facing northwards – of this bridgehead. The guns had been imposed on our maps so we could see where they were and when we got to them we were to do this quite remarkable swing northwards. Then the whole of the artillery barrage would restart after half an hour to help the 8th and 9th battalions to get onto the Sid Abd el Rahman track.88

  Similar briefings were conducted in 152nd Brigade and Brigadier Currie’s 9th Armoured Brigade. The latter would clear the way for 1st Armoured Division, which now included 2nd and 8th Armoured Brigades and 7th Motor Brigade, and which would lead the breakout. Currie’s brigade had past experience of the New Zealanders’ thoroughness in planning and executing operations, which was reassuring to Lance-Corporal Mick Collins of the Wiltshire Yeomanry: