Raul Hilberg
Page 18
not to take place until certain payments and conditions were satisfied.
The object of these provisions, according to Keesing, was the frustration of the transfer upon the outbreak of the war.11
We do not know what was in the minds of the Rothschilds. We do
not know whether this financial empire was endowed with prophetic
insights that enabled it to predict accurately the time when war was to
start. We do know that the transaction was a painful one for the
Rothschilds, and it is therefore likely that, in their choice between
relinquishment of title for 36 percent of just compensation and retention of title in the hope that after the destruction of the Hitler regime, possession
would
be
regained,
the
Rothschilds
oscillated
from
one
alternative to the other until war made the decision for them. Thus, in
September 1939 the owners of the Witkowitz Works leaned back to find
out who would last longer, the Nazi regime or the Rothschilds. But the
waiting was not a very tranquil and peaceful proposition.
In November 1939 the Germans attempted to secure the shares of
the Freja Works by an action in a Swedish court. They failed.55 In
January 1940 the Witkowitz Works, now no longer producing for the
British navy, were placed under the “supervision” of a board consisting
of the following members.55
Dr. Delius, Hermann Goring Works
Karl Hermann Frank, Staatssekretär, Protektorat Administration
Generaldirektor Pleiger, Hermann Goring Works
Generaldirektor Raabe, Hermann Goring Works
Dr. Rasche, Dresdner Bank
Dr. Rheinländer, Reichsstelle für Wirtschaftsausbau (Construction
Planning Office, Four-Year Plan)
Generalmajor
Weigand,
Armament
Inspectorate,
Prague
Goring was now in the saddle. However, the Germans still wanted to
make an agreement. The Witkowitz Works were English, and the Germans, though at war, still expected to come to terms with England. In short, physical possession did not solve the problem for them. Accordingly, in March 1940 Dr. Rasche wrote to the president of the Swedish subsidiary Freja, Mr. Sune Wetter, suggesting new negotiations.55 In 51 52 53 54
51. Affidavit by Leonard Keesing, March 19, 1948, NI-15625.
52. Affidavit by Leo F. Spitzer (General Counsel, Witkowitzer Bergbau), October
15, 1948, NI-15678.
53. Order by the Reichsprotektor in Prague (von Neurath), January 15. 1940, NI-
15347.
54. Rasche to Sune Wetter, March 11, 1940, NI-13654.
108
ARYANIZATIONS
April, Rasche went to Stockholm to threaten drastic measures. If the
Rothschilds were not prepared to negotiate on neutral soil, the Witkowitz
Works would
be “leased”
to a German concern
(Hermann Goring
Works), to be run for the latter’s account. Thus the owners would be
deprived of all war profits, and, in addition, claims against Freja would be
instituted, this time “in a different direction.”” But the Rothschilds were
not prepared to negotiate. Then, in June 1940, France fell.
On the day of the armistice, the Dresdner Bank asked the High
Command of the Army for a special pass to enable Rasche to travel to
France. Reason: there was a rumor that the Freja stocks were located
somewhere in Paris and could be seized.55 56 57 58 The shares were in fact
located
in
the
Paris
Rothschild
bank.5’
The
Rothschilds
began
to
weaken. England was fighting a single-handed battle against Germany
and Italy. The Nazi regime seemed more secure than it had been at any
time, since it had, so far, met the test of war and emerged victorious
everywhere.
In December 1940 the foreign division of the Reichsbank called the
chairman of the Vorstand of the Dresdner Bank, Gotz, to report that an
American bank had inquired on behalf of the Rothschilds whether the
Germans were interested in a resumption of negotiations about Witkowitz.” Rasche was a bit surprised that the Rothschilds took this step.
He was no longer so eager for negotiations, but he suggested that talks
be held in Spain.59 60 These discussions apparently did not take place
either, but, for the moment, neither side made an aggressive move. As
late as June 1941, the Freja Works made regular shipments of iron ore
to Witkowitz, as though there were no expropriations and no war.“
Early in 1941 a grotesque incident occurred. We may recall that
there were 100 bearer certificates signifying ownership of the British
corporation, which in tum owned the Witkowitz shares. These Witkowitz
shares
numbered
223,312.61
Fourteen
thousand
had
been
handed over to the Germans as part of the ransom arrangement for
Louis Rothschild's release; 43,300 (a considerable parcel) had been left
behind in Paris when Baron Eugene fled from the Germans. These
shares were lying in a depot at Nevers, guarded by a French official
55. Sune Wetter (Stockholm) to Oskar Federer (London), April 6,1940, NM3637.
56. G. Stiller (Secretariat, Dr. Rasche) to Generalquartiermeister/Passierschein-
hauplslelle (General Quartermaster/Main Pass Section), June 24. 1940, NI-1853.
57. File note, Dresdner Bank, July 2, 1940. NM832.
58. Götzto Rasche, December 21, 1940, Nl-13292.
59. Rasche to Götz. December 28, 1940, NI-13292.
60. G. Stiller (Secretariat, Dr. Rasche) to Assessor Zöppke (Legal Division.
Foreign Office), June 21, 1941, Nl-1557.
61. Note by Stiller, February 3, 1932, NI-2643.
109
EXPROPRIATION
(Jannicot,
director,
Administration
of
Property
and
General
Revenue
Office, Department Seine) and a Rothschild representative. On January 8, 1941, a group of Germans (the Devisenschutzkommando, or
“Currency Squad”) arrived at the depot, shoved the Frenchmen aside
physically,
and
removed
the
shares.
The
Vichy
government,
considerably annoyed, countered this move by sequestering (blocking with
a view to confiscation) all Rothschild properties in France.“ The Germans retreated, offering to purchase the shares for a suitable sum.“
(This was part of a plan to get hold of a majority or all of the 223,000
shares. However, the scheme was not very practical, because only the
43,300
shares
discovered
in
Paris
were
actually
“within
reach
[greifbar]'y*
As a result, the Goring Works continued to be in possession of the
enterprise without owning it. In a memorandum dated March 31, 1944,
the Witkowitz Works are listed as part of the Goring complex, with the
no
tation:
“no
capital
participation—operational
connection
only.”“
Notwithstanding the fact that the connection was “operational” only,
the Goring Works pocketed the profits, which amounted to 2,400,000
reichsmark during the business year 1941.“ And that is the history of
the Witkowitz “Aryanization."
We can see now the advance of techniques that marks the pre-
Rothschild
and
Rothschild
phases
of
“voluntary”
Aryanizations.
The
pre-Rothschild
arsenal
contained
the
following
principal
weapons:
(1)
boycott,
(2)
allocation
control,
(3)
buyers’
agreements,
and
(4) elimination of “good will” by decree. The Witkowitz Aryanization
reveals,
in
addition,
the
following
methods:
(S)
negotiation
by
plenipotentiary
(DresdnerBank),
(6)
exit-visa
restriction,
(7)
attempted
stealing of shares, (8) operation of the enterprise and collection of the
profits.
The Rothschild case, however, is not the best example of the effectiveness of German operative techniques. For practical purposes Goring had
accomplished
his aim,
but
he
did
fail to
complete
the
transaction. There was no final transfer, and Witkowitz was not entered in the books as a German plant. Undoubtedly, this reluctance is 62 63 64 65 66
62. Affidavit by Yvonne Delree Kandelafte, March 19,1948, NI-15552. Affiant was
private secretary to Baron Eugene. Jannicot to Director General for Registration, Administration of Property, and Revenue (Vichy), January II. 1941, NI-15537.
63. Marotzke (Office of the Four-Year Plan) to MitiUtrbefehlshaber Frankreichl
Verwaltungsslab (Military Commander France/Administration), copy to Dr. Rasche,
November 6, 1941, Nl-2647.
64. Note by Stiller, February 3, 1943, Nl-2643.
65. Reichswerke Hermann Gdring/Montanblock to Economy Ministry/Main Division UI/Division 5—Foreign Currency, March 31,1944, NG-2887.
66. PleigertoGbring, Decembers, 1941, NI-15575.
110
ARYAN1ZATIONS
traceable only to the fact that the Rothschilds had succeeded in making
Witkowitz an English enterprise. The British flag stopped the Germans
from installing themselves as the new owners of the Arm.
In the cases of Weinmann and Petschek, the transfer was completed. Extraordinary pressure had to be applied against both of these families. The Reich itself finally stepped in, confiscated the enterprises
and sold them at a profit to the interested buyers. Yet it must be
emphasized that these “confiscations” were not part of any general
confiscatory
process.
They
were
entirely
individual
measures
which
were taken only after the German negotiators, using all their tools and
all their tricks, had gotten nowhere. In short, these “confiscations”
were imposed as a sort of penalty for the obstinancy and the uncooperative attitude of the Jewish owners. The “provocations” in each case
were
not
identical—the
Weinmanns
petitioned,
the
Petscheks
defied. But their fate in the end was the same. Survival in Nazi Germany could not be assured by insisting on one's rights.
The party most interested in the Weinmann and Petschek properties was the same that had acquired Witkowitz: the Hermann Goring Works. The Goring Works were originally and primarily a coal and
steel concern. (These two branches could often be found in the same
German enterprise. Steel corporations were always on the lookout for
a “coal base”; that is, they were interested in the acquisition of
sufficient coal mines to assure a dependable supply for the manufacture
of steel.) Since the Goring Works were operated in the “state-political
interest,” it was not difficult for Goring to obtain Economy Minister
Funk’s agreement that all soft coal mines in the Sudeten area (annexed
from Czechoslovakia in October 1938) should belong to his concern.4’
To integrate the Sudeten coal mines into the Göring enterprise, a
new corporation, the Sudetenländische Bergbau A. G., Brüx (Subag),
was formed on June 10, 1939. Significantly, the first meeting of this
Göring subsidiary was held not in the Sudetenland, in Brüx, but in
Berlin, in the offices of the Dresdner Bank.4* The reason for this location was obvious. The properties of the Subag had not yet been acquired. The Aryanization still had to be carried out by the Dresdner Bank. The mines in question were still owned by the Weinmann and
Petschek families.
The smaller, but older, of the two concerns were the Weinmann 67 68
67. Funk to Staatssekretär Körner, April t3, 1939. NI-12512.
68. Minutes of first Aufsichtsrat meeting, June 10, 1939, NI-13910. Generaldirektor
Pleiger was elected chairman. Other members were Unterstaatssekretär von Hannecken
(Economy Ministry), Ing. Wolfgang Richter, Kehrl (Economy Ministry—Industry),
Gabel (Economy Ministry—Mines), Ministerialrat Mundt, Dr. Rasche. Delius (Goring
Works), and Ing. Nathow. For articles of incorporation, dated June 12, 1939, see NI-
111
EXPROPRIATION
enterprises,
with
headquarters
in
Aussig,
Sudetenland.
The
value
of
these enterprises was a subject of dispute from the beginning. Table 5-7
shows the discrepancy in the estimates. It will be noted that the Germans offered only about half the amount wanted by the Weinmanns.
The reason for that rather low valuation was to be found in the fact that
the principal Weinmann enterprise, the Brucher Kohlenwerke, had for
ten years been operated at a loss.” There are various ways of figuring
out the value of a corporation. One method is to estimate plant value
and “good will” (marketability of the product). That is evidently what
the Weinmanns did. Another method is to project past earnings (or
losses) into the future, measuring the value in terms of such past performance. That is what the Germans did.
There was another difficulty that was even more important: the
problem of foreign exchange. If the Germans had at least made their
offer in pounds or dollars, the Weinmanns might have been happy. But
the offer was made in a captive currency; Czech crowns. The Weinmanns had neglected to do what the Rothschild family had done. They had not established a British, Swiss, or American corporation to hold
their property. In fact, during the summer of 1938, before the German
invasion of Czechoslovakia, the Weinmann financial expert, Geiringer,
had given assurances to Sudeten German interests that the enterprises
would not be sold to the Czechs for foreign exchange or anything else.™
The Weinmanns had taken only one precautionary measure. In 1936,
they had made a loan to the Czech government that was repayable in
foreign currency.’1 However, in March 1939 there was no longer a
Czech government and, so far as the Germans were concerned, there
was no longer a Czech state. The loan served only to excite German
interest about the question of where the foreign currency that the
Czech government had promised might come from. For that reason
(and also because no agreement had been reached on the Aryanization
of the Weinmann holdings), one of the Weinmanns (Hans), caught by
the
invasion
in
Prague,
was
not
allowed
to
leave.
Unlike
Louis
Rothschild,
he
was
free,
but
to
“guarantee
readiness
to
negotiate
[Kautionfiir Verhandlungsbereitschaft]” he was not given a passport.B
To get Hans Weinmann out of Prague, Fritz Weinmann (in Paris)
paid 20,000 Swiss francs for “a real passport." Then Hans Weinmann
suddenly took off surreptitously, without any passport. When Rasche 69 70 71 72
69. Memorandum by Ansmann, April 19, 1939. Nl-15607.
70. Reinhold Freiherr von LUdinghausen (industrialist of the Sudeten area) to
Rasche, enclosing summary of a conference attended by Sudeten German bankers and
industrialists, July 28. 1938, Nl-13399.
71. Affidavit by Geiringer, October 13, 1948, Nl-15679.
72. Memorandum by Ansmann. April 18, 1939, NI-1S607.
112
T A B L E 5-7
THE WEINMANN ENTERPRISES (VALUES IN THOUSANDS)
Par Value of
Weinmann
German
Stocks Held
Estimate of
Estimate of
by Weinmanns
Market Value
Market Value
Enterprise
Crowns
1939 Dollars
Crowns
1939 Dollars
Crowns
1939 Dollars
B rucher Kohlenwerke A. G.
100.000 to
3,500 to
40,000 to
1,400 to
(100 percent Weinmann)
100.000
3,500
119,000
4,165
50.000
1,750
Westböhmischer Bergbau
Aktienverein
60,000 to
2,100 to
(40 percent Weinmann)
50.000
1,750