Raul Hilberg
Page 30
of
the
Propaganda
Ministry.
The
Interior
Ministry’s
expert
on
Jewish
affairs
(Ministerialrat
Lösener), who attended this meeting, said after the war: “I had assumed that, as usual, it would be a small conference of the participating experts." Instead, there were speeches. “Then there was applause, not
like in a conference—but as if it were an election campaign.”*1 However, in the end, the drafting of the decree was entrusted to Lösener."
In its final form the decree, dated September 1, 1941,76 77 78 79 80 81 82 83 84 * provided
that Jews six years or over were to appear in public only when wearing
the Jewish star. The star had to be as large as the palm of a hand. Its
color had to be black, the background yellow, and for the center of the
star the decree prescribed the black inscription Jude. The victims were
to sew the star tightly on the left front of their clothing. Jews in privileged mixed marriages were exempt.
The stars were manufactured by the Berliner Fahnenfabrik Geitel
& Co.“ and distributed immediately. There were no major repercussions. Some Jews attempted to hide the emblem with a briefcase or a book,
a
practice
the
Berlin
Gestapo
considered
inadmissible.*’
The
factory management of Siemens, Kabelwerk Gartenfeld, did not want
its Jewish work force to wear the star on the premises, claiming that
the Jews were already segregated there. The question of whether a
76. Lammers to Frank, August 10, 1941, NG-llll.
77. ¡bid.
78. Stuckan to Lammers, August 14, 1941, NG-1111.
79. Unterstaatssekretär Luther (Foreign Office/Division Germany) to Staatssekretär Weizsäcker of the Foreign Office. September 19.1941, Document Weizsäcker-488.
80. ¡bid.
81. Testimony by LOsener, Case No. II, tr. pp. 7636-38.
82. Affidavit by Losener, February 24, 1948, NG-1944-A.
83. RGB1I.547.
84. Memoranda of September 17 and 20, 1941, by Paul Eppstein of Jewish
Reichsvereinigung on meetings with Hauptsturmführer Gutwasser of Reich Security
Main Offtce/lV-B-4 on September 16 and 20, Leo Baeck Institute, microfilm roll 66 of
original documents in Deutsches Zentralarchiv. Potsdam.
8$. Memorandum by Eppstein, September 20, 1941, on meeting with representative of Berlin Gestapo (Prüfer). Ibid.
178
THE REICH-PROTEKTORAT AREA
plant was a public place within the meaning of the decree consequently
had to be pondered by the Reich Security Main Office.“ The party,
apprehensive about the possibility that the display of the star in the
streets
would
result
in
new
disturbances,
issued
circulars
warning
party members not to molest Jews." Children especially were to be
cautioned. But there is no record of violence. In fact, there is a story of
a little girl who went out of her way to greet politely a Jewish community worker. She said, “Heil Hitler, Mr. Jew.’’*8
An awkward situation was created for the churches when baptized
Jews with stars turned up for services. In Breslau, the elderly Cardinal
Bertram, head of the Catholic Church in eastern Germany, issued instructions that "the conduct of special services [die Abhaltung von Sondergottesdiensten]’' for star wearers was to be "weighed” only in
the event of “major difficulties,” such as the staying away or ostentatious departure from services by civil servants or party members.86 87 88 89 The representatives of the Evangelical-Lutheran church in seven provinces
invoked the teachings of Martin Luther to declare that racially Jewish
Christians had no place and no rights in a German Evangelical church.90
The Security Police, in the meantime, extended the marking to
apartments. In 1942 the Jews were ordered to paste the star on their
doors, in black print on white paper.91
The whole identification system, with its personal documents, specially assigned names, and conspicuous tagging in public, was a powerful weapon in the hands of the police. First, the system was an auxiliary
device
that
facilitated
the
enforcement
of
residence
and
movement restrictions. Second, it was an independent control measure
in that it enabled the police to pick up any Jew, anywhere, anytime.
Third,
and
perhaps
most
important,
identification
had
a
paralyzing
effect on its victims. The system induced the Jews to be even more
docile, more responsive to command than before. The wearer of the
star was exposed; he thought that all eyes were fixed upon him. It was
as though the whole population had become a police force, watching
86. Memorandum by Eppstein, September 26, 1941, on meeting with Gutwasser.
Ibid.
87. See the previously mentioned Bormann directive in NG-1672.
88. Account by Dr. Hugo Nothmann (Jewish survivor) in Hans Lamm, “Über die
Entwicklung des deutschen Judentums,’' (mimeographed, 1951), p. 313.
89. Milleilungen zur Weltanschaulichen Lage, April 15, 1942, pp. 13-17, EAP 250-
c-10/5.
90. Announcement of December 17. 1941, signed by Klotzsche for Saxony, Bishop
Schultz for Mecklenburg, Kipper for Nassau-Hessen, Dr. Kinder for Schleswig-
Holstein, Wilkendorf for Anhalt, Dr. Volz for Thuringia, and Siewers for Lübeck, reprinted in Helmut Eschwege, Kennzeichen ./(Berlin, 1966).pp. 161-62.
91. Jüdisches Nackrichtenblait (Berlin), April 17, 1942.
179
CONCENTRATION
him and guarding his actions. No Jew. under those conditions, could
resist, escape, or hide without first ridding himself of the conspicuous
tag, the revealing middle name, the telltale ration card, passport, and
identification papers. Yet the riddance of these burdens was dangerous, for the victim could be recognized and denounced. Few Jews took the chance. The vast majority wore the star and, wearing it, were lost.
We have now seen how, in consecutive steps, the Jewish community was isolated socially, crowded into special houses, restricted in its movements, and exposed by a system of identification. This process,
which we have called ghettoization, was completed with the institution
of a Jewish administrative apparatus through which the Germans exercised a stranglehold on the Jewish population. For our understanding of how the Jews were ultimately destroyed, it is essential to know the
origins of the Jewish bureaucratic machine. The Jews had created that
machine themselves.
Before 1933 the Jewish community organization was still decentralized. Each city with a Jewish population had a Gemeinde with a Vorstand responsible for the operation of Jewish schools, the synagogues,
hospitals,
orphanages,
and
welfare
activities.
By
law,
the
Gemeinden could levy a tax from all those who had been bom into the
Jewish faith and who were livin
g in the locality, so long as they did not
formally resign from membership.’2 There were also regional organizations (Landesverbände), which in the southern German states (Baden, Württemberg, and Bavaria) had statutory powers to control budgets
and appointments in the Gemeinden, but which were only confederations of local community delegates in Saxony and Prussia. The Prussian Landesverband covered 72 percent of Germany’s Jews, including the important cities of Berlin, Frankfurt am Main, Breslau, and Cologne. Its chairman. Rabbi Leo Baeck, was working on a “concordat"
with Prussia in 1932, on the eve of Hitler’s rise to power.”
At
that
time,
the
Jewish
communities, mirroring
the post-1918
political trend in Germany as a whole, were on the verge of centralization. Various drafts of a central Jewish organization had been prepared during the days of the Weimar Republic.” In 1928, pending an establishment of a "Reichsorganisation," delegates of the Landesverbände, meeting in conference, constituted themselves into a working group 92 93 94
92. Nathan Stein, "Oberrat der Israeliten Badens, 1922-1937,” Leo Baeck Year
Book 1 (1956): 177-90, particularly p. 183. On finance see also Adler-Rudel, Jüdische
Selbsthilfe, pp. 161, 178.
93. Leo Baeck, “ln Memory of Two of our Dead," Leo Baeck Year Book 1 (1956):
51-56, 52-53.
94. Drafts of 1926, 1931, and 1932 in Leo Baeck Institute, New York, Kreutzberger
collection, AR 7183, Box 18, folder 3.
180
THE REICH-PROTEKTORAT AREA
(Arbeitsgemeinschaft),
deputized
the
Prussian
Landesverband
to
keep
the books of the group, and created a committee that would represent
Jewish interests before official agencies in the German Reich.’5
In the spring of 1933, a rudimentary central Jewish organization
was formed. During the following years, it was to evolve in several
steps into a Jewish apparatus with increasingly significant functions.
The stages of its evolution, two of them in 1933 alone, are indicated in
the following changes of title:*
1933 Reichsvertretung der jüdischen Landesverbände
(Reich Representation of Jewish Land Federations)
Leo Baeck and Kammergerichtsrat Leo Wolff, cochairmen
Reichsvertretung der deutschen Juden
(Reich Representation of German Jews)
Leo Baeck, president
Ministerialrat Otto Hirsch, deputy
1935 Reichsvertretung der Juden in Deutschland
(Reich Representation of Jews in Germany)
Leo Baeck
Otto Hirsch, deputy
1938
Reichsverband der Juden in Deutschland
(Reich Federation of Jews in Germany
Leo Baeck
Otto Hirsch, deputy
1939
Reichsvereinigung der Juden in Deutschland
(Reich Association of Jews in Germany)
Leo Baeck
Heinrich Stahl, deputy
When the Jewish leadership was confronted by the Nazi take-over
in 1933, it sought first of all an “open debate” (offene Aussprache), a
"dignified controversy” (Auseinandersetzung . . . mit Waffen der Vornehmheit) with the Nazis on the subject of anti-Semitism and the Jew- 95 96
95. Hans-Erich Fabian. "Zur Entstehung der 'Reichsvereinigung der Juden in
Deutschland,’ " in Herbert A. Strauss and Kurt R. Grossman, eds., Gegenwart im Rückblick (Heidelberg, 1970), pp. 165-79, p. 167.
96. Adler-Rudel, Jüdische Selbsthilfe, pp. 9-18; K. Y. Ball-Kaduri. ‘The National
Representation of Jews in Germany.” Yad Vashem Studies 2 (1958): 159-78, containing
texts of recollections by Emst Herzfeld (chairman of Central-Verein) and Franz Meier
(Zionist); Max Gruenewald, “The Beginning of the 'Reichsvertretung,'" Leo Baeck Year
Book 1 (1956): 57-67; Fabian, "Reichsvereinigung," in Gegenwart im Rückblick, pp. 165—
79; Hugo Hahn, “Die Gründung der Reichsvertretung,” in Hans Ttamer, ed., In Zwei
Welten (Tel Aviv, 1962), pp. 97-105; Abraham Margaliot, "The Dispute over the Leadership of German Jewry (1933-1938),” Yad Vashem Studies 10 (1974): 129-48; Leonard Baker, Days of Sorrow and Pain—Leo Baeck and the Berlin Jews (New York, 1978).
Adler-Rudel. Ball-Kaduri. Gruenewald, Fabian, and Hahn are veterans of the Reichsvertretung.
181
CONCENTRATION
ish
future
in
Germany.”
In
March
1933,
Baeck
himself
and
the
Vorstand of the Berlin community at the time, Kleemann, dispatched a
letter to Hitler in which they enclosed a public statement (Aufruf)
expressing consternation about the Nazi boycott, calling attention to
the 12,000 Jewish dead of the First World War, and refusing responsibility for the “misdeeds of a few” (Verfehlung einiger Weniger).* Again and again the heads of various Jewish interest groups—among them
the
Central-Verein,
war
veterans,
and
Zionists—sought
interviews
with Hitler and other high-ranking Nazi officials. One delegation was
received by Goring on March 25,1933," but this meeting was to be the
last of its kind. In later years the Jewish leaders, not only in the Reich
but also in occupied territory, were forced to deal with German officials
of lower and lower rank, until they were appealing to SS captains. In
1933 they did not foresee this future, and they strove to create an
overall
representation
(Gesamtvertretung)
as
a matter of
the
highest
priority.
The
Reichsvertretung
der
jüdischen
Landesverbände
was
the
initial manifestation of this aim, but it was little more than an enlargement of the Berlin community and the Prussian Landesverband. Rabbi Baeck recognized the limitations of this powerless agency and resigned
from it after a few months.1”
During the late summer of 1933, a group of Jewish leaders in Essen
led a campaign to revamp the Reichsvertretung. They wanted much
heavier representation from communities outside Berlin and the inclusion
of
national
organizations.
Their
strategy
was
to
“isolate”
(isolieren) Berlin and to offer the leadership of the new Reichsvertretung to the man who, in their eyes, stood above factional politics: Leo Baeck.“' On August 28, 1933, a meeting was held in the Essen
synagogue to hammer out a plan. The participants formed a working
committee under the direction of Dr. Georg Hirschland (Essen) and
authorized him to recruit the Zionists—heretofore a small minority but
now
growing
in
influence—into
their
fold.
Ministerialrat
Dr.
Otto
Hirsch of Stuttgart was asked to work out the guidelines.'® Hirsch
drafted
a proclamation
addressed
“To
the
<
br /> German Jews,”
informing
them in the original wording that “with the consent of all Jewish Lan- 97 98 99 100 101 102
97. Lamm, "Über die Entwicklung des deutschen Judentums,'’ pp. 98-99.
98. Baeck and Kleemann lo Hitler, March 29, 1932, in Adler-Rudel, Jüdische
Selbsthilfe, pp. 183-84, and in Klaus Herrmann. Das Drille Reich und die Deutsch-
Jüdischen Organisationen (Cologne. 1969), pp. 60-61.
99. Baker, Days of Sorrow, pp. 153-54.
100. Baeck, "In Memory,” Leo Baeck Year Book 1 (1956): 54.
101. Hahn, "Reichsvertretung," ln Zwei Welten, p. 101. Rabbi Hahn belonged to
the Essen group.
102. A summary of the meeting can be found in the Leo Baeck Institute, Reichsvertretung collection, AR 221.
182
THE REICH-PROTEKTORAT AREA
desverbände and all major organizations, we have taken over the leadership of the Reichsvertretung of German Jews [An die deutschen Juden!
Wir haben mit Zustimmung aller jüdischen Landesverbände Deutschlands
und
aller
grossen
Organisationen
der
deutschen
Juden
die
Führung der Reichsvertretung der deutschen Juden übernommen].''"0
On September 3, 1933, Hirschland's working committee met in
Berlin. The conferees spoke of a leadership of personalities (Persönlichkeiten), which was to supplant the existing establishment. The list from which the future leaders were to be drawn included Martin Buber, the
philosopher, and Richard Willstätter, the Nobel laureate in chemistry.
The committee then chose Baeck as president and Hirsch as executive
chairman (geschäftsführenden Vorsitz j.1“
Two weeks after the September 3 meeting, the new Reichsvertretung came into being. It did not include some of the Orthodox Jews (Agudah), who looked askance at the liberal Rabbi Leo Baeck and his
scholarly studies of Christian doctrines, nor was it supported by assimilationist
Jews
espousing
German
nationalism
(Verband
nationaldeutscher
Juden),
who
believed
that
their
special
sacrifices
for
Germany entitled them to rights greater than those of other Jews, nor—
at the opposite end of the spectrum—by Zionist Revisionists, who
believed in the necessity of total emigration.1“ Still, the group had a
broad enough base to require care in the allocation of positions to its
presidium. Spaces had to be reserved for the newly recruited Zionists,
the other major Jewish organizations, and the larger communities, including that of Berlin, which numbered a third of all the Jews in Germany. In the end, there was no room for Buber or Willstätter.1“ All the men at the helm of the Reichsvertretung were experienced in the political arena, and almost immediately they were called on to use their expertise, not merely in dealing with each other but with the German