by The Destruction of the European Jews, Vol. 1-3 (Third Edition) Yale University Press (2003) (pdf)
Warsaw, the impact of ghettoization in any locality was but a matter of
time.307 308 309 310 311 312 313 For the German decision makers, the pace was not fast enough.
They could not wait two or three decades, or entrust the task of “solving the Jewish problem” to a future generation. They had to “solve”
this problem, one way or another, right then and there.
307. The ratio of deaths for men and women in L6d i ghetto was 3:2 both in 1941
and during the first six months of 1942. It was 17:12 in the Warsaw ghetto in 1941, and
about 17:13 during the first six months of 1942. The Lddt mortality rate of men as a group
was nearly twice as high as that of women in 1941 and during January-June 1942. L6dt
Ghetto collection, No. 58, p. 21, Czemiakdw to Auerswald, February 12, 1942, Polen
365e, p. 563, and monthly reports by Czemiakiw in Polen 363e. pp. 546-59,573-641.
308. Ldd t Ghetto collection. No. 58, pp. 23,26.
309. Report by Warsaw Propaganda Division, March 21, 1942, Occ E 2-2.
310. Population data in typed compilation from the files of the municipal administration in L6di, copy in Yad Vashem, folder 06/79.
311. Monthly statistics from September 1939 through November 1942, prepared by
Jewish Council, were enclosed in paper by Fliederbaum, “Clinical Aspects," in Winick,
ed.. Hunger Disease, p. 35. The same monthly totals, for 1941 only, and with breakdowns for different categories, are found in Czerniakdw's report of February 12, 1942.
Monthly council reports in 1942 also have totals with different details.
312. SS-Statistician Korherr calculated a Jewish population deficit, not attributable
to deportations, of 334,673 for the incorporated territories (including Bialystok) and
427,920 for the Generalgouvemement (including Galicia) from the time these areas had
been seized to December 31. 1942. Korherr to Himmler. April 19, 1943, NO-5193. In
effect, these figures may be translated into three-quarters of a million victims—including
a half million dead prior to and during the period of ghettoization, and most of the remainder
killed in ghetto-clearing operations, particularly in Bialystok and Galicia.
c
H
A
P
T
ω
S
E
MOBILE Z
KILLING E
OPERATIONS N
When the bureaucracy had completed all those measures that
comprised the definition of the Jews, the expropriation of their
property, and their concentration in ghettos, it had reached a dividing
line. Any further step would put an end to Jewish existence in Nazi
Europe. In German correspondence the crossing of this threshold was
referred to as “the final solution of the Jewish question [die Endlosung
der Judenfrage].” The word final harbored two connotations. In a narrow sense it signified that the aim of the destruction process had now been clarified. If the concentration stage had been a transition to an
unspecified
goal,
the
new
“solution”
removed
all
uncertainties
and
answered all questions. The aim was finalized—it was to be death. But
the phrase “final solution" also had a deeper, more significant meaning.
In Himmler’s words, the Jewish problem would never have to be
solved
again.
Definitions,
expropriations,
and
concentrations
can
be
undone. Killings are irreversible. Hence they gave to the destruction
process its quality of historical finality.
The annihilation phase consisted of two major operations. The first
was launched on June 22, 1941, with the invasion of the USSR. Small
units of the SS and Police were dispatched to Soviet territory, where
they were to kill all Jewish inhabitants on the spot. Shortly after these
mobile killings had begun, a second operation was instituted, in the
course of which the Jewish populations of central, western, and southeastern Europe were transported to camps equipped with gassing installations. In essence, the killers in the occupied USSR moved to the victims, whereas outside of this arena the victims were brought to the
killers. The two operations constitute an evolution not only chronologically but also in complexity. In the areas wrested from the Soviet Union, the mobile units could fan out with maximum freedom to the
farthest points reached by German arms. The deportations, by contrast, were the work of a much larger apparatus that had to deal with a host of constraints and requirements. The effort, as we shall see, was
deemed necessary to accomplish the final solution on a European-wide
scale.
273
MOBILE KILLING OPERATIONS
P R E P A R A T I O N S
The invasion of the Soviet Union and the mobile killings carried out in
its wake mark a break with history. This was not an ordinary war for
ordinary gain. The battle plans were discussed in the Army High Command (Oberkommando des Heeres) as early as July 22, 1940, eleven months before the armies crossed the Soviet border.1 No ultimatum
was to alert the Soviet government to any danger. No peace treaty was
envisaged to bring the war to its conclusion. The objectives of the
campaign were not limited, and the means with which it was to be
fought were not restricted. In unprecedented numbers, a ground force
was assembled that was to be engaged in what was soon to be called
“total war.”
The invading army groups were accompanied by small mechanized
killing units of the SS and Police that were tactically subordinated to
the held commanders but otherwise free to go about their special business. The mobile killing units operated in the front-line areas under a special
arrangement
and in
a unique
partnership
with
the German
army. To understand what made this partnership work, it is necessary
to have a closer look at the two participants: the German Wehrmacht
and the Reich Security Main Office of the SS and Police.
The Wehrmacht was one of the four independent hierarchies in the
machinery of destruction. Unlike the party, the civil service agencies,
and the business enterprises, the armed forces had no major role to
play in the preliminary phase of the destruction process. But in the
inexorable
development
of
the
process,
every
segment of
organized
German society was drawn into the destructive work. We may recall
that even in 1933 the Wehrmacht was interested in the definition of
“Jews.” Later the army was affected by the expropriation of Jewish
enterprises producing war materials. In Poland the generals narrowly
escaped from an entanglement in the concentration process. Now, with
the onset of the mobile killing operations, the armed forces found
themselves suddenly in the very center of the holocaust.
The Wehrmacht’s involvement began at the top level of the High
Command structure and spread from there to the field. The central
features of the military machine are shown in Table 7-1. It will be noted
that the Oberster
Befehlshaber der Wehrmacht was in charge of the
commanders in chief (Oberbefehlshaber) of the three services. However, there was no corresponding chain of command running from the OKW to the OKH, the OKM, and the OKL. The OKW, as well as the
three other high commands, were essentially staff organizations, each
I.
Franz Haider, Krlegstagebuch, ed. Hans Adolf Jacobsen, 3 vols. (Stuttgart,
1962-6*), vol. 2, pp. 32-33.
274
PREPARATIONS
of which carried out planning functions within its sphere of jurisdiction. Thus the integration of the mobile killing units into the invading army groups was accomplished only after extensive negotiations with
the OKW and OKH.
The territorial organization of the army is shown in Table 7-2. The
table
distinguishes
between
three
types
of
territorial
command:
the
Reich
itself,
occupied
territories,
and
newly
invaded
areas.
Broadly
speaking, the military authority over civilians increased with the increased distance of the territory from the Reich. In Germany proper, that authority was virtually nonexistent; in the newly invaded areas it
was nearly absolute. The forward region, from army group rear areas
to the front line, was considered an operational zone. There an administrative body, not part of the armed forces, could operate only under a special arrangement with the Wehrmacht.
The only agency admitted to the forward areas during the Russian
campaign was the Reich Security Main Office (the RSHA). It was the
agency that, for the first time in modem history, was to conduct a
massive killing operation. What sort of an organization was the RSHA?
The RSHA was a creation of Reinhard Heydrich. We have already
seen Heydrich as a prominent figure in the Einzelaktionen of 1938 and
in the concentration process within the German and Polish spheres.
However,
the
Heydrich
organization
did
not
assume
a
preeminent
place in the machinery of destruction until 1941. That year was crucial
for the development of the entire destruction process, for it was during
that period that Reinhard Heydrich laid the administrative foundations
for the mobile killing operations and for the deportations to the killing
centers.
The Heydrich organization reflected in its personnel composition a
characteristic of German government as a whole. The RSHA and its
regional machinery was an organization of party men and civil servants. The fusion of these two elements in the RSHA was so complete that almost every man could be sent into the field to carry out the most
drastic Nazi plans with bureaucratic meticulousness and Prussian discipline. This personnel amalgamation in the RSHA was accomplished over a period of years, in which Heydrich put his organization together
piece by piece.
The building process began in the early days of the Nazi regime,
when Himmler and his loyal follower Heydrich raided the Prussian
Interior Ministry and took over its newly organized Secret State Police
{Geheime Staatspolizei, or Gestapo). Goring was then Interior Minister
and Daluege the chief of police.1
2.
Testimony by Hans Bemd Gisevius, Trial of the Major War Criminals. XU, 168—
73, 181. Gisevius was in the Gestapo in 1933.
275
s
T A B L E 7 - 1
THE MILITARY MACHINE OF DESTRUCTION
Commander-in-Chief—
Chef. OKW. Keitel
of (he Armed Forces
Operations (Wehrmachtführungsstab—WFSlh Jodl
(Oberster Befehlshaber
Defense (Landesverteidigung—Lj, Warlimont
der Wehrmacht)
Propaganda (WPr), von Wedel
Hitler
Signals (Nachrichtenwesen—WNW), Fellgiebel
Intelligence (Amt Ausland-Abwehr), Canaris (Chief of Staff: Osler)
Ausland, Bürkner
Abwehr I, Pieckenbrock (Hansen)
Abwehr II, Lahouscn (von Freytag-Loringhoven)
Abwehr III. Bentivegny
Secret Field Police (GR*), Krichbaum
Economy-Armament Office (Wi RU), Thomas
Genera] Armed Forces Office (AWA). Reinecke
Prisoners of War, Breyer (von Graevenitz)
Armed Forces Sanitation (WSA). Handloser
Armed Forces Law, Lehmann
Commander-in-Chief
OKH
Commander-in-Chief
OKM
Commander-in-Chief - OKL
of the Army
Chief, Genera] Staff of the Army
of the Navy
of the Air Force
Chief,
(Oberbefehlshaber
Chief of
(Chef. GenStdH), Haider (Zeitzler, Guderianl
(Oberbefehlshaber
(Oberbefehlshaber
Genera]
des Heeres—OBdH)
Naval Warfare
Quartermaster
der Kriegsmarine)
(Chef der
der Luftwaffe)
Staff
von Brauchitsch
General (GenQu). Wagner
Raeder
Göring
of the
(Hitler)
Seekriegs-
Transport (HTr). Gercke
(Doenilz)
leitung)
Air Force
General for
Schniewindt
Jeschonnek
Special Purposes. Eugen Muller
(Fricke)
(Korten)
Army Personnel, Schmundt
Chief of Army Armament
and of the Replacement
Army (Chef, HRUst u.BdE), Fromm (Himmler)
General Army Office, Olbrichl
note: The table is based on the following affidavits: Affidavit by von Brauchitsch, November 7, 1945, PS-3703. Affidavit by Warlimont, October 12, 1946, NOKW-121. Affidavit by Warlimont, October31, 1946, NOKW-168. Affidavit by Jodi, September 26, 1946, NOKW-65. Affidavit by Bflrkner, January 22, 1946, Office of U. S. Chief of Counsel for Prosecution of Axis Criminality, Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression (Washington, D.C., 1946-48), VIII, 647-53. Affidavit by Keitel, June 15, 1945, Keitel-25. Affidavit by Wilhelm Krichbaum, June 7, 1948, NOKW-3460.
OKW (Oberkommando der Wehrmacht, or High Command of the Armed Forces)
OKH (Oberkommando der Heeres, or High Command of the Army)
OKM (Oberkommando der Kriegsmarine, or High Command of the Navy)
OKL (Oberkommando der Luftwaffe, or High Command of the Air Force)
In 1944 Amt Ausland-Ab^ehr was abolished. 1vo remnants of the office (Amt Ausiand, under Biirkner, and Amf Fronlaufkldrung und Truppenabwehr, under Silsskind-Schwendi) were subordinated to the WFSt under Jodi. Affidavit by Warlimont, October 12, 1946, NOKW-121. The Wi Ri) gave way to a Wehrwirtschaftsstab under Becker. Affidavit by Keitel, March 29, 1946, Keitel-11.
The Generalquartiermeister’s Office was divided into several sections, including a military government section (GenQu 4), which was placed outside of the GenstdH. Affidavit by Keitel, June 15, 194S, Keitel-25.
On unit level (army groups and below), the staff was organized as follows:
Chief of Staff of the unit
la
Operations
lb
Supply
(The designation lb was use
d in army groups and divisions. Supply officers at the army level were called Oberquartiermeister (OQu); at the corps level, Quartiermeister (Qu). See Army Manual 90: Supply of the Field Army. 1938, NOKW-2708.) 1c
Intelligence
Id
TVaining
Ha
Personnel (officers)
lib
Personnel (enlisted men)
III
Legal
IVa
Finance
IVb
Medical
IVc
Veterinary
IVd
Chaplains
IV WI Economic
V
Motor transport
VI
Indoctrination
VII
Military government
Only officers in I sections were "general staff" officers.
MOBILE KILLING OPERATIONS
Prussian Ministry of Interior
(later Reich Interior Ministry)
Minister: Goring (followed by Frick)
Staatssekretär: Grauert
Chief of Police: Daluege
Chief of Gestapo (in succession):
Diels, Hinkler, Diels, Himmler (deputized by Heydrich)
Next, Heydrich (as Himmler’s deputy) took over a special division in
the
office
of
the
police
president
of
Berlin:
the
Landeskriminal-
polizeiamt, or Criminal Police (Kripo).3 4 5 The Gestapo and the Criminal
Police were subsequently detached from their parent organizations and
joined together into the Hauptamt Sicherheitspolizei (Main Office Security Police). Heydrich had all key positions in this office:*
Chief of Security Police: Heydrich
Administration and Law: Dr. Best
Gestapo: Heydrich
Kripo: Heydrich
The creation of the Security Police as an agency of the state was
accompanied by the parallel formation of a party intelligence system,
the
so-called
Security
Service
( Sicherheitsdienst,
or
SD).
Heydrich
now had two main offices: the Hauptamt Sicherheitspolizei, which was
a state organization, and the Sicherheitshauptamt, which was a party
organization. On September 27, 1939, Himmler issued an order in pursuance of which the two main offices were amalgamated into the Reich Security Main Office ( Reichssicherheitshauptamt, or RSHA);! (as diagramed in Table 7-3.)
The organization of the RSHA is shown in abbreviated form in
Table 7-4. From this table we may observe that the RSHA revealed in
its structure the history of its organization. Thus the Security Police