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  comprised Offices IV and V (Gestapo and Kripo), while the Security

  3. Heydrich, “Aufgaben und Aufbau der Sicherheitspolizei im Dritten Reich." in

  Hans Pfundtner, ed„ Dr. Wilhelm Frick und sein Ministerium (Munich, 1937), p. 152.

  4. Dr. Ludwig Münz, Führer durch die Behörden und Organisationen (Berlin.

  1939), p. 95. For budgetary purposes the new Hauptamt was put under the Interior

  Ministry.

  5. Order by Himmler, September 27, 1939, L-361.

  278

  T A B L E 7 - 2

  THE TERRITORIAL ORGANIZATION OF THE ARMY

  Newly Invaded Areas

  Occupied Territories

  Types of

  Wehnnachtbefehls- Oberbefehls-

  Militärbefehls- Befehlshaber

  Kommandeur

  territorial

  haber(MB)

  rückwärtiges

  rückwärtiges

  command

  Befehlshaber

  Heeresgebiet

  Armeegebiet

  of specified

  (Korück)

  Deutscher

  General

  in specified

  Subordinated

  Oberbefehlshader

  ChefOKW

  Oberbefehls­

  Oberbefehls­

  Army Group

  des

  (Keitel)

  haber

  haber

  Commander

  Commander

  Commander

  Heeres/Befehls-

  des Heeres

  des Heeres

  haber

  (Brauchitsch,

  des Ersatz.·

  succeeded by

  a territorial

  keeres

  Hitler)

  Oberbefehls­

  ("Commander-

  haber

  in-Chief

  of the

  Army/the

  Commander

  Commander

  of the

  Replace-

  Fromm)

  note: The Wehrkreisbefehlshaber was the commander of an army district (designated by roman numeral). The WB, OR, or MB was the commander of a specified territory (such as the Ukraine, the Southeast, the Generalgouvemement). Sometimes a territorial command and a unit command (such as the OB Southeast and Commander of Army Group E) were united in the same person.

  MOBILE KILLING OPERATIONS

  T A B L E 7-3

  FORMATION OF THE RSHA

  Slate

  Party

  Gestapo

  Hauptamt

  Sicherheitspolizei

  Sicherheitshauptamt

  (Main Office Security Police)

  (Security Main Office)

  /

  Reichssicherheitshauptamt—RSHA

  (Reich Security Main Office)

  Service functioned in Offices III (Inland) and VI (Foreign).6 7 Heydrich

  himself henceforth carried the title Chef der Sicherheitspolizei und des

  SD, abbreviated Chef SP und SD.

  The RSHA had a vast regional network, including three types of

  organization: one in the Reich and incorporated areas, another in occupied territories, a third in countries undergoing invasion. This network is portrayed in Table 7-5. It will be noted that outside the Reich the Security Police and SD were completely centralized, down to the

  local (or unit) level. For the moment, however, we shall be concerned

  only with the machinery in the newly invaded areas: the so-called

  Einsatzgruppen. These groups were the first mobile killing units.’

  The context for deploying the Einsatzgruppen was operation “Barbarossa”—the invasion of the USSR. A written notation of the mission appeared

  in

  the

  war

  diary

  of

  the

  OKW’s

  Wehrmachtfiihrungsstab

  (WFSt) on March 3, 1941, at a time when invasion plans were already

  far advanced. The topic of the entry was a draft directive to troop

  commanders, which had been prepared by Warlimont’s office Landesverteidigung in the WFSt, and which had been submitted by WFSt 6. Office IV wad designated "Search for and Combat against Enemies" ICegner-Erforschung und Bekämpfung). Office V was “Combatting of Crime” (Verbrechensbekämpfung). Inland intelligence (Office III) styled itself "German Life Areas”

  (Deutsche Lebensgebiete).

  7. For a complete history of the Einsatzgruppen, see Helmut Krausnick and Hans-

  Heinrich Wilhelm, Die Truppe des Weltanschauungskrieges (Stuttgart, 1981). Part 1 (pp.

  12-279), by Krausnick, deals with the development and operations of the Einsatzgruppen

  as a whole. Part 2 (pp. 279-643), by Wilhelm, is a study of Einsatzgruppe A.

  PREPARATIONS

  Chief Jodi to Hitler for approval. The war diary contains Jodi’s enclosure of Hitler's comments, including a philosophical point defining the coming battle as a confrontation of two world views, and several

  specific statements, in one of which Hitler declared that the “Jewish-

  Bolshevik

  intelligentsia

  [Intelligenz]”

  would

  have

  to

  be

  “eliminated

  [beseitigt].” According to Hitler, these tasks were so difficult that they

  could not be entrusted to the army. The war diary went on with Jodi’s

  instructions to Warlimont for revising the draft in conformity with

  Hitler’s

  "guidelines.”

  One

  question

  to

  be

  explored

  with

  the

  Reichsfiihrer-SS, said Jodi, was the introduction of SS and Police organs in the army's operational area. Jodi felt that such a move was needed to assure that Bolshevik chieftains and commissars be “rendered harmless” without delay. In conclusion, Warlimont was told that he could contact the OKH about the revisions, and that he was to

  submit a new draft for signature by Keitel on March 13, 1941.*

  On the specified date, the revised directive was signed by Keitel.

  The decisive paragraph was a statement informing the troop commanders that the Führer had charged the Reichsfiihrer-SS with carrying out special tasks in the operational area of the army. Within the framework of these tasks, which were the product of a battle to the

  finish

  between

  two

  opposing

  political

  systems,

  the

  Reichsfuhrer-SS

  would act independently and on his own responsibility. He was going

  to make sure that military operations would not be disturbed by the

  implementation of his task. Details would be worked out directly between the OKH and the Reichsführer-SS. At the start of operations, the border of the USSR would be closed to all nonmilitary traffic,

  except for police organs dispatched by the Reichsführer-SS pursuant to

  directive of the Führer. Quarters and supplies for these organs were to

  be regulated by OKH/GenQu (High Command of the Army/General

  Quartermaster—Wagner).’ 8 9

  8. Kriegslagebuch des Oberkommandos der Wehrmacht fWehrmachtführungsslab)

  1940-1945, ed. Percy Schramm and Hans-Adolf Jacobsen (Frankfurt am Main, 1965),

  vol. 1. pp. 340-42.

  9. Directive by OKW/L (signed Keitel), March 13.1941, NOKW-2302. See also the

  detailed account by Walter Warlimont, Im Hauptquartier der deutschen Wehrmacht

  1959-1945 (Frankfurt am Main, 1962), pp. 166-87; and Waiiimont’s interrogation of October 25, 1962, by prosecution of Landgericht Munich II, Case Wolff, 10a Js 39/60, Z-Prot II/vol. 3, pp. 842-47, Zentrale Stelle der Landesjustizverwalt
ungen. Ludwigsburg.

  The use of mobile units as such was not unprecedented. See HSluf. Schellenberg to Obf.

  Jost, September 13, 1938, USSR-509, on committing two Einsatzstäbe to Czechoslovakia. Einsatzgruppen appeared in Poland in 1939, and small Security Police detachments were dispatched to the west in 1940. According to Streckenbach, Einsatzgruppen were

  planned for England, and two Kommandos were deployed in the Balkan campaign.

  Interrogation of Bruno Streckenbach, November 13, 1962, Case Wolff, Z-Prot. II/vol. 3,

  pp.977-87.

  T A B L E 7 - 4

  ORGANIZATION OF THE RSHA

  1941

  1943

  Chief of SP and SD

  OGruf. Heydrich

  OGruf. Dr. Kaltenbrunner

  Attache Group

  Stubaf. Dr. Plôtz

  1.

  Personnel

  Staf. Streckenbach

  I Personnel 4t Organization

  Bgf. Schulz

  II. Organization and Law

  Staf. Dr. Neckmann

  II Administration & Finance

  Staf. Prietzel

  IIA Organization and Law

  Stubaf. ORR. Dr. Bilfinger

  IIA I Organization

  HStuf. RcgAss. Dr. Schweder

  IIA 2 Legislation

  Stubaf. RR. Dr. Neifeind

  IIA 3 Indemnification

  Stubaf. RR. Suhr

  II A 4 Reich Defense

  Stubaf. RR. Renken

  IIA 3 Confiscations

  Stubaf. RR. Richter

  II B Passports

  Ministerialrat Krause

  IV F

  MinRat Krause

  IIC a Budget SP

  Staf. MinRat Dr. Siegen

  II Cb Budget SD

  OStubaf. Bracke

  IIA Finance

  OStubaf. ORR. Krekiow

  II D Technical Matters

  OStubaf. Rauff

  IIC

  OStubaf. ORR. Hafte

  III. SD-Inland

  Staf. Ohlendorf

  III A Legal Practice

  OStubaf. Dr. Gengenbach

  Deputizing:

  OStubaf. ORR. Neifeind

  III

  B Ethnos (Volksluml

  Staf. Dr. Ehlich

  IIIC Culture

  Stubaf. Dr. Spengler

  III D Economy

  Stubaf. Seibert

  IV. Gestapo

  Gruf. Müller

  Deputy for Border Police

  Staf. Krichbaum

  OStubaf. ORR. Huppenkothen

  IV A Enemies

  Ostubaf. ORR. Panzinger

  IV

  A I Communism

  Stubaf. KD. Vogt

  Stubaf. KD. Lindow

  IV A 2 Sabotage

  HStuf. KK. Kopkow

  IV

  A 3 Liberalism

  Stubaf. KD. Litzenbei

  IV A 4 Assassinations

  Stubaf. KD. Schulz

  IV B Sects

  Stubaf. Hart!

  IV B 1 Catholicism

  Stubaf. RR. Roth

  IV B 2 Protestantism

  Stubaf. RR. Roth

  IV B 3 Freemasonry

  IV B 4 Evacuations & Jews

  OStubaf. Eichmann

  IV C Card Files

  OStubaf. ORR. Dr. Rs

  IVD Spheres of Influence

  OStubaf. Dr. Weinmai

  IV E Counterintelligence

  Stubaf. RR. Schellenb

  IV EI Treason

  HStuf. KR. Lindow

  V.

  Kripo

  Bgf. Nebe

  V A Policy

  Staf. ORR. KR. Went

  V B Crimes (Eiiaalz)

  RR. KR. Galzow

  V C Identification

  ORR. KR. Berger

  V D Criminal Institute

  Stubaf. ORR. KR. He

  VI.

  SD-Forelgn

  Bgf. Jost

  VIA General

  OStubaf. Filbert

  VIB Gennan-ItaUan sphere

  vacant

  VID West

  vacant

  VIE Investigalroii

  Stubaf. Dt Knocben

  VIF Technical Mat

  OStubaf. Raaff

  VU. Ideology

  Staf. Dr. Sx

  VU B Evaluation

  Jews

  vacant

  note: Organization chart of the RSHA dating from 1941..

  the war. Panzmger (IV-A) took over the Kripo. Organization cli

  Deputizing:

  Stubaf. Roth

  Stubaf. RR. Hahnenbmch

  OStubaf. Wandesleben

  ng

  Deputizing:

  OStubaf. ORR. KR. Dr. Bemdorff

  in

  Staf. RD. Dr. Rang

  erg

  OStubaf. ORR. Huppenkothen

  Stubaf. ORR. Renken

  Stubaf. ORR. KR. Lobbes

  RR. KR. Schulze

  Obf. ORR. Schellenberg

  Stubaf. RR. Herbert Muller

  OStubaf. Steimle

  OStubaf. ORR. Dr. Graf

  Stubaf. RR. Dr. Raeflgen

  Stubaf. RR. Dr. Hammer

  Stubaf. Domer

  IV Wi Economy

  HStuf. Dr. Krallert

  IV S Special

  Stubaf. Skorzeny

  OStubaf. Dr. Dittel

  Deputizing:

  Stubaf. Ehlers

  HStuf. Ballensiefen

  L-185. Organization chart of the RSHA, October 1,1943, L-219. Before the end of

  iart of the Reich government in 194S, certified by Frick, PS-2903.

  MOBILE KILLING OPERATIONS

  Haider, Chief of the OKH, had been informed of Himmler’s “special task [ Sonderauftrag]” as early as March 5, and when the OKW

  directive was issued eight days later, he made a cryptic notation of a

  “Discussion Wagner-Heydrich: police questions, border customs.”10

  The

  circuitous

  Hitler-Jodl-Warlimont-Halder-Wagner-Heydrich

  chain of communications was certainly not the only one. Shorter and

  more direct was the route from Hitler to Himmler and from Himmler to

  Heydrich, but there is no record of instructions or “guidelines” passed

  through this channel during the first two weeks of March.

  The army’s correspondence goes on. It includes a draft of an agreement

  resulting

  from

  the

  Wagner-Heydrich

  negotiations.

  Dated

  March

  26, 1941, the Army-RSHA accord outlined the terms under which the

  Einsatzgruppen could operate in the occupied USSR. The crucial sentence in the draft provided that “within the framework of their instructions and

  upon

  their

  own

  responsibility,

  the

  Sonderkommandos

  are

  entitled to carry out executive measures against the civilian population

  [Die Sonderkommandos sind berechtigt, im Rahmen ihres Auftrages in

  eigener

  Verantwortung

  gegenüber

  der

  Zivilbevölkerung

  Exekutivmassnahmen zu treffen]." The two agencies also agreed that the mobile

  units could move in army group rear areas and in army rear areas. It

  was made clear that the Einsatzgruppen were to be administratively

  subordinated to the military command but that the RSHA was to retain

  functional control over them. The armies were to control the movements of the mobile units. The military was to furnish the Einsatzgruppen with

  quarters,

  gasoline,

  food

  rations,

  and,

  insofar

  as

  necessary, radio communications
. On the other hand, the killing units

  were to receive “functional directives” (fachliche WeisungenI from the

  Chief of the Security Police and SD (Heydrich) in this way:

  Commander in Chief

  of the Army

  (von Brauchitsch)

  territorial

  functional

  RSHA·

  Einsatzgruppen

  The relations of the Einsatzgruppen with the army’s Secret Field Police

  (Geheime Feldpolizei, or GFP) were to be based on a strict separation

  of jurisdictions. Any matter affecting the security of the troops was to

  be handled exclusively by the Secret Field Police, but the two services

  were

  to

  cooperate

  by

  prompt

  exchange

  of

  information,

  the

  Einsatzgruppen to report to the GFP on all matters of concern to it, and,

  10. Haider, Kriegstagebuch, ed. Jacobsen, vol. 2, pp. 303, 311.

  284

  T A B L E 7 - 5

  THE REGIONAL MACHINERY OF THE RSHA

  Reich

  Occupied Territories

  I/eroded Areas

  (Mobil* Unía)

  Inspekteure SP und SD

  Befehlshaber SP und SD Einsatzgruppen

  (IdS)

  (BdSI

  STAPOUeiOslellen

  KJUPOUeiiUiellen

  SDileiltabschniiie

  Kommandeure SP und SD Einsatzkommandos

  (Gestapo

  (Kripo directorates

  (SD directorates

  (KdS)

  directorates

  and offices)

  and sectors)

  Gestapo offices

  in small cities)

  Aussenslellen der

  (Haupt)aussensielle

  Sonderkommandos

  STAPO

  KRIPO dtr

  des SD

  SP und des SD

  (Field offices of

  (Field offices of

  (Main field offices

  (Field offices of

  the Gestapo)

  the Kripo)

  and field offices

  the SP and SD)

  of the SD)

  ■ : Based on affidavits by Hóttl and Ohlendorf, October 28,1945, PS-2364.

  MOBILE KILLING OPERATIONS

  conversely, the GFP to turn over to the Einsatzgruppen all information

  pertaining to their sphere of competence (Aufgabenbereich)."

  The final discussions between the army and the RSHA were carried out in May 1941. At first the negotiators were Generalquartiermeister Wagner and Gestapo chief Müller. The two could come to no

  final agreement. At the request of Wagner, Müller was therefore replaced

  by

  a

  subordinate,

  SS-Sturmbannführer

  Regiemngsrat

  Schellenberg, then chief of IV E. Schellenberg, who was chosen because of his

  experience in matters of protocol, drew up the final terms. They differed from the earlier draft in only one important respect. The Einsatzgruppen were to be permitted to operate not only in army group rear areas and army rear areas but also in the corps areas right on the

 

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