by The Destruction of the European Jews, Vol. 1-3 (Third Edition) Yale University Press (2003) (pdf)
front line. This concession was of great importance to the Einsatzgruppen, for the victims were to be caught as quickly as possible. They were to be given no warning and no chance to escape. The final version
of the agreement was signed at the end of May by Heydrich for the
RSHA and by Wagner for the OKH.11 12 The partnership was established.
The next step, so far as the RSHA was concerned, was the formation of the Einsatzgruppen. Mobile units were not kept on hand; they had to be formed anew for each new invasion. Accordingly, orders
were sent out to Security Police and SD men in the main office and
regional branches to proceed to the Security Police training center at
Pretzsch and from there to the assembly point at Düben.13 14
Altogether,
four
Einsatzgruppen
were
set
up,
each
of
battalion
size. The operational units of the Einsatzgruppen were Einsatzkommandos
and
Sonderkommandos,
of
company
size.
Einsatzgruppen
as
well as Kommandos had large staffs with sections representing the
Security Service, Gestapo, and Criminal Police.1* The number of
11. Texl of draft, dated March 26, 1941, enclosed in letter by Wagner to Heydrich.
April 4, 1941, copies to OKW/Abwehr (Canaris) and OKW/L (Warlimont), NOKW-256.
12. Affidavit by Scheilenberg, November 26, 194S, PS-3710. Statement by Ohlendorf, April 24, 1947, NO-2890. With reference to the task of the Einsatzgruppen, the final text was no more precise than the earlier one. However, it was generally understood that
Jews, Communist party functionaries, insane people, and a few others in undesirable
categories were to be killed on the spot. A copy of the final text is not available, and our
understanding of its terms derives mainly from the statements by Schellenberg and
Ohlendorf.
13. In the main, personnel were drawn from offices in which manpower could most
easily be spared. Interrogation of Streckenbach, Case Wolff, Z-Prot II/vot. 3, pp. 977-67.
For procedure of assignments in detail, see Krausnick, Die Truppe des Weltanschauungskrieges, pp. 141-50. Eichmann recalls having attended a large meeting in a movie house where the names of Einsatzkommando leaders were called out. See Eichmann's testimony at his trial, session 102, July 19, 1961, pp. Hl, II.
14. See breakdown of staffs in Einsatzgruppe A headquarters and in Einsatzkommando 2, as reproduced in Wilhelm, Die Truppe des Weitanschauungskrieges, pp. 290-93.
286
PREPARATIONS
T A B L E 7-6
OFFICERS OF EINSATZGRUPPEN AND KOMMANDOS
Einsatzgruppe A
Stahlecker (Jost)
Sonderkommando
la
Sandberger
Sonderkommando
lb
Ehrlinger (Strauch)
Einsatzkommando
2
R. Batz (Strauch, Lange)
Einsatzkommando
3
Jäger
Einsatzgruppe B
Nebe (Naumann)
Sonderkommando
7a
Blume (Steimle, Rapp)
Sonderkommando
Tb
Rausch (Ott, Rabe)
Sonderkommando
7c
Bock
Einsatzkommando
8
Bradfisch (Richter, Isselhorst, Schindhelm)
Einsatzkommando
9
Filbert (Schäfer, Wiebens)
Vorkommando Moskau
Six (Klingelhöfer)
Einsatzgruppe C
Rasch (Thomas)
Einsatzkommando
4a
Blobel (Weinmann, Steimle, Schmidt)
Einsatzkommando
4b
Herrmann (Fendler, F. Braune, Haensch)
Einsatzkommando
5
E. Schulz (Meier)
Einsatzkommando
6
Kröger (Mohr, Biberstein)
Einsatzgruppe D
Ohlendorf (Bierkamp)
Einsatzkommando
10a
Seetzen (Christmann)
Einsatzkommando
10b
Persterer
Einsatzkommando
lia
Einsatzkommando
tlb
B. Müller (W. Braune, P. Schulz)
Einsatzkommando
12
Nosske (Ministerialrat E. Müller)
b: RSHA IV-A-1, Operational Report USSR (No. 129, November 4, 1941, NO-
' 'it by Eugen Steimle, December 14, 1945, NO-3842. Affidavit by Adolf Ott,
7. NO-2992. Affidavit by Erwin Schulz, May 26, 1947, NO-3473. Affidavit
.......................................... 4, 1947, N0-4999.
mber 7, 1945. NO-
pp. 644-46. Emiren that is, they
irer, Obersturmbannführer. or Standartenführer (majors, lieutenant colonels, or colonels).
officers was much larger than in a military combat unit of comparable
size, and their ranks were higher. Table 7-6 lists the officers who commanded Einsatzgruppen and Kommandos.
Who were these men? Where did they come from? TVo of the
initial
Einsatzgruppen
commanders
were
taken
straight
from
the
RSHA:
Criminal
Police
Chief
Nebe
and
Chief
of
SD-Inland
Otto
Ohlendorf. The story of Ohlendorfs assignment sheds a great deal of
light on the attitude of the killers and, in a larger sense, on the whole
destruction process.
In 1941 Ohlendorf was a young man of thirty-four. He had studied
at three universities (Leipzig, Gottingen, and Pavia) and held a doctor's
degree in jurisprudence. As a career man he had successfully worked
287
MOBILE KILLING OPERATIONS
himself up to a research directorship at the Institute for World Economy and Maritime Transport in Kiel. By 1938 he was also Hauptgeschäftsführer in
the
Reichsgruppe
Handel,
the
German
trade
organization. Although Ohlendorf had joined the party in 1925, the SS
in 1926, and the SD in 1936, he regarded his party activities, and even
his position as chief of SD-Inland, as a sideline of his career. Actually,
he devoted only four years (1939-43) to full-time activity in the RSHA,
for in 1943 he became a Ministerialdirektor and deputy to the Staatssekretär in the Economy Ministry.15 16
Heydrich was a man who did not like subordinates with divided
loyalties.
Ohlendorf
was
too
independent.
Heydrich
wanted
no
one
who functioned ehrenamtlich (i.e., in an honorary capacity). The “executive measures” to be taken in Russia required complete and undivided attention. Thus it came about that the intellectual Otto Ohlendorf found himself in command of Einsatzgruppe D.“
A similar story can be told about Ernst Biberstein, who took over
Einsatzkommando 6 in Einsatzgruppe C in the summer of 1942. Biber-
stein was a somewhat older man, bom in 1899. He had been a private in
the First World War, and after his release from the army he devoted
himself to theology. In 1924 he became a Protestant pastor and in 1933
he rose to Kirchenprobst. After eleven years as a minister, Biberstein
entered the Church Ministry. In 1940 he was transferred to the RSHA.
This transfer should not be too surprising, for the Church Ministry was
an agency of the state. Besides, Biberstein had joined the party in 1926
and the SS in 1936.
But Biberstein was still a man of the church. When he was shown
around the offices of the RSHA, he developed some misgivings about
his new surroundings. Heydrich thereupon sent him to Oppeln to take
over the local Gestapo office. In this position Biberstein was already
drawn into the destruction process, because he had to concern himself
with the deportation of the Jews from the city of Oppeln to the killing
centers in the East. In the spring of 1942, Heydrich was assassinated
and Biberstein, no longer protected by his personal understanding with
the RSHA chief, was suddenly transferred to the field to conduct killings.17 18 19
Like Ohlendorf and Biberstein, the great majority of the officers of
the Einsatzgruppen were professional men. They included a physician
(Weinmann)," a professional opera singer (Klingelhöfer),15 and a large
15. Affidavit by Otto Ohlendorf, March 4, 1947, NO-2409.
16. Affidavit by Ohlendorf, July 14, 1946, SD(A)-44.
17. Interrogation of Emst Biberstein, June 29, 1947. NO-4997.
18. Affidavit by Eugen Steimle, December 14, 1945, NO-3842.
19. Affidavit by Waldemar Klingelhöfer, September 17, 1947, NO-5050.
288
PREPARATIONS
number of lawyers." These men were in no sense hoodlums, delinquents, common criminals, or sex maniacs. Most were intellectuals.
By and large, they were in their thirties, and undoubtedly they wanted
a certain measure of power, fame, and success. However, there is no
indication that any of them sought an assignment to a Kommando. All
we know is that they brought to their new task all the skills and training
that they were capable of contributing. These men, in short, became
efficient killers.
The total strength of the Einsatzgruppen was about 3,000 men. Not
all the personnel were drawn from the Security Police and SD. In fact,
most of the enlisted personnel had to be borrowed. A whole battalion
of Order Police was dispatched to the Einsatzgruppen from Berlin
because the Security Police could not put so many people into the
field.20 21 22 23 24 In addition, the Einsatzgruppen received Waffen-SS men.“ Finally, they rounded out their strength in the field by adding indigenous units of Lithuanians, Estonians, Latvians, and Ukranians as auxiliary
police. The resulting personnel composition is indicated in the following table showing a distribution of the members of Einsatzgruppe A:“
Waffen-SS.................................................. 340
Motorcycle riders....................................... 172
Administration............................................. 18
Security Service (SD).................................. 35
Criminal Police (Kripo)............................... 41
State Police (Stapo)..................................... 89
Auxiliary Police........................................... 87
Order Police............................................... 133
Female employees....................................... 13
Interpreters.................................................. 51
Teletype operators......................................... 3
Radio operators............................................. 8
Total....................................................... 990
Einsatzgruppe A, incidentally, was the largest group. The smallest was
Einsatzgruppe D, which had 400 to 500 men."
While the Einsatzgruppen were being assembled, a plenary meet-
20. See Wilhelm on Einsatzgruppe A, Die Truppe des Wellanschauungskrieges.
pp. 281-85.
21. Affidavit by Adolf von Bombard (Kommandoamt, Order Police), July 13, 1946.
SS(A)-82. In 1941 it was the 9th Bn., in 1942, the 3d. Hans-Joachim Neufeldt, Jurgen
Huck, and George Tessin, Zur Geschichte der Ordnungspolizei 1936-1945 (Koblenz,
1957), pt. II, p. 97; Krausnick, Die Truppe des Weitanschauungskrieges, pp. 146-47.
22. From 1st Bn. of dissolved I4th SS Inf. Reg. Krausnick, ibid.
23. Report by Einsatzgruppe A, October 15, 1941, L-180.
24. Affidavit by Ohlendorf, November 5. 1945, PS-2620.
MOBILE KILLING OPERATIONS
ing took place early in June, in the OKW building in Berlin. It was
attended
by
Canaris,
Wagner,
Heydrich,
Schellenberg,
and
a
large
number of Ic (intelligence) officers. This was the last opportunity to
plan for the close coordination of Einsatzgruppen and army activities.“
According
to
Ohlendorf,
the
commanders
of
the
Einsatzgruppen
were briefed by Himmler personally. They were informed that an important part of their task was the elimination (Beseitigung) of Jews—
women,
men,
and
children—and
of
Communist
functionaries.“
Standartenführer
Jäger
of
Einsatzkommando
3
recalls
a
meeting
of
about fifty SS leaders in Berlin, where Heydrich declared that in the
event of war with Russia the Jews in the east would have to be shot.
One of the Gestapo men asked: "We should shoot the Jews? [Wir
sollen die Juden erschiessen?]” Heydrich then answered: “Of course
[selbstverständlich).””
In
the
training
center
of
Pretzsch,
the
RSHA
personnel
chief
Streckenbach
addressed
the
Einsatzgruppen
members
in more general terms. He told them where they were going and instructed them to proceed ruthlessly (dass dort rücksichtslos durchgegriffen werden müsste).a At the beginning of June the four Einsatzgruppen assembled at
Düben.
After
speeches
by
Heydrich
and
Streckenbach,
the
mobile
killing units moved into position. Einsatzgruppe A was assigned to
Army Group North: Einsatzgruppe B was detailed to Army Group
Center; Einsatzgruppe C moved into the sector of Army Group South;
and Einsatzgruppe D was attached to the Eleventh Army, operating in
the extreme south. As the armies pushed over the first Soviet outposts,
the Einsatzgruppen followed, ready to strike. 25 26 27 28
25. Affidavit by Schellenberg, November 20, 1945, PS-3710.
26. Affidavit by Ohlendorf, November 5, 1945, PS-2620. Ohlendorf's veracity, and
that of others testifying about predeparture orders to kill Jews, has been called into
question by Alfred Streim, Die Behandlung sowjetischer
Kriegsgefangener im “Fall
Barbarossa" (Heidelberg, 1981), pp. 74-93.
27. Summary of interrogation of Karl Jäger, June 15, 1959, in Landeskrimmalamt
Baden-Württemberg, Sonderkommission/Zentrale Stelle, 1/3-2/59. Jäger committed
suicide on June 22,1959.
28. Affidavit by Wilhelm Förster (driver, Einsatzgruppe D), October 23, 1947, NO-
5520. The specificity of instructions seems to have been related to the ranks of those
addressed. See affidavit by Walter Blume, June 29, 1947, NO-4145, indicating that the
destruction of the Jews was mentioned to commanders of Kommandos by Heydrich and
Streckenbach, and affidavit by Robert Barth, September 12, 1947, NO-4992, recalling a
more general speech by Heydrich to the assembled men. See also Krausnick. Die Truppe
des Weltanschauungskrieges, pp. 150-72.
290
THE FIRST SWEEP
T H E F I R S T S W E E P
When the Einsatzgruppen crossed the border into the USSR, five million Jews were living under the Soviet flag. The majority of the Soviet Jews were concentrated in the western parts of the country. Four million were living in territories later overrun by the German army: Buffer Territories:'
Baltic area................................ 260,000
Polish territory....................... 1,350,000
Bukovina and
Bessarabia................. up to 30,000
up to 1,910,000
Old Territories:2
Ukraine (pre-1939
borders)............................. 1,533,000
White Russia (pre-1939
borders)................................ 375,000
RSFSR
Crimea.................................... 50,000
Other areas seized by
Germans........................... 200,000
ca. 2,160,000
About one and a half million Jews living in the affected territories fled
before the Germans arrived.
Not only were the Jews concentrated in an area within reach of the
German army, but they lived in the cities. Jewish urbanization in the
old USSR was 87 percent;5 in the buffer territories it was over 90
percent.* The following breakdown includes (aside from Moscow and
Leningrad)
only
localities
overrun
by
the
Germans.5
Generally,
the
figures, if not the percentages, had increased by 1939.
1. Rough approximations of estimates by American Joint Distribution Committee,
Report for 1939, pp. 31-38, and Report for 1940, pp. 19, 27.
2. Solomon M. Schwarz, The Jews in the Soviet Union (Syracuse, 1951), p. 15,
citing 1939 census figures for Ukraine and White Russia. Figures for RSFSR areas are