Raul Hilberg
Page 58
The initial concentrations were effected by the mobile units themselves. These ghettoizations were by-products of the killing operations in the sense that the Security Police were forced to defer the complete
annihilation of certain communities, either because they were too large
to be wiped out in one blow or (as Einsatzgruppe C explained the
situation) because “it could not be avoided, for reasons of a considerable skilled labor shortage, that Jewish workers who are needed for urgent reconstruction work, etc., be permitted to live temporarily
[wobei es sich nicht vermeiden Hess, aus Gründen des erheblichen
Facharbeitermangels jüdische Handwerker, die zur Vornahme dringender
Instandsetzungsarbeiten
usw.
gebraucht
werden,
vorerst
noch
am
Leben zu lassen].”* Within a short time, therefore, the Einsatzgruppen,
Higher SS and Police Leaders, and units of the BdS Kraköw introduced
marking
and
appointed
Jewish
councils.’
These
measures
were sometimes supplemented by registration, a task performed by the
newly organized councils.6 With the help of registration lists, the Einsatzgruppen put labor columns at the disposal of the army and the 4. RSHA IV-A-I, Operational Report USSR No. 135 (60 copies), November 19,
1941, NO-2832. Labor considerations prevailed also in the sector of Einsatzgruppe B.
RSHA IV-A-1, Operational Report USSR No. 94 (48 copies), September 25, 1941, NO-
3146. In the Ukraine, Einsatzgruppe C discovered Jewish collective farms ikolkhozy).
The Einsatzgruppe considered the Jewish kolkhozy workers to be unintelligent twenig
intelligent); therefore it "contented itself" with the shooting of the Jewish directors (who
were replaced by Ukrainians). The remainder of the Jewish labor force on the farms was
permitted to make a contribution to the harvest. RSHA IV-A-1, Operational Report
USSR No. 81 (48 copies), September 12, 1941, NO-3154.
5. RSHA Summary Report No. I, covering June22-July 31,1941, NO-2651. RSHA
Summary Report No. 3 (80 copies), covering August 15-31, 1941, NO-2653. RSHA IV-
A-1, Operational Report USSR No. 91, September 22, 1941, NO-3142, and other operational reports.
6. Report by Sonderkommando 11a (signed Stubaf. Zapp), covering August 18-31,
1941, NO-2066; OhlendorfviaGmeiner to 11th Army Ic/AO, September 8,1941, NOKW-
3234.
343
MOBILE KILLING OPERATIONS
Organisation Todt.’ In almost all large cities and many smaller ones, the
mobile killing units wedged the Jewish population into closed districts.
The
Polish-type
ghetto
thus
made
its
appearance
in
the
occupied
USSR.
One of the first ghettos was established in the Lithuanian capital of
Kaunas. To obtain the maximum cooperation of the local Jewish community, a committee of prominent Jews was summoned by the Einsatzgruppe to be informed, probably by Stahlecker himself, that the entire Jewish population of the city would have to move into the
Viliampole quarter, a relatively small district of old wooden buildings
without water mains or sewers, hemmed in by two rivers. When the
Jewish representatives tried to plead with the SS to desist from the
action, they were told that the establishment of a ghetto was the only
way to prevent new pogroms.1
When the civil administration took over part of the occupied territory in July and August of 1941, the mobile killing units had already completed a large part of the ghettoization process. Einsatzgruppe A
prided itself that, upon transfer of jurisdiction, it had already made
preparations for the incarceration in ghettos of all Jewish communities
7. RSHA IV-A-I. Operational Report USSR No. 43 (47 copies). August 5, 1941,
NO-2949. RSHA Summary Report No. 3 (80 copies), covering August 15-31, 1941, NO-
2653. Report by Sonderkommando 11a for August 18-31, 1941, NO-2066. Report by
Sonderkommando lia for August 22-Seplember 10, 1941, NOKW-636. RSHA IV-A-I,
Operational Report USSR No. 63 (48 copies), August 25, 1941, NO-4538. Ohlendorf via
Gmeiner to 11th Army Ic/AO, September 8, 1941, NOKW-3234. RSHA IV-A-1, Operational Report USSR No. 107 (50 copies), October 8, 1941, NO-3139. The Organisation Todt, first headed by Fritz Todt and then by Albert Speer, was engaged in construction
projects.
8. RSHA IV-A-1. Operational Report No. 19 (32 copies), July 11, 1941, NO-2934.
Stahlecker Report to October 15, 1941, L-180. A Jewish survivor, who was secretary of
the Jewish Council during the ghetto days, fixed the date of the meeting as July 7, 1941.
Statement by Avraham Tory (formerly Golub), July 6-8,1982, in warrant by Amtsgericht
Frankfurt am Main for the arrest of Helmut Rauca, July 16,1982,50/4 Js 284/71, through
the courtesy of the Canadian Department of Justice. See also Tory's diary and notes;
draft of ordinance by Lithuanian commandant of Kaunas (as of the end of June, Colonel
Bobelis) and Lithuanian mayor of the city (Paliiauskas). July 10, 1941, for the establishment of the Kaunas ghetto by August 15, 1941, including marking, movement restrictions, and provisions for liquidation of Jewish real estate, from Soviet archives through the courtesy of the U.S. Department of Justice; Jewish committee to German Security
Police, July 10, 1941, pleading for postponement of ghettoization order to enable Jews to
negotiate with Lithuanian offices for amelioration. Yad Vashem document 0-48/12-4; and
proclamation of ghetto, July 31, 1941, by Gebietskommissar Kauen-Stadt (Cramer),
affirming Lithuanian mayor's decree of July 10,1941, Amtsblalt des Generalkommtssars
in Kauen, November I, 1941, p. 2. For the extensive role of the Kaunas Lithuanian
municipality in ghettoization, see documents in Yad Vashem file 0-48/12-4 and in Soviet
archives.
344
THE INTERMEDIARY STAGE
(excepting only Vilna).’ However, the systematic concentration of the
Jews was the task of the military and civilian authorities, which exercised
overall
governmental
functions
in
the
occupied
territories.
To
understand what happened during the intermediary stage and the second sweep, which was to follow, we therefore need a rough outline of that administration.
Newly occupied areas were always placed under a military government. Secured areas were held by Befehlshaber (that is, a Wehrmachtbefehlshaber, Militärbefehlshaber,
or
Befelshaber
of
a
specified
region). Moving toward the front, a traveler would pass through the
army group rear area, army rear area, and corps area. In occupied
Russia the territorial organization of the army was extensive in its
dimensions (see Table 7-9 and Map 4).
On the map the “military area” refers to the territory of the three
army groups (including army group rear areas, army rear areas, and
corps
areas).
The
secured
territory,
under
the
two
Wehrmachtbefehlshaber,
corresponded
&nbs
p; roughly
to
the
areas
marked
“Ost-
land” and “Ukraine." These two areas were colonies governed by a
colonial
minister:
Reichsminister
für
die
besetzten
Ostgebiete
(Reich
Minister
for
the
Eastern
Occupied
Territories)
Alfred
Rosenberg,
whose office was in Berlin. His two colonial governors were called
Reichskommissare; they had their headquarters in the east (Riga and
Rovno). The domain of the Reichskommisar was the Reichskommissariat
(the
Reichskommissariat
Ostland
and
the
Reichskommissariat
Ukraine).
Each
Reichskommissariat
was divided
into
general districts
(Generalbezirke),
and
each
Generalbezirk
was
divided
into
regions
(Kreisgebiete).
The
chief
of
the
Generalbezirk
was
a
Generalkommissar; the chief of a Kreisgebiet was a Gebietskommissar.'" Below is an abbreviated list showing the most important offices in the ministry, the
two Reichskommissariate, and the Generalbezirke.
Ministry for Eastern Occupied Territories (Berlin)"
Reichsminister, Dr. Alfred Rosenberg
Staatssekretär, Gauleiter Alfred Meyer
Chief, Political Division, Reischsamtsleiter Dr. Georg Leibbrandt
Deputy Chief, Political Division, Generalkonsul Dr. Bräutigam
Expert in Jewish Affairs, Amtsgerichtsrat Dr. Wetzel 9 10 11
9. RSHA IV-A-I, Operational Report USSR No. 94 (48 copies), September 25,
1941. NO-3146.
10. In White Russia there was a level between Generalbezirk and Kreisgebiet: the
Hauptgebiet, which was governed by a Hauptkommlssar. Major cities were governed by
a Stadtkommissax. The Stadtkommissar was not subordinate but equal in rank to a
Gebietskommissar.
11. Memorandum by Rosenberg, April 29, 1941, PS-1024.
345
I
T A B L E 7-9
THE TERRITORIAL ORGANIZATION OF THE ARMY IN THE OCCUPIED USSR
Commanding
Army Group
4
Corps
Authority
ChefOKW
Commander
Comm
Commander
|
1
Territorial
Army Group Rear Area
Army Rear Area
Commander
Wehrmachtbefehlshaber
Commander
Commander
(Ostland and Ukraine)
(North, Center, South)
(Kor jck)
Lower Territorial
(Secured areas under
Sicherungsdivisionen
Echelons
civilian control: no
(security divisions)
military government
2-3 per Army Group
functions)
Feldkommandanturen
Feldkommajidanturen
(district commands)
Ortskommandanturen
Ortskommandanturen
(town commands)
MAP 4
ADMINISTRATION OF THE OCCUPIED USSR
Intatnaftonal bound·«··
347
MOBILE KILLING OPERATIONS
Reichskommissariat Ostland”
Reichskommissar, Gauleiter Hinrich Lohse
Chief, Political Division, RegRat Dr. Trampedach
Generalkommissar, Estonia, SA-OGruf. Litzmann
Generalkommissar, Latvia, Oberbürgermeister (Mayor) Staatsrat Dr.
Drechsler
Generalkommissar, Lithuania, Reichsamtsleiter Dr. von Rentein
Generalkommissar, White Russia, Gauleiter Wilhelm Kube (succeeded
by SS-Gruf. von Gottberg)
Reichskommissariat Ukraine11
Reichskommissar, Gauleiter Erich Koch
Chief, Political Division, Regierungspräsident Dargel
Generalkommissar, Volhynia-Podolia, SA-OGruf. Schöne
Generalkommissar, Zhitomir, Regierungspräsident Klemm
Generalkommissar, Nikolaev, Oppermann (OGruf. in NSKK-Party
Motor Corps)
Generalkommissar, Kiev, Gauamtsleiter Magunia (official in DAF-
German Labor Front)
Generalkommissar, Dnepropetrovsk, Selzner (DAF)
Generalkommissar, Crimea-Tauria, Gauleiter Frauenfeld
As a brief glance at the list will indicate, most of the high officials in
the Rosenberg apparatus were party men." The machinery as a whole
was
rather
small.
In
the
Ukraine,
for
example,
the
entourage
of
Reichskommissar Koch, composed of 800 Germans at its height, was
fixed in 1942 at 252.15 16 At the same time, the office force of a Generalkommissar consisted of about 100 Germans, while the personnel of a Gebietskommissar numbered no more than about a half-dozen German
bureaucra12 13 ts.14 In other words, the occupied territories were run by a
handful of party men, not very efficiently but all the more ruthlessly.
12. Lammers to Rosenberg, July 18. 19*1, NG-1325. Deutsche Zeitung im Ostland
(passim). For a list of Gebietskommissare in Ostland as of February l, 19*2, see T 459,
roll 24.
13. Deutsche Ukraine Zeitung (passim). The Generalbezirke Dnepropetrovsk and
Crimea-Tauria (both east of the Dnieper river) were added in August, 1942. The Crimean
Generalbezirk (seat, Melitopol) never included the Crimean peninsula, which remained
under military control. For a list of Gebietskommissare as of March 13, 1942, see ORPO
compilation (signed by Winkelmann) of that date, NO-2546.
14. Originally, it was intended that the leadership of the Eastern Occupied Territories the Ostfuhrerkorps, as it was called—should have the following composition: party men. 35 percent; SS, SA, and party organizations. 20 percent; agricultural and
industrial experts and others, 45 percent. See report by Dr. Hans-Joachim Kausch (journalist) June 26, 1943, Occ E 4-11.
15. Koch to Rosenberg, March 16, 1943, PS-192.
16. Report by Kausch, June 26, 1943, Occ E 4-11.
348
THE INTERMEDIARY STAGE
Before we leave the administration of the occupied USSR, a word
is
due
about
the
territories
west
of
the
two
Reichskommissariate.
There were three such areas: the Bialystok district, Galicia, and the
Romanian
territories.
The
Bialstok
area
became
a
quasi-incorporated
district of the Reich. It was placed under the administration of Gauleiter Koch, the Reichskommissar of the Ukraine—not in his capacity as Reichskommissar but as an adjunct to his position as Gauleiter and
Oberprasident of the neighboring Gau and province of East Prussia.'7
Southeastern Pol
and (Galicia) became the fifth district of the General-
gouvernement." Northern Bukovina and Bessarabia reverted to Romanian rule, whereas the area between the Dniester and the Bug became a new Romanian territory, “Transnistria.”1’
In anticipation of a second sweep, the primary task of both military
and civil administrations was the establishment of ghettos. In its very
nature, the ghetto was to prevent the dispersal of the victims and to
facilitate their future seizure for shootings. Reichskommissar Lohse of
the Ostland explained the purpose of the ghetto in ponderous but explicit language. His basic ghettoization order states: These provisional directives are designed only to assure minimum
measures by the Generalkommissare and Gebietskommissare in those
areas where—and so long as—further measures in the sense of the final
solution of the Jewish question are not possible.”
Thus the function of these ghettos, unlike those established in the
Generalgouvemement during the preceding year and a half, was to be
neither open-ended nor ambiguous. The goal was in sight from the
start.
From the summer of 1941, the military issued an avalanche of
orders providing for marking (in the form of either armbands or patches
worn in front and back), registration, Judenrate, ghettos, and ghetto
police.71 Interestingly enough, the army did not always regard the crea- 17 18 19 20 21
17. Decree (signed by Hitler, Keitel, and Lammers), July 17, 1941, NG-1280.
18. Dr. Max Freiherr von du Prel, Das Generalgouvemement (WUrzburg, 1942),
p. 363.
19. Agreement of Tighina. signed by Generals Hauffe and TStartnu. August 30.
1941, PS-3319. The Romanian governor was Gheorge Alexianu. Romanian currency was
not introduced into the territory and, under the terms of the agreement, its railway
system was placed under German control.
20. Wetzel to Foreign Office, May 16, 1942, enclosing Lohse directive of August 19,
1941, Generalkommissare NG-4815.
21. Order by Commander of Army Group Rear Area South (von Roques) (33
copies), July 21, 1941, NOKW-1601. Order by von Roques, August 28, 1941, NOKW-
1586. Order by Commander of Army Group Rear Area North/VII (signed by Oberslleut-
nant Muller-Teusler) (about 65 copies), September 3, 1941, NOKW-2204. Order by 454th
Security Division/Ia, September 8, 1941, NOKW-2628. Ortskommandantur in Dzankoy
(signed Hauptmann Weigand) to Commander of Area 553 (1 Ith Army), November 10,
349
MOBILE KILLING OPERATIONS
tion of ghettos as a task of great urgency. They were not to take precedence over genuinely military matters.”
By 1942 the military regulations were standardized and codified.
Instructions issued by the Oberquartiermeister of Army Group Center