Raul Hilberg
Page 59
in regard to Jewish affairs take up several pages and include all of the
following: Jews were members of the Jewish religion or those descended from three Jewish grandparents. Mixed marriages with non-Jews were prohibited. In registration lists of local inhabitants, Jews
who had been added after June 22, 1941, were to be noted with a J.
Identity cards of Jews over sixteen years of age were to be marked with
a J. Jews aged ten or older were to be marked with a 10-centimeter
yellow patch. The Jews themselves were to provide for patches and
armbands. Greetings by Jews were prohibited. Jewish councils were to
be installed. In the event of any infraction by a Jew, the Feldkomman-
danturen and Ortskommandanturen were to proceed with the heaviest
penalties, including death, not only against the culpable person but also
against council members. Jews were to reside in cities and towns that
were their homes before the war. Free movement was forbidden, and
ghettos or Jewish quarters were to be established, from which non-
Jews were to be barred. A Jewish Ordnungsdienst armed with rubber
or wooden sticks was to be created in each ghetto. Towns and cities
could
take
over
and
administer
Jewish
property
under
trusteeship.
Jews were not to engage in trade with non-Jews without the explicit
consent of German offices. Forced labor was to be instituted for Jewish
men aged fifteen to sixty and for Jewish women aged sixteen to fifty.
Local mayors and Jewish councils were to be held responsible for their
recruitment, but the utilization of Jewish labor was to be undertaken
only if non-Jewish manpower was unavailable. No wages were to be
paid in excess of 80 percent of rates earned by unskilled workers, and
the cost of meals was to be deducted from the pay. The bodies of Soviet
soldiers and cadavers of animals were to be buried immediately, and
the Ortskommandanturen could employ Jews for this purpose. As for
Gypsies, those found roaming about who did not have a fixed domicile
for at least two years were to be handed over to the Security Police,
and their horses and carts were to be retained by the army.” 22 23
1941, NOKW-1582. 299th Inf. Division/Ic lo XXIX Corps/Ic, November 29, 1941,
NOKW-1517. Draft of Proclamation of XLII Corps/Ia, December 11,1941, NOKW-1682.
Order by 101 st Light Inf. Division/Ic, May 24, 1942, NOKW-2699. Draft directive by
299th Division Ia/Ic, October 1,1942, NOKW-3371.
22. Order by von Roques, August 28, 1941 NOKW-1586. Order by Rear Army
Group Area North, September 3, 1941, NOKW-2204.
23. Military government ordinances (Miliiärverwaltungsanordnungen) by Army
Group Center, OQu VII, document Heeresgruppe Mitte 75858, located during postwar
years at Federal Records Center, Alexandria, Va.
350
THE INTERMEDIARY STAGE
The civil administration was even more preoccupied with ghettoi-
zation,
and
therefore
the
“provisional
directives”
of
Reichskommissar
Lohse, and especially those of his subordinates, are a little more detailed than the military orders. In the directive of Generalkommissar von Renteln (Lithuania), for example, we find, in addition to the regular instructions, such points as these: All telephones and telephone lines were to be ripped out of the ghetto. All postal services to and from
the ghetto were to be cut off. Whenever ghetto bridges had to be built
over thoroughfares, the bridges were to be enclosed with barbed wire
to prevent people from jumping down. With an eye to the future, von
Renteln ordered that Jews be forbidden to tear down doors, window
frames, floors, or houses for fuel.” A draft directive of the Generalkommissar in Latvia specified a proposed occupancy of four Jews per room and, among other things, prohibited smoking in the ghetto.“
While the directives of the civil administration were more elaborate than those of the military, they were not published in any proclamations or
decrees.
In
an
extraordinary
attempt
at secrecy,
Lohse
ordered his subordinates to “get by with oral instructions to the Jewish
councils.”“
Not only were the Kommissare very interested in ghetto administration;
they
also
developed a feeling of proprietorship toward the
Jewish districts. During the second sweep this feeling was to have
administrative repercussions, but even during the intermediary stage it
gave rise to difficulties.
On
October
11,
1941,
the
Generalkommissar
of
Latvia,
Dr.
Drechsler, was sitting in his private apartment in Riga when a visitor
arrived:
Brigadeführer
Dr.
Stahlecker,
chief
of
Einsatzgruppe
A.
Stahlecker
informed
his
surprised
host
that,
in
accordance
with
a
“wish” of the Führer, a “big concentration camp” was to be established
near Riga for Reich and Protektorat Jews. Could Drechsler help out
with necessary materials?17
Drechsler was now in a position similar to Regierungspräsident
Uebelhoer, who had been fighting about the L6di ghetto against the all-
powerful Himmler. Like Uebelhoer, Drechsler was to be the recipient
of tens of thousands of Jews who were sent from the Reich-Protektorat
area to some form of destruction in the East. The late fall months of
1941 were a transition period during which deportations were already
under way, but killing centers had not yet been established. The Ost- 24 25 26 27
24. Order by von Renteln, August 26.1941. Occ E 3-19. See also materials on Vilna
ghettoization in B. Baranauskas and K. Ruksenas, Documents Accuse (Vilnius, 1970),
pp. 217-18, 166-67.
25. Draft directive signed by Bönner, undated. Occ E 3-20.
26. Lohse directive. August 18, 1941, NG-1815.
27. Drechsler to Lohse, October 20, 1941, Occ E 3-29.
351
MOBILE KILLING OPERATIONS
land was looked over for possible sites while transports were shoved
east. In fact, on October 21, 1941, Sturmbannführer Lange of the Einsatzgruppe telephoned Dr. Drechsler to report that the killing unit was planning to set up a camp for 25,000 Reich Jews about fourteen miles
from Riga.“
By October 24, Reichskommissar Lohse was drawn into the picture.
With
Drechsler,
Lohse
complained
to
Lange
that
the
Einsatzgruppe had contacted Drechsler not to discuss the matter but to
inform him of developments. Lange repeated that higher orders were
involved and that the first transport was due on November 10. Lohse
replied that he was going to discuss the whole ques
tion in Berlin on
October 25."
By November 8, 1941, Lange sent a letter to Lohse, reporting that
50.000 Jews were on the move. Twenty-five thousand were due in Riga,
25.000 in Minsk. A camp was being built at Salaspils, near Riga.“ Since
the Reichskommissar was in Berlin, his political expert, Regierungsrat
Trampedach,
wrote
to
the
capital
to
urge
that
the
transports
be
stopped.” The chief of the ministry’s Political Division, Dr. Leib-
brandt, replied that there was no cause for worry, since the Jews would
be sent “farther east” anyway (that is, they would be killed).“
At the time of these tense discussions, more than 30,000 Jews were
still alive in Riga. The city’s Jewish community, one of the most prosperous in Eastern Europe, had experienced a brush with death during the opening days of the German occupation, but for several months
thereafter it was to remain intact. The German army was busily engaged in exploiting Jewish workers and in requisitioning Jewish-owned furniture.
The
Generalkommissar’s
labor
expert,
Oberkriegsverwaltungsrat Dorr, was reaching out for control of the Jewish labor supply,
and
the
Generalkommissar’s
chief
of
finance,
Regierungsrat
Dr.
Neuendorff, deputized the Gebietskommissar’s office to assess all the
registered
Jewish
property
with
a
view
to
its
confiscation.”
Dorr
wanted a ghetto, and after some preparations it was put into place.“
Then, in the middle of labor allocations and the taking of inventory, 28 29 30 31 32 33 34
28. Unsigned notation, October 21, 1941, Occ E 3-29.
29. Memorandum, office of the Reichskommissar, October 27,1941, Occ E 3-30.
30. Stubaf. Lange to Reichskommissar Ostland, November 8, 1941, Occ E 3-31.
31. TVampedach to ministry, copy for Lohse at Hotel Adlon in Berlin, November 9,
1941. Occ E 3-32.
32. Leibbrandt to Reichskommissar Ostland, November 13, 1941, Occ E 3-32.
33. See correspondence in T 459, rolls 21 and 23.
34. Dorr to Feldkommandantur and other offices, September 15, 1941, T 459, roll
23. The Feldkommandant was Generalmajor Bamberg. Orders of the Gebietskommissar
establishing a ghetto as of October 25, in his letter to the Generalkommissar, October 30,
1941, T 459, rolls 21 and 23. The Gebietskommissar of the city of Riga was Oberbürgermeister Wittrock.
352
THE INTERMEDIARY STAGE
Higher SS and Police Leader Jeckeln assembled his forces and struck
without
warning
in
two
waves—on
November
29-December
1
and
December 8-9, killing 27,800 Jews.” Space had now been created for
transports from Germany inside the ghetto itself.“
In a matter of days a double ghetto was created within the ghetto
fence. All but a few thousand Latvian Jews were dead, and most of the
German Jews were moved in. The new arrivals found apartments in
shambles, and some of the furnishings bore traces of blood.” That
winter fires flared in abandoned buildings,” pipes froze,” and epidemics raged unchecked.* In the months and years ahead, the German Jews, in labor camps and the ghetto, were whittled down to a handful
of survivors.
Meanwhile, other transports were arriving in Kaunas and Minsk.
Five thousand Jews from the Reich and the Protektorat were shot in
Kaunas by the efficient personnel of Einsatzkommando 3 on November 25 and 29.*' At Minsk the numbers were larger, and the correspon-35. The figure is given in an undated report of Einsatzgruppe A, PS-2273. See also
Max Kaufmann, Die Vernicklung der Juden in Lettland (Munich, 1947), and Gertrude
Schneider, Journey into Terror (New York, 1979), pp. KM5. On the involvement of
Latvian auxiliaries in the massacre, see E. Avotins, J. Dzirkalis, and V. Petersons.
Daugavas Vanagi—Who Are They? (Riga, 1963), pp. 22-24. The Jewish historian Simon
Dubnov was among those killed on December 8. On the suddenness of this "turn of
events” ( Wendung) for the German civil administration, see correspondence in T 459,
roll 21.
36. A transport from Berlin, the first to be directed to the Riga area, departed on
November 27. Three days later the victims were unloaded in the Rumbula forest and
shot. Schneider, Journey, pp. 14-15, 155. A telephone log kept by Heinrich Himmler in
his own handwriting at the Wolfschanze (Hitler's headquarters) contains a cryptic note
about a conversation with Heydrich at 1:30 p.m. on November 30. Five words of the
entry are: “Judentransport aus Berlin. Keine Liquidierung. [Jewish transport from Berlin. No liquidation.]" Facsimile in David Irving, Hitler's War (New York, 1977), p. 505.
Riga is not mentioned, but no other transport left Berlin during November 27-30. and on
December I there was another Himmler-Heydrich conversation about "executions in
Riga" (Exekutionen in Riga). See Martin Broszat, "Hitler und die Genesis der
Endlösung,” Vierteljahrshefte für Zeitgeschichte 25 (1977): 760-61. The veto, possibly
prompted by arguments from the Reichskommissariat, had evidently been without effect. Most subsequent transports, however, were not killed off immediately.
37. Affidavit by Alfred Winter, October 15, 1947 NO-5448. Winter, a Jewish survivor, was a deportee.
38. Gebietskommissar, city of Riga, via Generalkommissar to Reichskommissar,
December 30, 1941, enclosing report of fire chief Schleicher of the same date, T 459, roll
3.
39. Gebietskommissar via Generalkommissar to Reichskommissar, January 27,
1942, T 459, roll 3.
40. Reichskommissar’s Office (Health to Ministerialdirigent Frilndt on the premises, February 7,1942, enclosing report of Medizinalrat Dr. Ferdinand, February 3, 1942, T 459, roll 3.
41. Report by Staf. Jäger, December 1, 1941, Zentrale Stelle Ludwigsburg, UdSSR
108, film 3, pp. 27-38.
353
MOBILE KILLING OPERATIONS
dence
became
longer.
The
Wehrmachtbefehlshaber
in
the
Ostland
protested against the arrivals on purely military grounds. The German
Jews, he pointed out, were far superior in intelligence to White Russian
Jews; hence there was danger that the “pacification'’ of the area would
be jeopardized. Furthermore, Army Group Center had requested that
no trains be wasted on Jews. All railroad equipment was needed for the
supply of military matériel.42 43
The protest of the Wehrmachtbefehlshaber in the Ostland was followed on December 16,1941, by a letter from the Generalkommissar of White Russia, Gauleiter Kube. That letter was the first in a series of
letters and protests by this official that were to shake at the foundations
of the Nazi idea. It was addressed to Lohse personally (Mein lieber
Hinrich)."
Kube pointed out that about 6,000 to 7,000
Jews had arrived in
Minsk; where the other 17,000 to 18,000 had remained he did not know.
Among the arrivals there were World War I veterans with the Iron
Cross (both First and Second Class), disabled veterans, half-Aryans,
and even a three-quarter Aryan. Kube had visited the ghetto and had
convinced himself that among the Jewish newcomers, who were much
cleaner than Russian Jews, there were also many skilled laborers who
could produce about five times as much as Russian Jews. The new
arrivals would freeze to death or starve to death in the next few weeks.
There were no serums to protect them against twenty-two epidemics in
the area.
Kube himself did not wish to issue any orders for the treatment of
these Jews, although "certain formations” of the army and the police
were already eyeing the personal possessions of these people. The SD
had already taken away 400 mattresses—without asking. “I am certainly hard and I am ready,” continued Kube, “to help solve the Jewish question, but people who come from our cultural milieu are certainly
something else than the native animalized hordes. Should the Lithuanians and the Latvians—who are disliked here, too, by the population—be charged with the slaughter? I could not do it. I ask you, consider the honor of our Reich and our party, and give clear instructions to take care of what is necessary in a form which is humane.”
On
January
5,
1942,
the
Stadtkommissar
(city
equivalent
of
Gebietskommissar)
of
Minsk,
Gauamtsleiter
Janetzke,
going
over
the
heads of Kube and Lohse, addressed a letter to Rosenberg personally.
Janetzke had just been informed by the SS and Police that an additional
50,000
Jews were due from the Reich. In bitter language he pointed out
42. Wehrmachtbefehlshaber Ostland/Ic to Reichskommissar Ostland, November
20,1941 Occ E 3-34. The Wehrmachtbefehlshaber was Git. Braemer.
43. Kube to Lohse, December 16, 1941, Occ E 3-36.
354
THE INTERMEDIARY STAGE
that Minsk was a heap of rubble that still housed 100,000 inhabitants.
In addition, there were 15,000 to 18,000 Russian Jews and 7,000 Reich
Jews. Any further arrival of transports would bring about a catastrophe.“
The Jewish expert in the ministry, Amtsgerichtsrat Wetzel, replied
to the letter by addressing himself to Reichskommissar Lohse. Originally, wrote Wetzel, it had been intended to send 25,000 Jews to Minsk.