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  in regard to Jewish affairs take up several pages and include all of the

  following: Jews were members of the Jewish religion or those descended from three Jewish grandparents. Mixed marriages with non-Jews were prohibited. In registration lists of local inhabitants, Jews

  who had been added after June 22, 1941, were to be noted with a J.

  Identity cards of Jews over sixteen years of age were to be marked with

  a J. Jews aged ten or older were to be marked with a 10-centimeter

  yellow patch. The Jews themselves were to provide for patches and

  armbands. Greetings by Jews were prohibited. Jewish councils were to

  be installed. In the event of any infraction by a Jew, the Feldkomman-

  danturen and Ortskommandanturen were to proceed with the heaviest

  penalties, including death, not only against the culpable person but also

  against council members. Jews were to reside in cities and towns that

  were their homes before the war. Free movement was forbidden, and

  ghettos or Jewish quarters were to be established, from which non-

  Jews were to be barred. A Jewish Ordnungsdienst armed with rubber

  or wooden sticks was to be created in each ghetto. Towns and cities

  could

  take

  over

  and

  administer

  Jewish

  property

  under

  trusteeship.

  Jews were not to engage in trade with non-Jews without the explicit

  consent of German offices. Forced labor was to be instituted for Jewish

  men aged fifteen to sixty and for Jewish women aged sixteen to fifty.

  Local mayors and Jewish councils were to be held responsible for their

  recruitment, but the utilization of Jewish labor was to be undertaken

  only if non-Jewish manpower was unavailable. No wages were to be

  paid in excess of 80 percent of rates earned by unskilled workers, and

  the cost of meals was to be deducted from the pay. The bodies of Soviet

  soldiers and cadavers of animals were to be buried immediately, and

  the Ortskommandanturen could employ Jews for this purpose. As for

  Gypsies, those found roaming about who did not have a fixed domicile

  for at least two years were to be handed over to the Security Police,

  and their horses and carts were to be retained by the army.” 22 23

  1941, NOKW-1582. 299th Inf. Division/Ic lo XXIX Corps/Ic, November 29, 1941,

  NOKW-1517. Draft of Proclamation of XLII Corps/Ia, December 11,1941, NOKW-1682.

  Order by 101 st Light Inf. Division/Ic, May 24, 1942, NOKW-2699. Draft directive by

  299th Division Ia/Ic, October 1,1942, NOKW-3371.

  22. Order by von Roques, August 28, 1941 NOKW-1586. Order by Rear Army

  Group Area North, September 3, 1941, NOKW-2204.

  23. Military government ordinances (Miliiärverwaltungsanordnungen) by Army

  Group Center, OQu VII, document Heeresgruppe Mitte 75858, located during postwar

  years at Federal Records Center, Alexandria, Va.

  350

  THE INTERMEDIARY STAGE

  The civil administration was even more preoccupied with ghettoi-

  zation,

  and

  therefore

  the

  “provisional

  directives”

  of

  Reichskommissar

  Lohse, and especially those of his subordinates, are a little more detailed than the military orders. In the directive of Generalkommissar von Renteln (Lithuania), for example, we find, in addition to the regular instructions, such points as these: All telephones and telephone lines were to be ripped out of the ghetto. All postal services to and from

  the ghetto were to be cut off. Whenever ghetto bridges had to be built

  over thoroughfares, the bridges were to be enclosed with barbed wire

  to prevent people from jumping down. With an eye to the future, von

  Renteln ordered that Jews be forbidden to tear down doors, window

  frames, floors, or houses for fuel.” A draft directive of the Generalkommissar in Latvia specified a proposed occupancy of four Jews per room and, among other things, prohibited smoking in the ghetto.“

  While the directives of the civil administration were more elaborate than those of the military, they were not published in any proclamations or

  decrees.

  In

  an

  extraordinary

  attempt

  at secrecy,

  Lohse

  ordered his subordinates to “get by with oral instructions to the Jewish

  councils.”“

  Not only were the Kommissare very interested in ghetto administration;

  they

  also

  developed a feeling of proprietorship toward the

  Jewish districts. During the second sweep this feeling was to have

  administrative repercussions, but even during the intermediary stage it

  gave rise to difficulties.

  On

  October

  11,

  1941,

  the

  Generalkommissar

  of

  Latvia,

  Dr.

  Drechsler, was sitting in his private apartment in Riga when a visitor

  arrived:

  Brigadeführer

  Dr.

  Stahlecker,

  chief

  of

  Einsatzgruppe

  A.

  Stahlecker

  informed

  his

  surprised

  host

  that,

  in

  accordance

  with

  a

  “wish” of the Führer, a “big concentration camp” was to be established

  near Riga for Reich and Protektorat Jews. Could Drechsler help out

  with necessary materials?17

  Drechsler was now in a position similar to Regierungspräsident

  Uebelhoer, who had been fighting about the L6di ghetto against the all-

  powerful Himmler. Like Uebelhoer, Drechsler was to be the recipient

  of tens of thousands of Jews who were sent from the Reich-Protektorat

  area to some form of destruction in the East. The late fall months of

  1941 were a transition period during which deportations were already

  under way, but killing centers had not yet been established. The Ost- 24 25 26 27

  24. Order by von Renteln, August 26.1941. Occ E 3-19. See also materials on Vilna

  ghettoization in B. Baranauskas and K. Ruksenas, Documents Accuse (Vilnius, 1970),

  pp. 217-18, 166-67.

  25. Draft directive signed by Bönner, undated. Occ E 3-20.

  26. Lohse directive. August 18, 1941, NG-1815.

  27. Drechsler to Lohse, October 20, 1941, Occ E 3-29.

  351

  MOBILE KILLING OPERATIONS

  land was looked over for possible sites while transports were shoved

  east. In fact, on October 21, 1941, Sturmbannführer Lange of the Einsatzgruppe telephoned Dr. Drechsler to report that the killing unit was planning to set up a camp for 25,000 Reich Jews about fourteen miles

  from Riga.“

  By October 24, Reichskommissar Lohse was drawn into the picture.

  With

  Drechsler,

  Lohse

  complained

  to

  Lange

  that

  the

  Einsatzgruppe had contacted Drechsler not to discuss the matter but to

  inform him of developments. Lange repeated that higher orders were

  involved and that the first transport was due on November 10. Lohse

  replied that he was going to discuss the whole ques
tion in Berlin on

  October 25."

  By November 8, 1941, Lange sent a letter to Lohse, reporting that

  50.000 Jews were on the move. Twenty-five thousand were due in Riga,

  25.000 in Minsk. A camp was being built at Salaspils, near Riga.“ Since

  the Reichskommissar was in Berlin, his political expert, Regierungsrat

  Trampedach,

  wrote

  to

  the

  capital

  to

  urge

  that

  the

  transports

  be

  stopped.” The chief of the ministry’s Political Division, Dr. Leib-

  brandt, replied that there was no cause for worry, since the Jews would

  be sent “farther east” anyway (that is, they would be killed).“

  At the time of these tense discussions, more than 30,000 Jews were

  still alive in Riga. The city’s Jewish community, one of the most prosperous in Eastern Europe, had experienced a brush with death during the opening days of the German occupation, but for several months

  thereafter it was to remain intact. The German army was busily engaged in exploiting Jewish workers and in requisitioning Jewish-owned furniture.

  The

  Generalkommissar’s

  labor

  expert,

  Oberkriegsverwaltungsrat Dorr, was reaching out for control of the Jewish labor supply,

  and

  the

  Generalkommissar’s

  chief

  of

  finance,

  Regierungsrat

  Dr.

  Neuendorff, deputized the Gebietskommissar’s office to assess all the

  registered

  Jewish

  property

  with

  a

  view

  to

  its

  confiscation.”

  Dorr

  wanted a ghetto, and after some preparations it was put into place.“

  Then, in the middle of labor allocations and the taking of inventory, 28 29 30 31 32 33 34

  28. Unsigned notation, October 21, 1941, Occ E 3-29.

  29. Memorandum, office of the Reichskommissar, October 27,1941, Occ E 3-30.

  30. Stubaf. Lange to Reichskommissar Ostland, November 8, 1941, Occ E 3-31.

  31. TVampedach to ministry, copy for Lohse at Hotel Adlon in Berlin, November 9,

  1941. Occ E 3-32.

  32. Leibbrandt to Reichskommissar Ostland, November 13, 1941, Occ E 3-32.

  33. See correspondence in T 459, rolls 21 and 23.

  34. Dorr to Feldkommandantur and other offices, September 15, 1941, T 459, roll

  23. The Feldkommandant was Generalmajor Bamberg. Orders of the Gebietskommissar

  establishing a ghetto as of October 25, in his letter to the Generalkommissar, October 30,

  1941, T 459, rolls 21 and 23. The Gebietskommissar of the city of Riga was Oberbürgermeister Wittrock.

  352

  THE INTERMEDIARY STAGE

  Higher SS and Police Leader Jeckeln assembled his forces and struck

  without

  warning

  in

  two

  waves—on

  November

  29-December

  1

  and

  December 8-9, killing 27,800 Jews.” Space had now been created for

  transports from Germany inside the ghetto itself.“

  In a matter of days a double ghetto was created within the ghetto

  fence. All but a few thousand Latvian Jews were dead, and most of the

  German Jews were moved in. The new arrivals found apartments in

  shambles, and some of the furnishings bore traces of blood.” That

  winter fires flared in abandoned buildings,” pipes froze,” and epidemics raged unchecked.* In the months and years ahead, the German Jews, in labor camps and the ghetto, were whittled down to a handful

  of survivors.

  Meanwhile, other transports were arriving in Kaunas and Minsk.

  Five thousand Jews from the Reich and the Protektorat were shot in

  Kaunas by the efficient personnel of Einsatzkommando 3 on November 25 and 29.*' At Minsk the numbers were larger, and the correspon-35. The figure is given in an undated report of Einsatzgruppe A, PS-2273. See also

  Max Kaufmann, Die Vernicklung der Juden in Lettland (Munich, 1947), and Gertrude

  Schneider, Journey into Terror (New York, 1979), pp. KM5. On the involvement of

  Latvian auxiliaries in the massacre, see E. Avotins, J. Dzirkalis, and V. Petersons.

  Daugavas Vanagi—Who Are They? (Riga, 1963), pp. 22-24. The Jewish historian Simon

  Dubnov was among those killed on December 8. On the suddenness of this "turn of

  events” ( Wendung) for the German civil administration, see correspondence in T 459,

  roll 21.

  36. A transport from Berlin, the first to be directed to the Riga area, departed on

  November 27. Three days later the victims were unloaded in the Rumbula forest and

  shot. Schneider, Journey, pp. 14-15, 155. A telephone log kept by Heinrich Himmler in

  his own handwriting at the Wolfschanze (Hitler's headquarters) contains a cryptic note

  about a conversation with Heydrich at 1:30 p.m. on November 30. Five words of the

  entry are: “Judentransport aus Berlin. Keine Liquidierung. [Jewish transport from Berlin. No liquidation.]" Facsimile in David Irving, Hitler's War (New York, 1977), p. 505.

  Riga is not mentioned, but no other transport left Berlin during November 27-30. and on

  December I there was another Himmler-Heydrich conversation about "executions in

  Riga" (Exekutionen in Riga). See Martin Broszat, "Hitler und die Genesis der

  Endlösung,” Vierteljahrshefte für Zeitgeschichte 25 (1977): 760-61. The veto, possibly

  prompted by arguments from the Reichskommissariat, had evidently been without effect. Most subsequent transports, however, were not killed off immediately.

  37. Affidavit by Alfred Winter, October 15, 1947 NO-5448. Winter, a Jewish survivor, was a deportee.

  38. Gebietskommissar, city of Riga, via Generalkommissar to Reichskommissar,

  December 30, 1941, enclosing report of fire chief Schleicher of the same date, T 459, roll

  3.

  39. Gebietskommissar via Generalkommissar to Reichskommissar, January 27,

  1942, T 459, roll 3.

  40. Reichskommissar’s Office (Health to Ministerialdirigent Frilndt on the premises, February 7,1942, enclosing report of Medizinalrat Dr. Ferdinand, February 3, 1942, T 459, roll 3.

  41. Report by Staf. Jäger, December 1, 1941, Zentrale Stelle Ludwigsburg, UdSSR

  108, film 3, pp. 27-38.

  353

  MOBILE KILLING OPERATIONS

  dence

  became

  longer.

  The

  Wehrmachtbefehlshaber

  in

  the

  Ostland

  protested against the arrivals on purely military grounds. The German

  Jews, he pointed out, were far superior in intelligence to White Russian

  Jews; hence there was danger that the “pacification'’ of the area would

  be jeopardized. Furthermore, Army Group Center had requested that

  no trains be wasted on Jews. All railroad equipment was needed for the

  supply of military matériel.42 43

  The protest of the Wehrmachtbefehlshaber in the Ostland was followed on December 16,1941, by a letter from the Generalkommissar of White Russia, Gauleiter Kube. That letter was the first in a series of

  letters and protests by this official that were to shake at the foundations

  of the Nazi idea. It was addressed to Lohse personally (Mein lieber

  Hinrich)."

  Kube pointed out that about 6,000 to 7,000
Jews had arrived in

  Minsk; where the other 17,000 to 18,000 had remained he did not know.

  Among the arrivals there were World War I veterans with the Iron

  Cross (both First and Second Class), disabled veterans, half-Aryans,

  and even a three-quarter Aryan. Kube had visited the ghetto and had

  convinced himself that among the Jewish newcomers, who were much

  cleaner than Russian Jews, there were also many skilled laborers who

  could produce about five times as much as Russian Jews. The new

  arrivals would freeze to death or starve to death in the next few weeks.

  There were no serums to protect them against twenty-two epidemics in

  the area.

  Kube himself did not wish to issue any orders for the treatment of

  these Jews, although "certain formations” of the army and the police

  were already eyeing the personal possessions of these people. The SD

  had already taken away 400 mattresses—without asking. “I am certainly hard and I am ready,” continued Kube, “to help solve the Jewish question, but people who come from our cultural milieu are certainly

  something else than the native animalized hordes. Should the Lithuanians and the Latvians—who are disliked here, too, by the population—be charged with the slaughter? I could not do it. I ask you, consider the honor of our Reich and our party, and give clear instructions to take care of what is necessary in a form which is humane.”

  On

  January

  5,

  1942,

  the

  Stadtkommissar

  (city

  equivalent

  of

  Gebietskommissar)

  of

  Minsk,

  Gauamtsleiter

  Janetzke,

  going

  over

  the

  heads of Kube and Lohse, addressed a letter to Rosenberg personally.

  Janetzke had just been informed by the SS and Police that an additional

  50,000

  Jews were due from the Reich. In bitter language he pointed out

  42. Wehrmachtbefehlshaber Ostland/Ic to Reichskommissar Ostland, November

  20,1941 Occ E 3-34. The Wehrmachtbefehlshaber was Git. Braemer.

  43. Kube to Lohse, December 16, 1941, Occ E 3-36.

  354

  THE INTERMEDIARY STAGE

  that Minsk was a heap of rubble that still housed 100,000 inhabitants.

  In addition, there were 15,000 to 18,000 Russian Jews and 7,000 Reich

  Jews. Any further arrival of transports would bring about a catastrophe.“

  The Jewish expert in the ministry, Amtsgerichtsrat Wetzel, replied

  to the letter by addressing himself to Reichskommissar Lohse. Originally, wrote Wetzel, it had been intended to send 25,000 Jews to Minsk.

 

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