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  Because of transport difficulties, the project could not be carried out.

  As

  for Janetzke,

  Wetzel requested

  that the Stadtkommissar be instructed to heed official channels in the future.4’

  Although the controversy was now over, Kube insisted on a last

  word. Writing to Lohse, he pointed out that had Janetzke used official

  channels, he not only would have been within his rights but would have

  done his duty.44 45 46 47 48

  Whereas the mobile killing units were interested only in concentrating the Jews to facilitate the second sweep, the military and civilian administrations decided to exploit the situation while it lasted. Hence

  economic

  measures,

  in

  the

  form

  of

  labor

  utilization

  and

  property

  confiscations, became an important aspect of the intermediary stage.

  Economic exploitation was not the exclusive task of the army groups

  and the Reich Ministry for Eastern Occupied Territories. We shall

  therefore have to look briefly at two other agencies: the Wirtschaftsinspektionen

  (economy

  inspectorates)

  and

  the

  Rüstungsinspektionen

  (armament inspectorates).

  Overall economic control in the military areas was placed into

  Göring’s hands. To cany out his task, the Reichsmarschall formed a

  policy

  staff,

  the

  Wirtschaftsführungsstab

  Ost

  (Economy

  Leadership

  Staff East). Goring himself headed the organization. The deputy was

  Staatssekretär Körner (Office of the Four-Year Plan). Other members

  included Staatssekretäre Backe and Neumann (also of the Office of the

  Four-Year Plan) and General Thomas, who was chief of the OKW/Wi

  Rti

  (Armed

  Forces

  High

  Command/Economy-Armament

  Office).41

  In

  the field the policies of the Wirtschafsführungsstab Ost were carried

  out by another staff, the Wirtschaftsstab Ost (Economy Staff East),

  headed by Generalleutnant Schubert.44 The regional machinery of the

  Wirtschaftsstab Ost consisted of three Wirtschaftsinspektionen—one

  44. Stadtkommissar Janetzke to Minister for Eastern Occupied Territories (Rosenberg), January 5, 1942 Occ E 3-37.

  45. Wetzel to Reichskommissar, January 16, 1942. Occ E, 3-37.

  46. Kube to Lohse, February 6, 1942. Occ E 3-37.

  47. Von Lüdinghausen (Dresdner Bank) to Dr. Rasche (Dresdner Bank), July 20,

  1941, Nl-14475. Decree by Göring, July 30, 1941, Wi/ID .240.

  48. Decree by Goring, July 30, 1941. WiflD .240.

  355

  MOBILE KILLING OPERATIONS

  with each army group. Each inspectorate was subdivided territorially

  into Wirtschaftskommandos (economy commands).

  Originally it was intended that Goring have plenary economic control

  in

  the

  entire

  occupied

  territory

  (military

  areas

  and

  civilian

  Reichskommissariate

  alike)."

  That

  arrangement,

  however,

  hurt

  the

  sensibilities

  of

  the

  newly

  appointed

  Reichsminister,

  Rosenberg.

  The

  functions of the economy inspectorates were therefore confined to the

  military areas, while the Rosenberg machinery was given a free hand to

  regulate general economic matters (finance, labor, agriculture) in the

  Kommissariate.

  Like

  all

  other

  regional

  potentates,

  however,

  Rosenberg had no control over war contracts placed in his territory. The

  continuous

  supervision

  of

  war

  production

  contracted

  for

  by

  the

  German

  army,

  navy,

  or

  air

  force

  was

  the

  function

  of

  the

  Rustungsinspektionen,

  which

  belonged

  to

  General

  Thomas

  of

  the

  OKW/Wi Ru.»

  Table 7-10 summarizes the basic economic jurisdictions in the east.

  From this table it should be apparent why the economy inspectorates in

  the

  military

  area

  dealt

  with

  all

  economic

  measures

  against

  Jews,

  whereas the armament inspectorates in the civilian area were concerned only with forced labor questions arising from war contracts.49 50 51

  The economic measures against Jews comprised starvation, forced

  labor, and confiscations of property. So far as the German bureaucrats

  were concerned, the measure that gave rise to the least difficulty was

  the prescription of a starvation diet.

  In the military area the Wirtschaftsstab Ost ordered that Jews receive half the rations allotted to people who did “no work worth mentioning.” This meant that Jews were entitled to no meat but that they could receive a maximum of 2 pounds of bread, 2’A pounds of potatoes,

  and 1 Yi ounces of fat per week.52 Lohse’s “provisional directives” provided that Jews would receive only whatever the rest of the population could do without, but in no case more than was sufficient for scanty

  49. Directive by OKH/GenQu (signed Wagner) (60 copies), May 16,1941, NOKW-

  3335. Von LQdinghausen to Dr. Rasche, July 20, 1941, NI-14475.

  50. For precise functions of the armament inspectorates in the Rosenberg territories, see decree by Thomas, July 25, 1941, Wi/ID .240; decree by Goring, August 25, 1942, WL/ID 2.205.

  51. In their internal organization, economy inspectorates were quite different from

  armament inspectorates. The economy inspectorates and commands were organized into

  sections dealing with economy, labor, agriculture, finance, etc. The armament inspectorates and commands were organized into a central section and three sections designated

  “Army,” “Navy,” and “Air Force."

  52. Instructions by Wirtschaftsstab Ost/Fuhrung ia, November 4, 1941, PS-1189.

  The Jewish diet was the same as the allotment for children.

  356

  THE INTERMEDIARY STAGE

  T A B L E 7-10

  ECONOMIC JURISDICTIONS IN THE EAST

  Civilian Area

  Military Area

  WirtschaftsfUhnmgsstab Ost:

  Goring

  General Economy War Contracts

  Wirtschaftsstab Ost:

  Git. Schubert

  (succeeded by Gen. d. Inf. Stapf)

  l—----------1

  RU In Ru In

  Wi In

  Wi In

  Wi In

  Ostland Ukraine

  North

  Center

  South

  Economy IV Wi Sections

  Commands (with armies,

  corps, and divisions)
r />   nourishment.”

  The

  food

  rationing

  problem

  was

  thus

  easily

  solved,

  Jews simply did not have to eat. More difficult, however, was the

  question of labor utilization, for Jews did have to work.

  To understand the role of Jewish labor in the newly occupied territories, we should examine in particular that early period of the occupation when

  the

  Germans

  first

  organized

  eastern

  production.

  The

  Wirtschaftsstab Ost planned to make maximum use of the productive

  capacity of the new areas, but in the very beginning it hoped that this

  objective could be accomplished without the Jews. On July 16, 1941,

  Generalleutnant Schubert (chief of the Wirtschaftsstab Ost) reported in

  telegraphic style:

  With respect to the Jewish question important experience at

  Drohobycz, where [oil] refinery employed the leading Jews only during the

  first week, and runs today without any Jews [ganzjudenfrei].*

  No

  such

  pronouncements

  were

  made

  after

  July.

  In

  PrzemySl-

  South, the IV Wi officer wrote the following report about his troubles

  in organizing war industries during the summer of 1941: 53 54

  53. Lohse to Generalkommissare in Ostland, August 8, 1941. NG-4815.

  54. Chief of Wirtschaftsstab Ost (signed Schubert) to OKW/Wi Ru and other offices

  (90 copies), July 16, 1941, Wi/ID 0.10. The Drohobycz area (Galicia) was then under

  army control.

  357

  MOBILE KILLING OPERATIONS

  Almost insoluble was the problem of finding expert managers. Almost

  all former owners are Jews. All enterprises had been taken over by the

  Soviet State. The Bolshevik commissars have disappeared. The Ukrainian

  trustee administrators, who were appointed upon the recommendation of

  the Ukrainian Committee, turned out to be incompetent, unreliable, and

  completely passive. Only a handful of Poles were useful. The real experts

  and real heads are Jews, mostly the former owners or engineers. Constantly, they stand as translators of the language or translators into action at the side of the Ukrainian straw man ( Immer stehen sie als sprachliche

  oder fachliche Dolmetscher neben dem ukrainischen Strohmann], They

  try their utmost and extract the very last ounce of production—until now

  almost without pay, but naturally in the hope of becoming indispensable.

  The assistance of Reich and ethnic Germans who offered their services as

  “trustees” had to be dispensed with because, without exception, they

  proved to be speculators or adventurers who pursued only selfish aims.

  Although they have already acquired plenty of enterprises in the Generalgouvernement, they are interested only in more booty.”

  Reading these lines, one cannot escape from the conclusion that during

  the crucial organizing period the Jews had already become indispensable.

  The reliance upon Jewish skills and brains was immediately recognized as a potential obstacle to the “final solution.” On August 14, 1941, Goring himself declared that the Jews no longer had any business

  in German-dominated territories (dass die Juden in den von Deutschland beherrschten Gebieten nichts mehr zu suchen hätten). Wherever Jewish labor was needed, the Jews were to be grouped into work

  formations. Insofar as they had not had an “opportunity” to “emigrate,” they were to be incarcerated in “something like” prison camps, to be organized there into labor battalions. Any other type of employment was not to be permitted, save in exceptional cases during the beginning of the occupation.K

  However, the implementation of that directive proved to be a

  difficult

  proposition.

  Expert

  mechanics

  can

  easily

  be

  employed

  as

  heavy

  laborers,

  but

  unskilled

  laborers

  cannot

  easily

  replace

  trained

  artisans. The attempt was made. In November 1941 the Economy Inspectorate Center went so far as to order that Jewish skilled workers surrender their tools and report for work in labor columns.” To the 55 56 57

  55. Report by Feldkommandantur PrzemySI SOd/Gruppe IV Wi (signed Hauptmann

  Dr. Bode), August 29,1941, Wi/ID 1.113.

  56. Report by Nagel (OKW/Wi Rü liaison officer with the Reichsmarschall), August 14, 1941. Wi/ID 2.319.

  57. Economy Inspectorate Center (signed Kapitän zur See Kotthaus) to

  Wirtschaftsstab Ost, Economy Inspectorates North and Center, Armament Inspectorate

  Ukraine, Army Group B, 2nd, 4th, and 9th Annies, Armament Command Minsk, and

  economy commands of the Economy Inspectorate Center, November 16, 1941, Wi/ID

  2.124.

  358

  THE INTERMEDIARY STAGE

  north,

  in

  Latvia,

  the

  forest

  administration

  of

  the

  Generalkommissar

  used “large contingents" of Jews to collect wood for heating.58 To the

  south, in military territory, municipalities made use of labor columns

  for clearing away debris and reconstruction work.55 But in the end the

  pressing need for irreplaceable Jewish skilled labor made itself felt

  everywhere.

  The army needed Jewish workers in its repair shops and Jewish

  clerks in its offices.“ The armament plants under “trusteeship” continued to be dependent upon Jewish labor.61 In the Volhynian sector of the

  Generalkommissariat

  Volhynia-Podolia,

  the

  labor

  force

  in

  armament plants was 90 percent Jewish throughout 1941 and 1942.“ In the

  same area “educated Jews were in many cases the real factory managers

  [Gebildete

  Juden

  waren

  vielfach

  die

  eigentlichen

  Betriebsführer)."* The ghettos themselves employed a large labor force in

  workshops and administrative positions.“

  In the Riga region, where the German Jews were to be “quartered

  only for a transitory stay [nur vorübergehend hier untergebracht]," and

  where many of the deportees were "cripples, war invalids, and people

  over seventy years of age [Krüppel, Kriegsinvaliden und über 70 Jahre

  alte Leute],"* a widespread demand for Jewish workers became manifest all the same. On one occasion a Gebietskommissar employee complained that soldiers, shouting in the presence of more than 1,000 Jews, had simply seized the labor in defiance of regulations.“ By 1943 the

  remaining thousands of German and Latvian Jewish laborers were di-

  $8. Generalkommissar Lalvia/Division 11a to Reichskommissar Ostland/lla. October 20, 1941 Occ E 3-27.

  59. Order by Army Group Rear Area South (signed von Roques). July 21, 1941.

  NOKW-1601.

  60. On September 12, 1941, Keitel prohibited the utilization of Jews in “preferential” jobs. Army Group Rear Area North/Ic to Army Group Rear Area North/VIl, September 24, 1941, NOKW-1686.

  61. For early recruitment, report by Economy Command Riga to Economy Inspectorate Nor
th. July 21, 1941, PS-579. Riga was then still under military control.

  62. Armament Command Luck to Armament Inspectorate Ukraine, report for October 1 to December 31. 1942, January 21, 1943 Wi/ID 1.101.

  63. Ibid.

  64. See chan of Statistical Office of the Vilna ghetto. June. 1942, Vilna Ghetto

  Collection, No. 286. According to this chart, Vilna had 7,446 employed Jews, of whom

  1,401 worked for the ghetto.

  65. Report by a labor official in Riga (the signature appears to be that of

  Kriegsverwallungssekretir Slandtke) following discussions with OStuf. MaywaJd and

  Ostuf. Krause (on the staffs of Einsatzgruppe A and Einsatzkommando2, respectively),

  February 16, 1942, T 549, roll 23. The SS was building camps at Salaspils and Jungfem-

  hof.

  66. Report by Generalkommissar/HIe (Labor), signed Lippmann. June 6, 1942. T

  459, roll 19.

  359

  MOBILE KILLING OPERATIONS

  vided among a large number of employers: SS, army, navy, air force,

  railroads, and firms.” One medical laboratory needed three specially

  selected Jews from whom blood was to be drawn twice daily to feed

  lice.“

  Not much need be said about working conditions and wages.

  Labor columns returning to the Riga ghetto each night were received

  with rubber truncheons and fists.“ In the Salaspils camp for Reich

  Jews, 900 men were buried in a single mass grave (i.e., about 60 percent

  of the working force died).™ With respect to wages, the Lohse directive

  provided that only subsistence money was to be paid. In White Russia,

  wage scales for the Slavic population ranged from 0.5 ruble (child

  labor) to 2.5 rubles (foremen) per hour. The wage scale for Jews was

  0.40 to 0.80 ruble.71 This differential was not intended for the benefit of

  private firms, though; it was to be paid to the Kommissariat.” During

  the second sweep, the civil administration in particular was also to

  have a financial reason for the retention of the Jewish labor supply.

  The third economic measure against Jews was the confiscation of

  property. Unlike the Jews of the Reich-Protektorat area or even the

  Jews of Poland, USSR Jewry could offer no major “objects” to German

  industrialists, bankers, and economy experts. In the USSR no private

  person owned enterprises, warehouses, real estate, or art collections.

  Such items were state property. The only prizes to be taken from

  Soviet Jews were their apartments, furniture, utensils, small amounts

  of cash, bits of jewelry, and large quantities of old clothes. In spite of

  the meagemess of this loot, there were jurisdictional disputes over

  possession of the Jewish belongings. In part, such disputes were an

  inevitable outgrowth of the chaotic state of affairs during the transition

 

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