Raul Hilberg
Page 60
Because of transport difficulties, the project could not be carried out.
As
for Janetzke,
Wetzel requested
that the Stadtkommissar be instructed to heed official channels in the future.4’
Although the controversy was now over, Kube insisted on a last
word. Writing to Lohse, he pointed out that had Janetzke used official
channels, he not only would have been within his rights but would have
done his duty.44 45 46 47 48
Whereas the mobile killing units were interested only in concentrating the Jews to facilitate the second sweep, the military and civilian administrations decided to exploit the situation while it lasted. Hence
economic
measures,
in
the
form
of
labor
utilization
and
property
confiscations, became an important aspect of the intermediary stage.
Economic exploitation was not the exclusive task of the army groups
and the Reich Ministry for Eastern Occupied Territories. We shall
therefore have to look briefly at two other agencies: the Wirtschaftsinspektionen
(economy
inspectorates)
and
the
Rüstungsinspektionen
(armament inspectorates).
Overall economic control in the military areas was placed into
Göring’s hands. To cany out his task, the Reichsmarschall formed a
policy
staff,
the
Wirtschaftsführungsstab
Ost
(Economy
Leadership
Staff East). Goring himself headed the organization. The deputy was
Staatssekretär Körner (Office of the Four-Year Plan). Other members
included Staatssekretäre Backe and Neumann (also of the Office of the
Four-Year Plan) and General Thomas, who was chief of the OKW/Wi
Rti
(Armed
Forces
High
Command/Economy-Armament
Office).41
In
the field the policies of the Wirtschafsführungsstab Ost were carried
out by another staff, the Wirtschaftsstab Ost (Economy Staff East),
headed by Generalleutnant Schubert.44 The regional machinery of the
Wirtschaftsstab Ost consisted of three Wirtschaftsinspektionen—one
44. Stadtkommissar Janetzke to Minister for Eastern Occupied Territories (Rosenberg), January 5, 1942 Occ E 3-37.
45. Wetzel to Reichskommissar, January 16, 1942. Occ E, 3-37.
46. Kube to Lohse, February 6, 1942. Occ E 3-37.
47. Von Lüdinghausen (Dresdner Bank) to Dr. Rasche (Dresdner Bank), July 20,
1941, Nl-14475. Decree by Göring, July 30, 1941, Wi/ID .240.
48. Decree by Goring, July 30, 1941. WiflD .240.
355
MOBILE KILLING OPERATIONS
with each army group. Each inspectorate was subdivided territorially
into Wirtschaftskommandos (economy commands).
Originally it was intended that Goring have plenary economic control
in
the
entire
occupied
territory
(military
areas
and
civilian
Reichskommissariate
alike)."
That
arrangement,
however,
hurt
the
sensibilities
of
the
newly
appointed
Reichsminister,
Rosenberg.
The
functions of the economy inspectorates were therefore confined to the
military areas, while the Rosenberg machinery was given a free hand to
regulate general economic matters (finance, labor, agriculture) in the
Kommissariate.
Like
all
other
regional
potentates,
however,
Rosenberg had no control over war contracts placed in his territory. The
continuous
supervision
of
war
production
contracted
for
by
the
German
army,
navy,
or
air
force
was
the
function
of
the
Rustungsinspektionen,
which
belonged
to
General
Thomas
of
the
OKW/Wi Ru.»
Table 7-10 summarizes the basic economic jurisdictions in the east.
From this table it should be apparent why the economy inspectorates in
the
military
area
dealt
with
all
economic
measures
against
Jews,
whereas the armament inspectorates in the civilian area were concerned only with forced labor questions arising from war contracts.49 50 51
The economic measures against Jews comprised starvation, forced
labor, and confiscations of property. So far as the German bureaucrats
were concerned, the measure that gave rise to the least difficulty was
the prescription of a starvation diet.
In the military area the Wirtschaftsstab Ost ordered that Jews receive half the rations allotted to people who did “no work worth mentioning.” This meant that Jews were entitled to no meat but that they could receive a maximum of 2 pounds of bread, 2’A pounds of potatoes,
and 1 Yi ounces of fat per week.52 Lohse’s “provisional directives” provided that Jews would receive only whatever the rest of the population could do without, but in no case more than was sufficient for scanty
49. Directive by OKH/GenQu (signed Wagner) (60 copies), May 16,1941, NOKW-
3335. Von LQdinghausen to Dr. Rasche, July 20, 1941, NI-14475.
50. For precise functions of the armament inspectorates in the Rosenberg territories, see decree by Thomas, July 25, 1941, Wi/ID .240; decree by Goring, August 25, 1942, WL/ID 2.205.
51. In their internal organization, economy inspectorates were quite different from
armament inspectorates. The economy inspectorates and commands were organized into
sections dealing with economy, labor, agriculture, finance, etc. The armament inspectorates and commands were organized into a central section and three sections designated
“Army,” “Navy,” and “Air Force."
52. Instructions by Wirtschaftsstab Ost/Fuhrung ia, November 4, 1941, PS-1189.
The Jewish diet was the same as the allotment for children.
356
THE INTERMEDIARY STAGE
T A B L E 7-10
ECONOMIC JURISDICTIONS IN THE EAST
Civilian Area
Military Area
WirtschaftsfUhnmgsstab Ost:
Goring
General Economy War Contracts
Wirtschaftsstab Ost:
Git. Schubert
(succeeded by Gen. d. Inf. Stapf)
l—----------1
RU In Ru In
Wi In
Wi In
Wi In
Ostland Ukraine
North
Center
South
Economy IV Wi Sections
Commands (with armies,
corps, and divisions)
The
food
rationing
problem
was
thus
easily
solved,
Jews simply did not have to eat. More difficult, however, was the
question of labor utilization, for Jews did have to work.
To understand the role of Jewish labor in the newly occupied territories, we should examine in particular that early period of the occupation when
the
Germans
first
organized
eastern
production.
The
Wirtschaftsstab Ost planned to make maximum use of the productive
capacity of the new areas, but in the very beginning it hoped that this
objective could be accomplished without the Jews. On July 16, 1941,
Generalleutnant Schubert (chief of the Wirtschaftsstab Ost) reported in
telegraphic style:
With respect to the Jewish question important experience at
Drohobycz, where [oil] refinery employed the leading Jews only during the
first week, and runs today without any Jews [ganzjudenfrei].*
No
such
pronouncements
were
made
after
July.
In
PrzemySl-
South, the IV Wi officer wrote the following report about his troubles
in organizing war industries during the summer of 1941: 53 54
53. Lohse to Generalkommissare in Ostland, August 8, 1941. NG-4815.
54. Chief of Wirtschaftsstab Ost (signed Schubert) to OKW/Wi Ru and other offices
(90 copies), July 16, 1941, Wi/ID 0.10. The Drohobycz area (Galicia) was then under
army control.
357
MOBILE KILLING OPERATIONS
Almost insoluble was the problem of finding expert managers. Almost
all former owners are Jews. All enterprises had been taken over by the
Soviet State. The Bolshevik commissars have disappeared. The Ukrainian
trustee administrators, who were appointed upon the recommendation of
the Ukrainian Committee, turned out to be incompetent, unreliable, and
completely passive. Only a handful of Poles were useful. The real experts
and real heads are Jews, mostly the former owners or engineers. Constantly, they stand as translators of the language or translators into action at the side of the Ukrainian straw man ( Immer stehen sie als sprachliche
oder fachliche Dolmetscher neben dem ukrainischen Strohmann], They
try their utmost and extract the very last ounce of production—until now
almost without pay, but naturally in the hope of becoming indispensable.
The assistance of Reich and ethnic Germans who offered their services as
“trustees” had to be dispensed with because, without exception, they
proved to be speculators or adventurers who pursued only selfish aims.
Although they have already acquired plenty of enterprises in the Generalgouvernement, they are interested only in more booty.”
Reading these lines, one cannot escape from the conclusion that during
the crucial organizing period the Jews had already become indispensable.
The reliance upon Jewish skills and brains was immediately recognized as a potential obstacle to the “final solution.” On August 14, 1941, Goring himself declared that the Jews no longer had any business
in German-dominated territories (dass die Juden in den von Deutschland beherrschten Gebieten nichts mehr zu suchen hätten). Wherever Jewish labor was needed, the Jews were to be grouped into work
formations. Insofar as they had not had an “opportunity” to “emigrate,” they were to be incarcerated in “something like” prison camps, to be organized there into labor battalions. Any other type of employment was not to be permitted, save in exceptional cases during the beginning of the occupation.K
However, the implementation of that directive proved to be a
difficult
proposition.
Expert
mechanics
can
easily
be
employed
as
heavy
laborers,
but
unskilled
laborers
cannot
easily
replace
trained
artisans. The attempt was made. In November 1941 the Economy Inspectorate Center went so far as to order that Jewish skilled workers surrender their tools and report for work in labor columns.” To the 55 56 57
55. Report by Feldkommandantur PrzemySI SOd/Gruppe IV Wi (signed Hauptmann
Dr. Bode), August 29,1941, Wi/ID 1.113.
56. Report by Nagel (OKW/Wi Rü liaison officer with the Reichsmarschall), August 14, 1941. Wi/ID 2.319.
57. Economy Inspectorate Center (signed Kapitän zur See Kotthaus) to
Wirtschaftsstab Ost, Economy Inspectorates North and Center, Armament Inspectorate
Ukraine, Army Group B, 2nd, 4th, and 9th Annies, Armament Command Minsk, and
economy commands of the Economy Inspectorate Center, November 16, 1941, Wi/ID
2.124.
358
THE INTERMEDIARY STAGE
north,
in
Latvia,
the
forest
administration
of
the
Generalkommissar
used “large contingents" of Jews to collect wood for heating.58 To the
south, in military territory, municipalities made use of labor columns
for clearing away debris and reconstruction work.55 But in the end the
pressing need for irreplaceable Jewish skilled labor made itself felt
everywhere.
The army needed Jewish workers in its repair shops and Jewish
clerks in its offices.“ The armament plants under “trusteeship” continued to be dependent upon Jewish labor.61 In the Volhynian sector of the
Generalkommissariat
Volhynia-Podolia,
the
labor
force
in
armament plants was 90 percent Jewish throughout 1941 and 1942.“ In the
same area “educated Jews were in many cases the real factory managers
[Gebildete
Juden
waren
vielfach
die
eigentlichen
Betriebsführer)."* The ghettos themselves employed a large labor force in
workshops and administrative positions.“
In the Riga region, where the German Jews were to be “quartered
only for a transitory stay [nur vorübergehend hier untergebracht]," and
where many of the deportees were "cripples, war invalids, and people
over seventy years of age [Krüppel, Kriegsinvaliden und über 70 Jahre
alte Leute],"* a widespread demand for Jewish workers became manifest all the same. On one occasion a Gebietskommissar employee complained that soldiers, shouting in the presence of more than 1,000 Jews, had simply seized the labor in defiance of regulations.“ By 1943 the
remaining thousands of German and Latvian Jewish laborers were di-
$8. Generalkommissar Lalvia/Division 11a to Reichskommissar Ostland/lla. October 20, 1941 Occ E 3-27.
59. Order by Army Group Rear Area South (signed von Roques). July 21, 1941.
NOKW-1601.
60. On September 12, 1941, Keitel prohibited the utilization of Jews in “preferential” jobs. Army Group Rear Area North/Ic to Army Group Rear Area North/VIl, September 24, 1941, NOKW-1686.
61. For early recruitment, report by Economy Command Riga to Economy Inspectorate Nor
th. July 21, 1941, PS-579. Riga was then still under military control.
62. Armament Command Luck to Armament Inspectorate Ukraine, report for October 1 to December 31. 1942, January 21, 1943 Wi/ID 1.101.
63. Ibid.
64. See chan of Statistical Office of the Vilna ghetto. June. 1942, Vilna Ghetto
Collection, No. 286. According to this chart, Vilna had 7,446 employed Jews, of whom
1,401 worked for the ghetto.
65. Report by a labor official in Riga (the signature appears to be that of
Kriegsverwallungssekretir Slandtke) following discussions with OStuf. MaywaJd and
Ostuf. Krause (on the staffs of Einsatzgruppe A and Einsatzkommando2, respectively),
February 16, 1942, T 549, roll 23. The SS was building camps at Salaspils and Jungfem-
hof.
66. Report by Generalkommissar/HIe (Labor), signed Lippmann. June 6, 1942. T
459, roll 19.
359
MOBILE KILLING OPERATIONS
vided among a large number of employers: SS, army, navy, air force,
railroads, and firms.” One medical laboratory needed three specially
selected Jews from whom blood was to be drawn twice daily to feed
lice.“
Not much need be said about working conditions and wages.
Labor columns returning to the Riga ghetto each night were received
with rubber truncheons and fists.“ In the Salaspils camp for Reich
Jews, 900 men were buried in a single mass grave (i.e., about 60 percent
of the working force died).™ With respect to wages, the Lohse directive
provided that only subsistence money was to be paid. In White Russia,
wage scales for the Slavic population ranged from 0.5 ruble (child
labor) to 2.5 rubles (foremen) per hour. The wage scale for Jews was
0.40 to 0.80 ruble.71 This differential was not intended for the benefit of
private firms, though; it was to be paid to the Kommissariat.” During
the second sweep, the civil administration in particular was also to
have a financial reason for the retention of the Jewish labor supply.
The third economic measure against Jews was the confiscation of
property. Unlike the Jews of the Reich-Protektorat area or even the
Jews of Poland, USSR Jewry could offer no major “objects” to German
industrialists, bankers, and economy experts. In the USSR no private
person owned enterprises, warehouses, real estate, or art collections.
Such items were state property. The only prizes to be taken from
Soviet Jews were their apartments, furniture, utensils, small amounts
of cash, bits of jewelry, and large quantities of old clothes. In spite of
the meagemess of this loot, there were jurisdictional disputes over
possession of the Jewish belongings. In part, such disputes were an
inevitable outgrowth of the chaotic state of affairs during the transition