by The Destruction of the European Jews, Vol. 1-3 (Third Edition) Yale University Press (2003) (pdf)
places.
Everyone was now asked to register his holdings, even if he had already done so.102 103
In the Ukraine, Lohse's counterpart, Reichskommissar Koch, was
far less ambitious in his efforts to collect Jewish belongings. On September 7,1942, Koch received a directive, prepared in the East Ministry, to seize all Jewish and abandoned property. He was to use former Ukrainian officers and civil servants for the task. The Ukrainians were
to seize Jewish furniture in empty apartments, collect debts owed by
the population to Jews, seize Jewish bank accounts, and pay Jewish
debts. After some months, Koch replied that the implementation of
this decree was a “political and organizational impossibility." He had
already confiscated Jewish valuables, “particularly gold.” The remainder of the Jewish property consisted primarily of furnishings, part of which he was using in his offices and the rest of which he had burned.
‘To make lists now,” he wrote, “to collect bank accounts, some of
which no longer exist, to pay Jewish debts—that in my opinion is a
presumption about my administration that cannot be justified in wartime. The suggestion, moreover, that I should use former Ukrainian officers for such a purpose, I consider politically dangerous.”'03
99. Vialon directive of August 27, 1942, Institut fur Zeitgeschichte, Munich, Fb
85/2, and his subsequent directives in T 459, roll 3.
100. Decree by Reichskommissar Oslland, October 13,1941, Verkiindungsblau des
Relchskommissarsfur das Oslland, 1941, p. 27.
101. Implementation decree (signed Lohse). October 14, 1942. in Amtsblaii des
Generalkommissars in Minsk, 1942, pp. 246-48.
102. Deutsche Zeilung im Oslland (Riga), November 16, 1942, p. 5.
103. Koch to Rosenberg personally. March 16, 1943. PS-192.
365
MOBILE KILLING OPERATIONS
The recovery of Jewish possessions from de facto owners thus
made little headway. Lohse found that it was a most difficult administrative
task;
Koch
did
not
even
try.'"
So
much,
then,
for
the
“confiscations.”
During the intermediary stage the missing steps of the destruction
process were introduced one by one. To the SS and Police the concentration measures were most important, since they were to pave the way for the annihilation of the remaining Jews. Economic exploitation was
of primary interest to the administration. In the field of labor, the SS
and Police tolerated economic activities at first but fought hard against
them during the second sweep. The third step, definition, was opposed
by Himmler on principle. He could see no use in it to anybody.
The
mobile
killing
units
did
not
concern
themselves
with
definitions.
To
the
Einsatzgruppen
it
made
little
difference
whether
there were half-Jews or even quarter-Jews among their victims. Since
the
other
half
or
other
three-quarters
were
non-German,
everybody
who answered to the name “Jew” or was denounced as a Jew was
killed as a Jew.
There were, however, two small groups, Jews by religion, yet living as separate communities and speaking Ibrkic languages, that defied easy classification. One, a schismatic sect, the Karaites, had practiced
Judaism
outside
the
talmudic-rabbinic
tradition
for
twelve
hundred
years.
Before
the
German
invasion,
clusters of
several hundred
to
several thousand were residents of Vilna (Lithuania), Halisz (Galicia),
and the Crimea. Claiming to be entirely dissociated from Jewry, the
Karaites cited exemptions from anti-Jewish measures granted to them
in czarist days. The Germans exempted them as well.1“ The second
group, known as Krimchaks, were an old, established community of
several thousand living in the Crimea. Though full adherents of rab- 104 105
104. Interestingly enough, in the Romanian-occupied territory of Tfansnistria. Germans were the de facto claimants and Romanian authorities had to do the recovering. In the city of Odessa, ethnic Germans had moved into Jewish apartments and had taken
possession of the furnishings therein. The SS Welfare Agency for Ethnic Germans
(Volksdeutsche Millelslelle—VOM1) decided to protect these Germans. An agreement
concluded in August 1942 provided that, in view of the "fact" that during the Soviet
regime many ethnic Germans had been forced to give up their apartments to Jews, the
present German occupants should remain in possession. For the furniture they were to
pay a “modest" amount to the Romanian administration. Agreement signed by Governor
Alexianu of TVansnistria and Oberiuhrer Horst Hoffmeyer of the VOMI, August 30,
1942, NO-5561.
105. Dr. Steiniger, “Die Karaimen," Deutsche Zeitung im Ostland (Riga), November 15, 1942, p. 1. Also, correspondence in document Occ E 3ba-l00. and Philip Friedman, “The Karaites under Nazi Rule," in Max Beloff, ed.. On ike Track of tyranny (London, 1960), pp. 97-123.
366
THE INTERMEDIARY STAGE
binic Judaism, their origins were complicated enough to warrant presumptions
of
past
intermarriages
with
indigenous
neighbors
and
perhaps partial descent from medieval Central Asian converts to the
Jewish religion (the Khazars). Nevertheless, when they did not answer
to a call for “registration,” it was decided that they were racially incontestable Jews (rassisch emwandfreie Juden).m They were seized and killed, although listed apart from Jews in recapitulations of the dead.10’
While the mobile killing units were concerned only with broad
categorizations of ethnic groups, the military and civilian offices in the
occupied
territories
imported
the
Nuremberg
definition
(three
Jewish
grandparents, or two Jewish grandparents plus the Jewish religion or a
Jewish marital partner) into regulations pertaining to marking, ghettoi-
zation, and so on.'“ The definitions, which could be found only in
secret directives with limited distribution, aroused no protests from the
SS and Police.
In the beginning of 1942, however, the Ministry for Eastern Occupied Territories decided to issue a definition that was deemed more appropriate for the eastern area (that is, more stringent) than the
Nuremberg decree. For this purpose, a conference was called on Jan-
106. Orstkommandantur Feodosiya to Rear Army Area 553 (1 Uh Army). November 16, 1941, NOKW-1631. See reference to Krimchaks as descendants of Khazars in an article by Abraham Poliak, Encyclopedia Judaica (1971-72) 3: 1103-6. But see also
Itzhak Ben-Zvi, The Exiled and the Redeemed (Philadelphia, 1957) pp. 83-92.
/> 107. RSHA IV-A-1. Operational Report USSR No. 150 (65 copies). January 2,
1942, NO-2834, noting 2,504 Krimchaks shot as of December 15. See also the following:
RSHA IV-A-1, Operational Report USSR No. 190 (65 copies), April 8, 1942, NO-3359.
Ortskommandantur Kerch to Army Rear Area 553 (11th Army), July 15, 1942, NOKW-
1709. Ortskommandantur Bakhchisaray to Army Rear Area 553 (11th Army), July 16,
1942, NOKW-1698. Einsatzgruppe D also killed the so-called Tati (mountain Jews from
the Caucasus who had been resettled in the Crimea by the American Joint Distribution
Committee). Feldkommandantur Eupatoria to Army Rear Area 553 (11th Army), March
16, 1942, NOKW-1851. Another group of victims were the Gypsies, not because it was
thought that they were Jews but because they were regarded as a criminal element.
RSHA IV-A-1, Operational Report USSR No. 150 (65 copies), January 2, 1942, NO-
2834. RSHA IV-A-1, Operational Report USSR No. 178 (65 copies), March 9, 1942, NO-
3241. RSHA IV-A-1, Operational Report USSR No. 184, March 23, 1942, NO-3235.
RSHA IV-A-1, Operational Report USSR No. 195 (75 copies), April 24, 1942, NO-3277.
After the systematic killing of Gypsies had begun, an order exempted all “nonmigratory"
Gypsies who could prove a two-year period of residence in the place where they were
found. 218th Security Division to Oberfeldkommandantur 822. March 24,1943. NOKW-
2022. Other correspondence in document Occ E 3-61.
108. 454th Security Division la to Onskommandaluren in its area, September 8,
1941, NOKW-2628. Lohse directive. August 18, 1941, NG-4815. The Lohse directive
exempted half-Jews who had married Jewish partners before June 20. 1941, and who
were no longer living with their partners on that date. The military definition specified no
marriage cutoff date. Neither definition contained a cutoff date for Jewish religious
367
MOBILE KILLING OPERATIONS
uary 29, 1942, under the chairmanship of Generalkonsul Dr. Bräutigam
(deputy chief, Political Division) and with a long list of participants,
including
Amtsgerichsräte
Wetzel
and
Weitnauer
and
Regierungsräte
Lindemann
and
Beringer
(all
of
the
East
Ministry);
Ministerialrat
Lösener, Jewish expert of the Interior Ministry and author of the original
Nuremberg
definition;
Oberregierungsrat
Reischauer
of
the
Party
Chancellery;
Sturmbannführer
Neifeind
and
Sturmbannfüher
Suhr
(both RSHA officials); Legationssekretär Muller of the Foreign Office
(Abteilung
Deutschland);
Korvettenkapitän
Frey,
representing
the
Canaris office (Armed Forces Intelligence); and a representative of the
Justice Ministry, Pfeifle.
Over the objections of Ministerialrat Lösener, who preferred that
his decree be applied in all territories under German control, the conferees decided on a broader definition. Any person was to be considered as Jewish if he belonged to the Jewish religion or had a parent who belonged to the Jewish religion. For determination of adherence to
the Jewish religion, the slightest positive indication was to be conclusive. A declaration that the father or mother was Jewish was to be entirely sufficient. In cases of doubt an “expert” race and heredity
examination was to be ordered by the competent Generalkommissar.105
When Himmler heard about the definition-making, he wrote the
following letter to the chief of the SS-Main Office, Obergruppenführer
I request urgently that no ordinance be issued about the concept of
“Jew.” With all these foolish definitions we are only tying our hands. The
occupied eastern territories will be cleared of Jews. The implementation of
this very hard order has been placed on my shoulders by the Führer. No
one can release me from this responsibility in any case. So I forbid all
interference.1"
No one could interfere with Himmler now, for the second sweep had
begun, leaving in its wake the demolished ghettos of the occupied East.
T H E S E C O N D S W E E P
The first sweep was completed toward the end of 1941. It had a limited
extension in newly occupied territories of the Crimea and the Caucasus
during the spring and summer months of 1942. The second sweep
109. Summary of inlemrimsterial conference {held on January 29, 1942), dated
January 30, 1942, NG-5035.
110. Himmler to Berger, July 28, 1942, NO-626.
368
THE SECOND SWEEP
began in the Baltic area in the fall of 1941 and spread through the rest of
the occupied territory during the following year. Hence, while the first
sweep was still proceeding in the south, the second had already started
in the north. At the pivotal point, in the center, the turn came around
December 1941.
The machinery employed in the second sweep was larger and more
elaborate than that of the first. Himmler's forces were joined by army
personnel in mobile and local operations designed for the complete
annihilation of the remaining Soviet Jews.
In the ensuing operations the Einsatzgruppen played a smaller role
than before. Organizationally they were placed under the direction of
the Higher SS and Police Leaders.1 2 3 In the north the chief of Einsatzgruppe A (through 1944: Stahlecker, Jost, Achamer-Pifrader, Pan-ziger, and Fuchs) became the BdS Ostland, and in the south the chief of
Einsatzgruppe C (Rasch, Thomas, Böhme) became the BdS Ukraine,
with jurisdiction over the Reichskommissariat as well as over the military areas to the east.’ Despite such attributes of permanence, the Security Police in the occupied USSR did not grow.
The Order Police, on the other hand, was greatly expanded. The
police regiments were increased from three at the beginning of the
campaign to nine at the end of 1942. Whereas five of these nine regiments were at the front, the remainder, together with six additional battalions, were at the disposal of the Higher SS and Police Leaders in
the rear.’ The police regiments had a stationary counterpart in the
Einzeldienst
(single-man
duty),
divided
into
Schutzpolizei
(in
cities)
and Gendarmerie (in rural areas). At the end of 1942 the Einzeldienst
had 14,953 men, of whom 5,860 were in the Schutzpolizei and 9,093 in
the Gendarmerie.4
Almost from the beginning, the Order Police was augmented by
native personnel. On July 25, 1941, Himmler, noting that the Einsatzgruppen had already added local helpers to their detachments, ordered the rapid formation of a force composed primarily of Baltic, 1. RSHA Summary Report No. 6, June 5, 1942, NO-5187. A fourth Higher SS and
Police Leader. Bgf. Korsemann, was installed in the Caucasus. Einsatzgruppe D
operated in that area.
2. Below the level of BdS. the machinery branched out into the offices of the
Kommandeure der Sicherheilspoltiei und des SD (KdS). In the
Ostland the chiefs of
Einsatzkommandos became Kommandeure. However, this amalgamation did not take
place in the Ukraine. RSHA Summary Report No. 6, June 5, 1942, NO-5187.
3. Oberst-Gruppenfiihrer Daluege (Chief of the Order Police) to OGruf. Wolff
(Chief of Himmler's Personal Staff), February 28, 1943, NO-2861. Police regiments had
about 1,700 men, battalions. 500.
4. ¡bid. The statistics do not include Calicia and the Bialystok district. Galicia
obtained a regiment, Bialystok a battalion and 1,900 men in Einzeldienst.
369
MOBILE KILLING OPERATIONS
White
Russian,
and
Ukrainian
nationalities.’
During
the
following
months the Order Police set up an indigenous Schulzmannschaft in the
form of units and precincts.’ By the second half of 1942, this apparatus
had reached sizable proportions. As of July I, 1942, there were seventy-eight Schutzmannschaft (or Schuma) battalions with 33,270 men, and at the end of the year the count was 47,974.’ For every German
battalion, the Schuma had at least five. Moreover, these units were
widely used. Although identified as Lithuanian, Latvian, and so on,
some were stationed far from their original bases.* The nonmobile component of the Schutzmannschaft was even larger. It consisted of three branches:
Einzeldienst,
firemen,
and
auxiliaries
(Hilfsschulzmannschaft) serving in labor projects or guarding prisoners of war. The
native Einzeldienst was a considerable factor in the second sweep. In
the small towns and villages of the Ostland and the Ukrainian regions,
it outnumbered the German Gendarmerie nearly ten to one (see Table
7-11).
Assisting the SS and Police was the network of military rear-
echelon offices and their specialized personnel who roamed about the
countrysides
collecting
information
about
hidden
partisans
and
Jews:
the Ic/AO offices, the Feldgendarmerie (military police), the Geheime
Feldpolizei (Secret Field Police, an intelligence branch), and the so-
called
Partisanenjäger
(partisan
hunters,
or
antipartisan
patrols).
The
military intelligence machinery was formally incorporated into the killing apparatus by an agreement between Heydrich and Canaris for exchange of information in the field. The agreement provided specifically that “information and reports might bring about executive activities are