Religious Revival and Secularism in Post-Soviet Azerbaijan

by Dobrosława Wiktor-Mach

  The right to control over mosques, an appointment of akhunds and monitoring of sermons and religious teaching are the main resources of the official clergy. State’s mosques, under the jurisdiction of Pashazade are known to receive ready sermons and guidelines. Not a single voice of criticism of the government is acceptable. For those eager to make a career in the religious industry it is necessary to subordinate to official and unofficial rules and norms of the Muslim Board. It is not enough to graduate from a particular university, and precisely from the Baku Islamic University headed by Haji Sabir. Prospective akhunds must also go through an attestation process. If they are allowed to take special exams and pass them successfully they will be assigned to a mosque. As the local Islamic higher education is relatively new (it was established in the early 1990s), old religious cadres hold diplomas from Uzbekistan’s universities. For instance, an akhund of the Shia Suleymanov mosque told me that the sheikh Pashazade studied Islam in Uzbekistan, at first in a madrasa in Bukhara (Mir-i Arab Academy) and later at the Islamic University of Tashkent. The practice of restrictions to leaderships in mosques is one of the chief practices used by the Islamic hierarchy to maintain their status and material capital. According to the recent legal rules, people holding foreign diplomas, even from prestigious Islamic universities, are unable to get a nomination to be in charge of a registered mosque.

  Mosques have to gain their financial capital themselves (Motika, 2001). Most of the income comes from money paid by believers for individual religious ceremonies, such as weddings or funerals. As there is a general scarcity of material resources, practices leading to exclude other religious specialists, in this case imams and akhunds from abroad, need to be effective. The Muslim Board has also significant revenue from the control over profitable business of hajj organizations. The costs of a trip to Mecca are for an average Azeri citizen very high. To gain a total control over this kind of financial capital, sheikh-ul-islam eliminated his rivals announcing officially that only the Caucasus Muslim Board can organize the annual pilgrimage (Aliyev, 2009). To explain the high costs of the pilgrimage the Sheikh of Islam points to the requirements of Saudi Arabia and the protocols signed every year with the Hajj Ministry of Saudi Arabia (Allahshukur, 2013). For an impoverished society, where the majority hardly manages to get by, the hajj is out of reach. In some cases an affluent patron or sponsor decides to cover the expenses.

  Another source of income comes from black donation boxes, nazir qutusu, located outside or inside mosques, where people can leave money. The most popular mosques gather money from the faithful who come to pray and thank God for listening to their wishes, also by donating a few manats to charity boxes. According to the version of the Muslim Board, the money is used for the current functioning of mosques, such as salaries or urgent renovations. Although people generally do not believe in this explanation, suspecting the sheikh and other members of the religious establishment to get advantage of this resource, they continue to leave their money at mosques (Bedford, 2009).

  The control over material and political capital has not been sufficient to gain support and influence in society. Above all, the lack of religious and symbolic capital hindered the success to control religious life. Officially sanctioned Shia clergy are unable to provide adequate religious ideas and religious knowledge demanded by believers. Fighting for social support, Pashazade employed various strategies, but most of them proved unsuccessful in the light of fierce competition. One of them was undertaken in the early 1990s, when he endeavoured to establish positive relationships with those who threaten him the most—independent preachers and groups as well as some Islamist organizations. As a pragmatic actor, he was eager even to transform his religious ideas in line with Islamist programs. He even proposed to reintroduce the Arabic alphabet in Azerbaijan, which was already not in use for over 60 years. However, such moves only deteriorated the sheikh’s authority (Goyushov, 2008). The favourable conditions for the Islamic religion in society did not mean that people were eager to transform their state into one of the Arab countries. Positive sentiments towards Turkey were much stronger.

  Figure 7.2 A mosque in Baku’s Icheri Sheher (Old City) and a nazir qutusu (donation box) Similarly, sheikh-ul-islam’s pragmatic search for international support to reinforce his power did not result in success. Soon after Azerbaijan regained independence, Pashazade made an alliance with a Chechen influential separatist Dzhokhar Dudayev. This enabled him to assume an active role in the creation of the Caucasus Confederation, which was supposed to help him extend his power over Muslims in the North Caucasus. However, neither the temporary support nor the change of the Board’s name from the Spiritual Board of Transcaucasian Muslims38 to the Caucasus Muslim Boards made his jurisdiction over Muslims from abroad a real force. After Putin has joined the international war on terrorism, Pashazade began to support his movements expecting help and support from Russia. In Azerbaijan, official clergy have identified local terrorists allegedly in contact with Al-Qaida and labelled them Wahhabis.39 The sheikh has also announced the nurchular movement to be an extremist group, which has to limit its activities (Goyushov, 2008).

  But the Sheikh scored some points as well. An example of a successful move of the official establishment was an appropriation of an originally Zoroastrian celebration of New Year into a Shiite Islamic tradition. In Azerbaijan, the majority of people regard it as the main event in the whole year, and Pashazade, instead of condemning it as a pagan and un-Islamic ritual, every year congratulates Azerbaijanis on this occasion. In fact, accommodating non-Islamic practices is not new in Islam. Many prominent Islamic figures argued that Novruz belongs to their religion.

  Novruz is a symbol of renaissance of Nature and Earth created by Allah and it contains endless love to the Creator and thanks Him for blessing (…) Novruz coincides with a number of religious points, which increases significance of this holiday (…) Thanks to Allah that every Novruz Holiday promotes the successful, sustainable development of our country and people. It encourages us for our victory in Karabakh (News.Az, 2010).

  This news report from the official speech of Sheikh-al-Islam delivered on the occasion of Novruz in 2010 make clear the adoption of this festival into the officially accepted Islamic symbols. This position is strongly criticized by his competitors who fight for a separation between tradition and religion. Some more religiously conscious people do not treat Novruz as a religious feast at all. They spend the day with family, visit friends and neighbours, but restrain from Novruz’s allegedly Islamic character. Nevertheless, the popularity of Novruz among Azeri people gives a point to the official clergy. They let people celebrate what they enjoyed the most without forcing them to choose between fire worshipping and “real” Islam.

  Another visible change introduced into Islamic culture under the recent influence of pluralism is the new reformist orientation of the Baku Islamic University. Although it is the only acceptable Islamic educational institution in Azerbaijan, it has made an effort to improve its image in society. Haji Saadi, the head of the Lenkoran branch of the university, expressed this strategy:

  We do not want Turkish or Iranian tradition to govern us. We prefer to have our own traditions. We have now entered the Internet generation, and Islam must adapt (International Crisis Group, 2008, p. 18).

  In order to attract young people interested in Sunni ideas, the university embraces an ecumenical approach and emphasizes its Pan-Islamic identity. Theoretically it is open for any Muslim, regardless of his tradition or preferences. However, many of the graduates, as I was told by its former student, have strong Shia inclinations. Besides, most observers regard the level of education at this university as too low, especially in comparison to foreign well-established Islamic centres.

  Another reform of the official leaders relates to ritualistic sphere of Shiism. Conventionally, traditional Shiite acts of self-mortification have been contested by Sunnis. They argue that this ritual is un-Islamic as it does not stem directly from the Koran. In the ligh
t of such accusations, the Shiite leaders undertook reforms to reinterpret the celebration of Muḥarram and ʿĀšūrāʾ. In fact, the same strategy of modernizing Islamic tradition has been employed by both the official, as well as unofficial Shiite communities. They propose actions such as blood donation instead of self-flagellation. While it has met with resistance on the part of many traditional Shiites in Azerbaijan who continue their old practices, the idea of replacing the bloody rituals with socially more useful acts is supported by many people. Hundreds of volunteers participate in this action to commemorate Imam Hussein. Blood donation campaigns are conducted in mosques all over Azerbaijan. The Caucasus Muslim Board announces a list of mosques as well as shrines that collect the blood, which, after medical tests, is then transferred to the Central Blood Bank. In 2010, according to the Board’s spokesperson the following religious institutions joined the action during the Ashura Day: Taza Pir, Haji Sultanali, Bibi-Heybet, Mir-Movsum aga, Garachuhur, Sumgait Mosque, the Imamzade mosque in Ganja, in the Heydar mosque in Mingachevir, the Sheki mosque, the Shirvan Mosque, the Boyukbazar Mosque in Lankaran and the Barda mosque (Hajiyev, 2010). This trend is more global. Shiite communities in countries such as Turkey, Afghanistan, Lebanon, Pakistan, Iraq, United Arab Emirates and Iran organize blood donation actions and encourage the faithful to engage in such humanitarian activities.

  The strategies of the descendants of saints, regarded in the USSR as representatives of “unofficial Islam” have a different nature. The people in charge of family shrines take advantage of the symbolic capital of people buried in those places, i.e., of their genealogy and titles. The sacred descent is believed to guarantee an extraordinary spiritual power and an ability to give blessings to believers. Although the practice of ziyārat to the tombs has become an object of fierce attack of many Sunni groups, the popular pirs still attract a huge numbers of pilgrims and do not engage in open conflict with other Islamic traditions. There is a niche that they cover. On the basis of interviews and conversations with people in Baku I have identified the following most popular pirs:

  Mir Movsum Aga’s tomb in Shuvalan, a suburb of Baku, and the saint’s house in the center of Baku

  Ali Ayaghi (Ali’s Foot) in Buzovna on the Absheron Peninsula

  The tomb of Rahima khanum, located in Nardaran

  The tomb of Bibi Heybet, on the outskirts of Baku40

  The Imamzadeh in Ganja

  Ashab-e Kehf in Nakhchivan, which draws on a legend from the Koran

  These places of worship are valued by people for the simple and undemanding requirements, contrasted with the complex rules of orthodox Islam. Believers do not face any problems with any formal affiliation. The rules and rituals are very simple. No knowledge of Arabic is necessary. People praying at the tombs ask for help and leave money, food, cloth, or even precious stones in exchange. The nazirs, “gifts” for a sayyid, become an important source of a capital for people possessing or controlling the places. The substantial level of economic self-sufficiency enabled the most popular pirs to stay independent of Pashazade’s control. The deep-rooted and emotional attachment of Azerbaijani people to their saints and miracles seems to have survived attacks from other sides, but also encouraged pirs’ opponents to create new approaches and strategies to this tradition.

  The Muslim Board tested different methods. When in 1992 haji Nizam, a well-known charismatic leader, managed to restore the shrine of Mir Movsum Aga and to increase his influences, officials from the Board tried to remove him from duty. However, haji Nizam was able to mobilize support from the political sphere and won this battle. Being unable to take over “unofficial” Islam, the strategy of the sheikh-ul-islam was turned into the direction of accepting pirs and related practices as a part of “official” Islam. As Saroyan argues (1997, pp. 104–124), such an appropriation of shrine pilgrimages by the official clergy used to take place even in the former Soviet Union, despite the wide conviction that these two models of Islam contradicted one another. The Azerbaijani clergy thus appeals to the Shiite tradition, which promotes the veneration of saints, particularly the Imams and their families.

  Salafi Muslims who repeatedly manifest their objections and hatred to this “folk stuff,” or “superstitions” generally follow a moderate way. Although some cases of Salafi violence towards pirs were reported in the past, the main strategies consist in appealing to people. Some of the Salafis endeavour to convince others that all pir-related practices are innovations in religion and should therefore be avoided. They want to educate people, make them aware of the religious tenants. Other Salafi groups have accepted the tradition of visiting tombs of important people. Some of them even visit pirs themselves. Pirs for them are sacred, but they are aware that at the tombs one should pray not to a sayyid, but directly to God. In that way, a typical strong opposition of Salafis towards “unofficial cults” have undergone changes in the process of competition. Azeri Salafis are too much embedded in local tradition and risk too much in being too radical.

  7.2Demand for Piety and Change

  Even though the Shiite establishment possesses a large part of the institutional religious infrastructure, from which it gathers material resources, it has been unable to respond to believers’ current needs for spirituality and change. For years, the clergy was more engaged in their own interests than in developing good reciprocal relationships with the faithful. The hierarchical structure did not leave a place for a social dialog. Words that come from above are more like orders than guidelines. What’s more, the Board’s close links with the communist state apparatus discredited much of its religious teachings in the eyes of average people. This gave opportunities to new religious suppliers whose main asset was the religious capital, i. e., attractive ideas, values, and symbols related to religion. In the ideological vacuum that people felt after the sudden fall of the Soviet Union, there was a need for alternative propositions that could legitimize the social order, give new meanings to life and hope for the future. People who were turning towards Islam searched for religion which can inspire and provide a moral guidance. They looked for a real authority and for leaders they could trust.

  Moreover, there has been a demand for religious knowledge, for people educated in Islamic law and theology. One person said that Azerbaijan was not lucky enough to have such an influential religious leader as the Polish people in the figure of Pope John Paul II. The lack of religious professional guidance turned a lot of Azerbaijanis to look for authorities abroad, to countries with long-established and uninterrupted Islamic educational institutions. This demand made it easier for foreign Islamic specialists, as well as Azerbaijanis educated at Islamic universities in other countries, to enter into competition with traditional Islamic leaders in the South Caucasus.

  In order to effectively compete with the well-established clergy with its close relations to politicians, representatives of non-local Islamic traditions began to adopt and popularize a modern rule that religious affiliation is a matter of choice. Most of them also accept and preach, to a different degree, reflexiveness in religious matters. To question the existing authorities, one must give their words serious thought, confront them with one’s own critical mind. New religious suppliers encourage people to use their own reason, to study Islamic Scriptures, and to consult them in case of uncertainty. Every Muslim has an obligation to lead an active spiritual life. Apart from rituals, there is a world of God’s words that need to be reflected upon. Among younger generations, the Internet, television, and other mass media became extremely popular in search for information about Islam. Thus, those groups that successfully experiment with new ways of communication gain more popularity and have a chance to spread more quickly.

  Besides, as the political transformation carried on but without spectacular successes, people became disappointed with the lack of changes in their lives. As a result of wildcat capitalism, a class of businessmen and politicians cooperating with the highest state structures enriched themselves at the expense of others. The Karaba
kh conflict with Armenia caused a national trauma and resulted in thousands of IDPs who fled from the occupied territory. The semi-authoritarian regime of the Aliyev dynasty made a lot of people sceptical towards politics. Finally, widespread corruption enforced the feeling of frustration. In such circumstances people welcomed religious propositions that avoided political engagement. They proposed focusing on a private sphere and preached ideas of self-perfection, personal piety, and moral development.

  7.3New models of Islam

  For Islamic missionaries Azerbaijan as well as other post-Soviet Muslim states were a promising land. The preachers made sudden inroads into the Azerbaijani religious culture when communism was coming to an end. They brought religious knowledge based upon long studies in Islamic jurisprudence. Religious capital was the major asset in the struggle with the class of Shiite clergy for religious primacy. Some groups and movements had also a significant amount of material and political forms of capital at their disposal. Depending on the types and amount of resources, different groups were implementing various strategies in the intra-religious struggle. As the major players have been introduced and characterized in chapter earlier, here I will focus on the main mechanisms of competition.

  Iranian Clerics

  Clerics arriving from Iran after 1991 posed a sudden threat to the Azerbaijani clergy and to independent Shia preachers. Their main advantage was a much higher level of education and a deep knowledge of Shia tradition. Using this capital, Shiite Iranians achieved a great success in the first years of independence, but today their influence is limited, although still noticeable. As the Azerbaijani political circles became more restricted and suspicious towards Iranian clerics, the tactic of Iran changed. Instead of sending Shiite preachers to propagate their model of Islam, Iran began offering scholarships and attracting young Azeris to its religious seminaries for studies. The majority of Azeri students went to the holy city Qom to a popular marǧaʿ at-taqlīd Ayatollah Fazil Lenkorani, who died in 2007. According to available data, at present there are around 200–250 Azeri students in Qom (International Crisis Group, 2008, p. 7). After Lenkorani’s death, a lot of his students have turned towards the Grand Ayatollah Makarem Shirasi and other “hardline,” orthodox ideologues (Goyushov, 2008). The Grand Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, the Supreme Leader of Iran and the former President (1981–1989), is also among the most revered spiritual leaders. According to many sources, he has Azeri roots (e. g., Encyclopedia of the Peoples of Africa and the Middle East, 2009, p. 79), just as Lenkorani. The average length of study is between five and ten years. But there are also shorter options for those lacking enough time or resources. It is estimated that between 1993–1996, 300 Azerbaijanis took part in three-month courses in Iran (Goyushov, Askarov, 2010, p. 215).