Religious Revival and Secularism in Post-Soviet Azerbaijan

by Dobrosława Wiktor-Mach

  Apart from providing education and training to young people, Iran’s strategy to attract support utilized charity organizations. It established numerous institutions providing humanitarian help alongside promoting the Shiite tradition and —in many cases—the vision, slogans and ideas of Islamic revolution. The massive assistance was directed mainly to Azeri refugees from Nagorno-Karabakh, who were left without any sources for survival, but also to other Azerbaijanis in harsh economic situation. Iran’s main aid institution is the Imam Khomeini Relief Foundation (IKRF), which functions like many NGOs which provide assistance to the underprivileged. In the south, in Astara, IKRF was helping newlymarried couples in buying their own apartment. Besides it distributed food and offered financial support (Hadjyzadeh, 2005b). Inspired by Islamic ideology, Iranian organizations are also involved in building new mosques and madrasas where religious teaching is organized.

  In the competition with increasing Sunni influences, more radical Iranian clergy actively attempt to discredit the opponents. They promote and implement the exclusivist model of religious diversity claiming that only Shiism, in their interpretation, is the right Islamic religion. There is a fear in Azerbaijan among moderate Muslims that Iran will recreate sectarian divisions and smash the current relative balance and tolerance. The more chaotic and violent the situation in the Middle East is, the more dangerous the antagonistic calls are. The “Arab Springs” has open a new chapter in the Sunni-Shia relations in many countries. In Nardaran, one of the chief bastion of Shiism in Azerbaijan, children learn verses that curse the caliph Umar, known in Shia tradition as an unjust usurper. There is also an opinion among Nardaran people that Sunnis are the people who honour Umar—“a very bad man who urged people to marry their brothers or sisters” (Rohoziński, 2005, p. 148). So far, such stereotypical images of Sunnis are more an exception than a norm among Azerbaijanis.

  The political aspirations of Iranian clergy that stand in sharp contrast with the secular orientation of the majority of Azerbaijani Muslims have not been welcomed. There are a lot of negative feelings towards Iran, and even some Shiites inspired by Iranian ayatollahs do not approve of their political agenda. I observed that most people accept the secular state with a freedom of choice, which also concerns the controversial issue of hijab. Nayereh Tohidi, who has done her research on gender issues, summons words of an Azeri woman that illustrate the Azeri attitude towards Iranian-style veiling (Tohidi, 2002):

  In June 1992, when a delegation of 22 Islamist women headed by Zehra Mostafavi, daughter of Khomeini, visited Baku, Azerbaijan, wrapped in heavy chadors in the heat of summer, they were met with stares and disdainful reactions everywhere they went. On one occasion, a middle-aged Azeri woman asked, “Do not you feel hot under this heavy black garment in this hot summer?” “But the fire in hell is much hotter if one fails to follow Allah’s orders,” one of the Iranians replied. Baffled by her response the Azeri woman mumbled, “What a cruel God you have! The Allah that I know is much kinder to women.”

  Most Azeris today are oriented towards Turkey and, to a lesser degree, towards the Western world. This direction is supported by the political class, that is afraid of potential revolutionary attitudes. Nevertheless, there are still groups which are deeply attached to the Shiite tradition, and for them Iranian scholars constitute a point of reference in religious dilemmas. It can be thus said that, although the threats that Azerbaijan will follow an Iranian way are exaggerated, Iranian ideas appeal to a part of traditional Shiites and to those who have recently been discovering this tradition, particularly in the younger generation.

  Independent Shiism

  In the competition for souls and minds of believers, independent Shia communities have been gaining relative success. These Shia communities that are functioning outside of the Sheikh-ul-Islam’s authority are not numerous, but growing, attracting mostly younger generation who feel that Shiism is an element of their cultural and religious identity. The most influential Shiite leader in Baku is Haji Ilgar Ibrahimoglu, a graduate of an Iranian university. Although he has lost his institutional attachment, when the authorities banned him from leading the Juma mosque in the old centre of Baku, he continues his work on the reinterpretation of Islamic heritage to be compatible with modern democratic state. His efforts have been appreciated by an international community, which in 2009 announced him to be one of the 500 most influential Muslims in the world (500 Muslims, 2009). The publication praises Ibrahimoglu as a “charismatic young Islamic scholar and human rights activist, who is the head of a pro-Iranian Shia congregation in Baku.” While I agree with the first part of the description, the statement that he is pro-Iranian raises doubts. Ibrahimoglu’s openly admits that he received his graduate and postgraduate education (magistratura and aspirantura) from an Iranian university and in his religious teachings he is inspired by Iranian scholars and their interpretation of the Shiite Jafari maḏhab. He promotes conservative religiosity in terms of morality and ideas. At the same time the Imam’s ideological orientation is rooted in European values, such as the rule of law and freedom of conscious. Among other things he has studied human rights in Poland and is now actively engaged in democratic transformation of Azerbaijan. His activities and rhetoric are directed against corruption, authoritarianism and human rights violations. He’s among a few public religious figures that dare to openly criticize the ruling elite. It has earned him respect and made him influential among the urban educated Shia youth.

  During a meeting with the female members of his community (during which the Haji left us alone so as not to influence the opinions), I asked about the reason for the popularity of their imam. In the office there were mostly young and middle-aged, educated women, all wearing the hijab. One of them explained Haji Ilgar’s attitude, which the members of the community find appealing:

  Haji Ilgar helps us find true information about religion. Obviously, we can search and read ourselves, but he has a great advantage: an objectivity. He is not forcing people to accept his views without any reasons. He is approaching religion in a rational way, shows us the way, gives proof, presents logic behind the religious path. He asks us and himself questions, for instance, whether God exists or not and directs us towards an answer. Sometimes such issues do not even come to our minds.

  Rationality in religion is a value most underlined by Ibrahimoglu and appreciated by his followers. Discussions over the Scripture are not only welcomed but also encouraged. The claim that this approach is more intellectual helps the faithful in the competition with other groups, especially Sunni. It situates them at a higher level. “In Sunnism rationalism is not a virtue,” the imam said. Among Juma community’s main and most vigorous opponents there are: the official Shiite establishment and the Salafis. Unlike the first group, the Juma community does not have “their” mosque to gather and to gain revenues from it, nor financial revenues. In spite of being expelled from the mosque, on the business card haji Ilgar has written: “Imam of the ‘Juma’ mosque religious congregation in Icheri-sheher (Old city).”

  Concerning the official clergy, he repeats the public criticism: “They used to work for KGB.” In his opinion, the Islamic university in Baku has not produced a single person who would know Islam. It forces people to subordinate and see the world in black and white. They are not engaged in spiritual and religious development. Their level of education is not sufficient enough to teach others. Ibrahimoglu’s words are uncompromising: “Unlike the state clergy, we are no apparatchiks from the Soviet period who are used by the state to legitimize a corrupt and increasingly authoritarian regime and make a parody of Islam. They preach conformism and resignation” (Cordier, 2008).

  Imam Ibrahimoglu works on the project of modernizing the ʿĀšūrāʾ celebrations. Blood donations organized by his community are part of wider project of social work—an essential component of a true religion. A component that was missing during the dark ages of communism and needs to be revived and popularized among the faithful. Imam Ibrahimoglu goes furt
her in his reinterpretation of the ʿĀšūrāʾ than the official Shiite clerics do. He has called to associate ʿĀšūrāʾ Day with values of patriotism and heroism. According to him, the whole Muḥarram “embodies such high qualities as courage, invincibility, bravery, devotion and genuine civil position” (Ashura, 2008). This ideology should be also seen in the light of Ibrahimoglu’s active engagement in human rights and his fight against abuses of democracy and injustice in politics, which is not only a theoretical problem in Azerbaijan. The Shiite tradition of political struggle is actively developed by the Juma Imam. Moreover, he has set an example of resistance when in 2003 he took part in protests against results of the presidential elections, for which he was imprisoned. Now he heads the DEVAM human rights centre.

  Ibrahimoglu also satisfies criteria of a desirable religious leader established by pious traditions: an imam must be first of all knowledgeable. A woman from the Juma group said that the deep knowledge of religion, which mullahs in Azerbaijan are generally lacking, is a prerequisite for being a leader. Other values cherished by the Juma community include morality. “The values such person realizes in life are very important; he must set an example to believers,” people said. The next crucial feature is charisma: “He should know how to appeal to people, how to make them follow his path; he needs to have a gift that people eagerly listen to him,” I heard from another person.

  Another strategy that makes Ibrahimoglu successful is his support for secular law, which is not common in the Shia tradition. He is a strong public advocate of a democratic system. He knows that Azerbaijanis are disappointed with Western democratic countries for a variety of reasons, mainly due to the lack of support in democratic transformation. He is not enchanted with European culture all-together, but with some European institutions that are working well. His strategy is to promote a “concept of democracy,” not a particular implementation of this model. He explained, “I do not want that people identify democracy with a given state. Most people in Azerbaijan identify it with US. We want to show the truth about democratic regime.” At the same time his aim is to change the perception of religion. Imam’s followers distinguish between two sides of religion. In their vision of religion there is a “practical” aspect, full of detailed requirements concerning religious pillars, such a namaz or hajj. Rituals must be performed with the highest degree of precision. The second is a wider worldview, a moral and philosophical side of religion—“a general striving for good, justice, friendship; a belief in God, the Prophet, Imams, and in God’s justice.” Haji Ilgar added that Poland is a good example for him. Polish people were often close to the Church to do great things together. Collective actions were based on some shared moral principles, rooted in religion. But not every Pole blindly follows the Vatican. Similarly, Azerbaijanis are inspired by their faith, but do not act as Iran expects. In this manner, the imam distances himself from common accusation of his Sunnis opponents that Shiite Muslims want to change Azerbaijan into an Iranian-like country. In his mind, the Islamic revolution which transformed Iran into a theocratic state is unlikely to take place in his country.

  Figure 7.3 Muhur. A Shia ritual object used during prayer

  7.4The Process of Sunnitization

  Whereas Shiism is attractive to numerous people in Azerbaijan and constantly attracts new believers, Sunni traditions have managed to successfully compete with it. Increasingly and forcefully they are making inroads into the post-Soviet societies. Initially the new, foreign Sunni groups, movements and organizations were in a rather disadvantageous position compared to the established Islamic structures. They lacked mosques and profits they bring. Nevertheless, the Sunni branch of Islam managed to overcome initial problems. The ongoing process of internal competition leads to the augmentation of religious authority of Sunnism in its various forms. The struggle strengthens the Sunni actors. If the trend continues, it can result in the “Sunnitization” of the society.

  Salafism

  Sunni traditions respond to two basic social needs among young and middle-aged generations: the need of an attractive piety model and of ideological alternative to an existing social order. All of the new Sunni pious traditions have been promoting an idea of deep and radical changes. It is particularly visible in the case of the Salafi community, that is using these ideas as a kind of a “trademark.” Contrary to the popular cliché, the Sunni people I talked to underlined the understanding of religion as a path or a process. It means a constant struggle with moral imperfection, weaknesses and sins (what is sometimes referred to as jihad.) Religious rituals are supposed to direct people towards God and moral perfection. In this tradition, a person who does namaz should become a better person after each prayer. Rituals must follow the faith, otherwise they are useless. That is the prevalent discourse among Salafis in Azerbaijan.

  As I was told by a local expert on religion, Salafis in Azerbaijan form two distinct groups. One of them focuses mostly on the detailed implementation of Islamic pillars. They mostly care about the dress code, behavior, regular prayers and fast. There is a strong intergroup pressure to subordinate to the socio-religious norms. The other group views both aspects of religion—formal requirements and moral guidance—as equally important. A young Salafi girl working in an Islamic shop in Baku was trying to persuade me that when I accept Islam my whole life will undergo a revolutionary change. Rituals and symbols are important as they testify to the inner religiosity. They are the proof that one is taking religion seriously, but they are empty without a spiritual development.

  When Sofi Bedford conducted her research on Islamic activism in Baku in 2004–2005, the number of mosque visitors to the Abu Bakr mosque was surprisingly high in comparison to other Islamic places in the capital. While the majority of Shia mosques were visited by only a handful of believers, this Sunni centre had around 8000 people coming for Juma prayer (Bedford, 2009, p. 105). Most scholars, including Farideh Heyat (2008), confirm its popularity. Friday prayers used to attract thousands of people every week and during religious holidays the numbers were even higher, reaching sometimes over 10,000 people. The faithful were coming even from the north of Azerbaijan.

  Today the situation is different, since the mosque had been closed after the terrorist attacks in it in 2008. The Salafis I met in 2009 attend mostly the much smaller Lezgin mosque in Icheri Sheher. However most of their activities are held at private homes. Much of Salafi education seems to be outside of the formal structures. People gather in small groups at homes to study Arabic, Islamic literature and to pray together. Private venues are much more comfortable to discuss views which are not popular. One of my respondents said that she meets with her “sisters” usually two-three times a week. In such loose, informal webs of personal relationships and circles people trust each other. Informality and the small size of the groups enhances solidarity and involvement. In Central Asia there are also reports of Salafi social networks that are crucial in recruitment and mobilization in the community. They gather in teahouses or private houses of the community and members hold lectures or discussions.

  The lack of a possibility to gather openly at a mosque has been partially compensated, similarly as in the Juma community case, by the use of a new means of communications, especially the Internet. Both communities are actively getting engaged in on-line discussions. On the forums there is a possibility to consult imams of those groups. This method is especially attractive to young educated people, who constitute the majority of followers of these two movements. Popular way of proselytizing is also the spread of Salafi-like messages through mobile phones.

  Especially because of the lack of institutional infrastructure, i.e., a Salafi mosque that could function without restrictions, an important channel in recruiting new members is through social networks. Apart from kinship and friend circles, there are some private companies, which are known as informal centres of Salafism. Their profiles of activity are not linked to religion in any way. One company that I visited deals with occupational training and provides
various kinds of courses in fields as diverse as management, oil and gas, safety and security, or English language. Its boss is a highly successful person with many achievements in business. But he is also valued for his moral characteristics, such as courage in thinking and acting, or resistance to the widespread corruption. He proposes young people a way to success, but also a way of spiritual development based on Islam. For many Muslims his habitus of successful, religious, and knowledgeable person is highly attractive. It appeals to upwardly mobile middle class. In the company’s office there is even a room designated for prayer. I was even invited inside to take a look. It’s a small and an exceptionally quiet place where one can pray or meditate for a while in a comfortable condition.