Religious Revival and Secularism in Post-Soviet Azerbaijan

by Dobrosława Wiktor-Mach

  8.1Post-Soviet Religious Policy

  The current work presents our nationwide leader Heydar Aliyev as connoisseur of Koran and Islamic sciences, traces back Aliyev’s views on Islamic morality and spiritual values as referred to appropriate fragments from Koran, stressing his particular erudition in theological sciences; Dr. Adil Al-Falah carried out a thorough analysis of Aliyev’s speeches and reports to authoritative international forums, conferences, held in Baku and other places worldwide, his meetings and discussions with world leaders. Following the results of his analysis, Dr. Al-Falah lays a special emphasis on Aliyev’s selfless love to his people, land, religion; the author shows that Heydar Aliyev harshly criticized double standard policies pursued by some great powers with respect to major political problems (al-Falah, 2007, p. 6).

  These sentences from an introduction sheikh-ul-islam Pashazade wrote in a book on the life and ideology of the former president of Azerbaijan Heydar Aliyev (died in 2003) point to the use of Islam as an ideological tool in the state’s religious policy. It also shows the alliance between official Shiism and the state. In an effort to deal with sudden and vital Islamic resurgence and the influx of Islamic missionaries, the traditional cooperation between Shiite and secular powers has regained its significance. The sheikh expects protection and privileges for his system of “official” Muslims hierarchy of clergy; politicians needed religious legitimization to their public activity. From the security point of view, independent, uncontrolled Islam is a potential source of tensions or even terrorism.

  Initial Free Market

  This alliance is one of the main differences between Azerbaijan and other post-Soviet Muslim countries, where Sunni Islam has traditionally dominated. Nevertheless, the general course and strategies used in religious policy all over Central Asia and Azerbaijan seem surprisingly similar. The first years after the break-up of the USSR were marked by an introduction of liberal law granting all kinds of religious activists freedom of practice and teaching. None of the religious tradition was officially favoured. Besides, all citizens of the post-Soviet republics were given a choice regarding religion. At that time, Azerbaijan attracted numerous preachers, clerics, and missionaries mainly from neighbouring countries. An intense revival of religious life was felt all over the region.

  Although formal rules were absent, state authorities were turning towards various means to influence the religious landscape according to their preferences. Azerbaijan’s charismatic president Abulfaz Elcibey (1992–1993), known for his pan-Turkic sympathy, strongly opposed Islam in its Iranian manifestation. He was deeply suspected of Iranian clerics who were coming to Azerbaijan in great numbers. He was even eager to replace Pashazade, but was persuaded not to do so by the Speaker of Parliament Isa Gambar. Sheikh-ul-islam’s position improved with Heydar Aliyev’s presidency (1993–2003) (Goyushov, 2008). The religious diversity and an activity of new religious suppliers did influence the status the Caucasus Muslim Board. To be able to compete with new actors, this institution undertook some reforms to make cooperation with believers stronger. Among other things, it began to improve religious education for young candidates eager to become clerics. It was striving to attract young graduates of Islamic universities from abroad, in particular from Turkey, Egypt, Syria, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia and Iran. Besides, new branches of the only Azerbaijani Islamic University were opened to produce new clerics that would replace the old cadre usually without any formal education (International Crisis Group, 2008). These reforms, inspired by the need to compete with educated independent Islamic groups, led to an increase in the level of religious education, although in the eyes of competitors it was not sufficient. Haji Ilgar Ibrahimoglu, who holds an Iranian diploma, said that at the Baku Islamic University he had not met any expert in Islamic religion.

  When the nationalist, pro-Turkish rule came to an end in 1993, the state became friendlier towards Iran. Heydar Aliyev was showing a more favourable approach to Tehran and also cared about his homeland, the Nakhchivan Autonomous Republic. During his visit to Iran, the president boasted that he has opened around 200 mosques in that Azerbaijani enclave (Świętochowski, 1995). Having gained experience in the communist era (as a KGB general), Heydar Aliyev realized perfectly how serious the religious resurgence was. His strategies were thus based on careful examination of threats and possibilities that religion brings to politics.

  Towards Restrictions

  After the initial period of freedom, political leaders began to transform their strategies towards the religious sphere. On the one hand, they saw an advantage in the use of Islam as an effective ideological tool and, on the other hand, they were afraid that the rising religiosity in the country would threaten their positions. What Elcibey and Aliyev had in common was their willingness to promote themselves as true committed Muslims. Both of them used every possible opportunity to take part in religious celebrations, and Aliyev even went for an ʿumra (lesser pilgrimage) to Mecca as the first political leader from Azerbaijan (Valiyev, 2005).

  The attempts to use religion as a tool in state-building were typical of all Central Asian and Caucasian republics. Home-grown Islam, encompassing a range of traditions, customs and values, is one of the main elements in forging new national identity. Islamic values were presented as a part of national heritage and as a platform of cooperation with other Muslim nations. For that reason, religious values were often mixed with national ones. In many mosques portraits of Heydar Aliyev hang on the walls. Such a “nationalistic” variant of Islam has no place to accommodate foreign ideas or values and that is why they are being challenged.

  Gradually political leaders set out a campaign directed against religious movements that were gaining too much strength. One of the first displays of this restrictive policy was connected with the Islamic Party of Azerbaijan (IPA), which registered in 1992. It is estimated that its membership reached around 50,000 on the Absheron Penisula (Świętochowski, 1999, p. 6). Soon after its popularity rose, first allegations appeared; the party leadership was accused of mixing religion with politics and as such posing a threat to a secular country. Among others, he was charged with receiving financial support from abroad and serving foreign interests. These attacks finally led to the arrest of some of the party’s leaders in 1996, which has practically impeded the IPA’s activities.

  The regulations and restrictions soon touched not only single organizations. The struggle for a national form of Islam as a part of cultural and ethnic heritage led to eliminating all those actors who had political Islamist aspirations. This idea is being repeatedly underlined by prominent politicians, for example Seyfullayev (2010):

  The secular state building in Azerbaijan is the choice of the citizens. No foreign religious influence can go counter popular belief. It is unacceptable to use religion for political purposes, as the belief in the politicization loses its holiness.

  The engagement in politics is seen as the main reason for discriminatory measures undertaken against Ilgar Ibrahimoglu and his Juma mosque community. He is not only an oppositionist and a human rights activist; he was also dangerous as an influential religious leader, who was able to mobilize people around Islamic values. The official accusation after his arrest in 2003 was that he had used religion in achieving political goals, which Azerbaijani law defines as illegal.42

  All Islamic institutions, including functioning mosques, were put under the jurisdiction of the Caucasus Muslim Board (CMB), an institution which became independent from the state, but informally has retained close links to its authorities. The amendments to religious law from 1996 were perceived by independent clerics as a serious infringement of the law (International Crisis Group, 2008). Activities of foreign religious groups were forbidden and all religious groups and communities were forced to re-register. CMB was made responsible for this registration, which gave it a powerful tool of interference in activities of its competitors. Pashazade, the Board’s director, is also in charge of the appointment of official clergy in Azerbaijan. However, the
existence of CMB turned out to be not enough to implement religious policy. In 2001 another institution, this time a state organ, was established to manage religious activity—the State Committee for Work with Religious Associations (SCWRA).43 The official purpose of SCWRA is promotion of religious tolerance. Indeed, for the first time, registration of many religious groups, including Islamic, Christian, Jewish and Jehovah’s Witnesses was made possible.

  In practice, both institutions have been realizing the same aim: to ensure that influential “heretics” are eliminated. By a heretic I mean, following the word’s Greek etymology, a person who makes his own choice. In the post-Soviet context, heretics are people choosing a different variant of religion than what is recommended or imposed on the society by politicians. The exact meaning of the word has been changing, but according to the most recent trend an increasing number of religious groups, movements and figures are included in this category. They are also referred to as “independent groups.” In practice, these are all communities that operate outside the jurisdiction and control of the CMB.

  The process of increasing state interventions into a religious market continued till 2012. In the period between 2006–2008 numerous religious TV programs were cancelled and Koranic courses restricted. The sale of Islamic books and magazines received more attention of Azerbaijani authorities. A number of mosques were closed throughout the country. During my stay in Baku, in October 2009, state officials again attempted at restricting the aḏān, which raised a heated debate among the faithful. On that day when I was paying a visit to the Juma mosque community, this news spread quickly and everybody was talking about it. The action was conducted in a very informal way—some mosques received phone calls “from the top” to put an end to loud aḏān on claims that it allegedly disturbed the peace. No formal regulation was presented, no one wanted to be blamed for it or even responsible for the decision.

  In 2009 new amendments to the religious law were adopted by the Azerbaijani Parliament, introducing stronger administrative control. According to them all leaders of Islamic communities have to be appointed by the state. New rights and privileges were given to local clerics, i. e., “citizens of Azerbaijan who have received their education in Azerbaijan” (Corley, 2009). Only they are entitled to conduct Islamic rituals. This law introduces serious restriction for two groups: foreign movements, groups, leaders and for the Azerbaijanis who have received Islamic education abroad. Even those who were sent abroad for studies through an official state channel, are now deprived of their rights. This trend has been visible for a few years; Ilgar Ibrahimoglu, one of such people, said that now people with foreign diplomas are not respected by state authorities. This law aims at eliminating religious traditions that constitute a threat to the “nationalistic Islamic culture” promoted by the state. Many oppositional Muslims complain that the regulations are directed in particular against representatives of Islamic religion. “In a Muslim country, Jews or Christians have freedom of practice and do not have to obey sheikh-ul-islam. The policy is strictly anti-Islamic,” a Salafi Muslim complained to me.

  Moreover, since 2009 the law bans the “spreading propaganda of religions with violence or by threatening violence, as well as with the purpose of creating racial, national, religious, social hostility and enmity. It is prohibited to spread and propagate religions (religious movements) against the principles of humanity and human dignity” (Corley, 2009b). The lack of clear definitions in legal regulations serves as another method of fighting with all whose activities that are uncomfortable to the state. Salafi people also told me that groups that gather in private homes, as they do, are being harassed by the police. The functionaries interrupt such religious meetings, look for “dangerous” books, ask many questions and sometimes take people with them for further investigation.

  Recent actions on the political level involve an attack on Sunni mosques in many regions of Azerbaijan, the so-called hijab ban and the arrest of Islamic clerics and believers. Only in 2009 several mosques, funded by the Turks, have either been closed or subject to demolition. In Ganja a Salafi mosque is out of use. Officials have announced that some of the buildings needed to be repaired, whereas others have been built illegally (Makiri, 2010). The hijab controversy began a year later, in December 2010. The unofficial anti-hijab campaign was led by the Minister of Education, Misir Mardanov. Girls in public schools are indirectly prohibited from wearing headscarves. But even before pious Muslims women wearing hijabs could not work at public universities. Only private ones, at the Khazar University in Baku where I taught for a semester, accepted veiled women. “National Islam” incorporates ethnic traditions but does not leave much place for Islamic religiosity and its symbols. There is no official law regulating it, as there was no law regarding aḏān. The efforts of state authorities to control the religious public sphere are rather informal; the pressure on people is exercised in a more subtle way. Some political commentators, such as Zafar Guliyev, consider that this situation is a result of the government’s raising “Islamophobia.” The authorities are afraid to lead an open war with believers, but at the same time are afraid of their prospective mobilization. The sheikh-ul-islam tried to reach a compromise, but also took the government’s secularist side. When asked by journalists in December 2010 to comment on this problem, Pashazade answered that wearing a headscarf “was decided by God and has to be followed by Muslims,” but underlined that Azerbaijan’s secular “laws cannot be violated, either” (Abbasov, 2011). A mass peaceful protest which was organized in May 2011 was dispersed by police and arrests followed. Next year, in October 2012 another protest—“Freedom for hijab”—took place before the Ministry of Education and again demonstration led to detentions and imprisonment (Norwegian Helsinki Committee, 2015).

  Another controversy revolves around the arrest of Islamic clerics. Over the past few years this practice has only intensified. Muslim leaders and some believers are detained and put into prison for various reasons, questioned by the government’s opposition. One of the most resounding was the arrest of the Islamic Party of Azerbaijan in January 2011. Movsum Samedov was arrested along with some of his colleagues. Also, Shia clerics who had received Iranian education were inconvenient for the ruling elite. Charges put against them include acts of hooliganism and weapon possession. According to observers, such cases of arrests of Muslim leaders have recently become more common. The Norwegian Helsinki Committee, a non-governmental organization dedicated to human right issues, lists the names of 80 political prisoners in Azerbaijan, many of whom are religious figures (Norwegian Helsinki Committee, 2015).

  Realizing how negative the government’s image among the independent religious communities is, in 2012 authorities undertook reforms. The most significant was the change of leadership of the SCWRA. A new chairman of the Committee was carefully chosen among religiously educated and profession candidates. Elshad Iskenderov who was widely respected among Islamic leaders in Azerbaijan replaced a former president, Hidayat Orujov. The change was meaningful. Orujov was widely regarded as an ignorant on religious issues and the SCWRA’s activities under his leadership only deteriorated the Committee’s image in the society. Tensions among the state authorities and religious communities escalated and there was no common ground for reconciliation. Iskenderov’s appointment brought high expectations for reforms. His CV was seen as a hope for ending the impasse. In the 1990s he was active in Azerbaijani youth organizations and was a natural leader. Islamic leaders view Iskenderov’s as a pious Muslim and a knowledgeable and experienced man. He worked, among others, as secretary general of Islamic Conference Youth Forum for Dialogue and Cooperation. As SCWRA’s chairman Iskenderov began an active work leading numerous interfaith and dialogue initiatives. He took part in meetings with representatives of other religions from Azerbaijan and abroad at which he praised and promoted a national model of religious tolerance. He has also travelled widely and attended important events in other countries. Also at home he began networking with local Sunn
i and Shia communities.

  However, an assessment of SCWRA’s activities is not optimistic. Positive steps are appreciated and his engagement with religious life noticed. But still the leaders of Independent Islamic groups do not see a radical step in solving major problems that exist between the state and Islamic communities. They judge the situation as stable, but not as improving. The hijab issue is unresolved, Sunni mosques remain closed, and other problems remain untouched. The only thing that has probably improved so far is the Azerbaijan’s image abroad (Liles, 2013).

  The year 2013 witnessed new amendments to the Law on Religious Freedom approved by the Azerbaijani parliament. The sale of religious materials, such as books or videos, was further restricted and brought under the political control. The requirement to have a “verification mark” issued by the state in practice strengthens the censorship system. There are costly fines as well as imprisonment for the production or distribution of religious literature which was not approved by SCWRA and is thus considered illegal (US Department of State, 2013).