Religious Revival and Secularism in Post-Soviet Azerbaijan

by Dobrosława Wiktor-Mach

  War on Terror

  Paradoxically, the events of September 11, 2001 enhanced the state’s position in the competition with pious Muslim traditions. The tragedy on the other continent legitimized the ruling regime’s practices directed against some Muslim communities in the eyes of society. The Azerbaijani power structures with the aid of official religious establishment successfully use the rhetoric based on a strict division of Islamic groups between the “proper” traditional Islam, constituting an integral element of Azerbaijani culture, and “dangerous” radical Islam, posing a threat to society. Radical Islam was soon labelled as “Wahhabi” Islam, and this description has been popularized in mass media and is now known by virtually every citizen of Azerbaijan. From time to time there are news reports about extremist groups that intend to commit terror acts and destabilize the political situation. The accusations were also made by the official Shiite clergy and the governmental bodies. Independent religious communities claim that the state exaggerates the threat of radicalism to mobilize local and international sympathy for its undemocratic measures taken against certain groups. Nonetheless, the public opinion has generally accepted this rhetoric and holds a very negative view of Wahhabis.

  “Do not meet with Wahhabis!” shouted my friend Sughra with horror when I told her that I had arranged a meeting with a member of this group. “We are afraid of them, because they are terrorists. Our teacher was trying to convince us that not all Wahhabis are terrorists, only some, but I do not know…” She is always afraid of them, especially when they are in the metro. She has one Wahhabi in her family. He joined this group when he came to Baku to study geography at the Baku State University. Sughra’s family opposed his decision. For some time, the young man used to visit his relatives and always made an effort to convince them that they had no idea about Islam. Sughra was terrified so much that she did not dare to talk to him at all. He criticized everything. Consequently, the family expelled him from the home and broke all relationships. “Wahhabis claim that only those who behave exactly like them are true Muslims!” she added at the end.

  The regime’s approach to particular Islamic traditions can be characterized as dynamic and incoherent. Since the beginning of the “war on terror” the main focus of authorities has been members of the Wahhabi tradition. There were several reasons for that. First of all, people identified as “Wahhabis,” who prefer to call themselves “Salafi Sunnites,” usually follow the stricter Hanbali school of law and thus their habitus is more conservative than that of other Muslims. For that reason, they stand in a clear contrast to secular Muslims with their very moderate approach to religious affairs. Secondly, Salafis are easily identifiable by visual symbols, the most prominent being “beard” and “hijab.” Wahhabi men are often referred to by other Azeris as sakkalilar (bearded people), or garasakkalilar (black-bearded people) (Valiyev, 2005). The same symbols distinguish Salafi Muslims in the North Caucasus. “Wahhabi” men have a longish beard with no mustache and, additionally wear trousers of above-ankle length. “Wahhabi” women do not wear traditional loose female head covering (known as kalaghai), frequently seen in Azerbaijani mosques and pirs, but a hijab covering all hair and body, except for faces and hands. However, while beards together with shorter trousers are unique only for Salafi men, hijabs worn by Salafi women in most cases (except for the most pious believers) resemble a typical hijab that is popular also among pro-Turkish and Shiite Muslims.

  Although Salafi-like symbols are not prohibited, beards and short trousers cause unpleasant incidents with the security forces. Salafis complain of how the police treat them. There were cases when Salafi men were caught in the street only for the reason of their symbols, taken to a police station and shaved. As if the state was intending to get rid of public manifestations of religiosity without inquiring into religious ideas and convictions. During a focus group, a Salafi man told me a story of his friend who came back from Medina after five years of studies. He was arrested and forced to choose his “guilt,” either involvement in a drug business or something else. After having signed such a statement charges might have been brought against him. The Salafi man himself was once taken to the police for doing namaz in a public place. In this case, he only had to sign a document stating that he was not a terrorist.

  Figure 8.1 The most popular form of hijab worn by some pious Azerbaijani women On the other hand, political regime’s approach to Salafis is more nuanced than it may appear. According to Anar Valiyev (2008), Azerbaijani official agencies have not managed to work out a unified strategy to this often-diverse group of people. Wahhabism has not been so far forbidden in the country, and the divisions inside this group are judged in various ways. There are official bodies that would prefer to exclude Salafism from the Azerbaijani religious market; their representatives point to alleged involvement of those Muslims in the fighting in the North Caucasus and Afghanistan. The terrorist act in the Salafi Abu Bakr mosque in 2008 is also given as proof that they are dangerous radicals. However, there are also politicians who do not share this view. The leaders of the State Committee for Work with Religious Associations admit that most of the Salafis are not engaged in violence and anti-state activities. Despite of this opinion, the SCWRA has not managed to re-open the Abu Bakr mosque.

  Alongside the struggle with Salafis, state authorities have also undertaken a silent war with Turkish traditions. As it has been mentioned earlier, all foreign preachers are forbidden to lead religious communities in Azerbaijan. It is however surprising that particularly the Nurcu communities have been discriminated in recent years, despite of their loyalty to the ruling regime. Sheikh-ul-islam equated people close to the movement with Salafis as equally dangerous to Islam (International Crisis Group, 2008, p. 9). An argument raised against the fethullahci community is the controversy around the leader of the movement, Fethullah Gülen. He was accused of pro-Islamic and anti-state activities and in 1998 departed for the U.S. Although he was acquitted in 2006, his activity still rises doubts among Azerbaijani politicians. People close to the movement are afraid to pronounce Gülen’s name in public places in order not to raise suspicion. It seems that the political leaders realized the massive support of mainly young people for pious Sunni traditions and try to prevent this trend as much as they can. They are afraid of social and political mobilization Islamic preaching may unleash.

  8.2Impact of State Regulations

  The secular state’s interference in religious reality has been constantly increasing. In contrast to almost unregulated market from the first years of 1991 independence, each subsequent move is directed against the freedom of choice and freedom of religious teachings. The visible Islamic revival is triggered, to a large degree, by Sunni pious traditions, which became the main target of government’s attacks and restrictions. Organizations and believers of Independent Islam have to adapt their strategies to the new circumstances. They react to the rising level of restrictions and secularist practices of the government.

  State suppression leads to unintended consequences. When the law made it more difficult for religious communities to register, they did not stop their activities, but went underground. They operate in private rooms, apartments, shops, offices, etc. According to SCWRA, in 2005 there were around 500 illegal and secret houses of prayer (Hadjy-zadeh, 2005a, p. 9). Many Sunnis who used to attend mosques, which are now closed, told me that they gather from time to time to study Islam in small groups in private apartments. Shiite Juma community holds lectures and discussion not in a mosque space but in a private space. They read and study the Koran privately, on their own.

  Another aspect of religious organization is the status of state supported places. As the official Shiite clergy and the state accepted “unofficial” Islam of saint veneration, some of the pirs have been taken “under the protection” of the government. They are given right to function more easily than independent mosques. Some pirs have even been renovated by the order and patronage of the president of Azerbaijan. For instance, it was He
ydar Aliyev’s initiative to rebuilt the famous Bibi Heybet mosque, which is considered to be a pir by locals. Now a portrait of the president hangs at its entrance.

  Secondly, the symbols of Islam, such as Muslim clothes, undergo change. Since the first attacks on the longer Wahhabi beard, many followers of this tradition have shaved themselves. For some it was their own choice, some were inclined to do so by their employers. Still others had no choice, since they were shaved at police stations during one of a “hunt on beards” campaign. In particular, the disappearance of visible Salafi symbols touched those adherents who are active in politics and influential companies. Several people employed in institutions such as the Ministry for Internal Security, National Security, and some BP’s departments are said to be Salafis (Kotecha, 2006, p.13), but they are not recognized by their appearance. The same trend refers to female dress. Alongside arguments that hijab is obligatory for every Muslim woman because Allah in the Koran says so, another approach is gaining popularity among Muslims in Baku. Most women I talked to, even those wearing hijab, underline that it is solely a woman’s choice. It must follow from the study of Islam, and the decision to wear it should be made on second thoughts. Even some girls close to the Salafi ideology prefer not to wear hijab and instead to dress in a modest way. They do not want to attract attention, as they were justifying their decision. If the majority of women were wearing Muslim clothes, they would do so as well. Another reason for not wearing hijab is the pressure from teachers and employers. In Baku Caucasus University, for instance, students are sometimes asked to reflect a lot before they cover their heads, and Muslim women in hijab are not accepted as lecturers there, because the university pragmatically tries to avoid any confrontation with state officials. Therefore, in the public space, Islamic symbols are limited and a lot of religious people do not openly demonstrate their piety. Islamic discourse of the main traditions has been reformulated to put an emphasis on modesty instead of on a particular dress code.

  Thirdly, Muslims who desire to practice their religion and do not want to conform to the state’s policy take under consideration an emigration from Azerbaijan. Although Muslim countries are the first desired place of destination, they consider also Europe. One Salafi man, who has travelled to European countries, said that there are non-Islamic countries where one can practice Islam more freely than in Azerbaijan. Other Muslims radicalize their views and become more prejudiced to any state institution. Although, in my opinion, most religious people in that country support a secular state, the ongoing discrimination of Islam in a Muslim country make some of them change their attitudes. They argue that under the sharia law their religious rights would be guaranteed.

  Moreover, state’s restrictions in the freedom of the religious market contributed to limiting religious radicalism in the country. In the opinion of local observers, vestiges of extremist groups are mostly kept under surveillance. From time to time, there are news reports about lawsuits brought against groups accused of terrorist activities. This can probably change in the future, if standard forms of religious practice, such as gathering at mosques, will still be discouraged. Once the religious communities learn to operate underground in the atmosphere of fear, the state cannot be sure of their conformity.

  Last but not least, statistics confirm what people sense in Baku. Islamic sentiments and the number of people engaged in Islam are growing. The Islamic resurgence is all the time dynamic and it is hard to predict its scenario. The state’s desire to curtail the influence of Islamic activism and radicalism is felt by common Muslims as unfair. Many believers who would prefer to refrain from politics are joining the protests against the authorities’ crackdown on hijab or aḏān. They join forces against arrests of Islamic figures and allegations made against them. Such a situation incites strong emotions and leads to public discussions and mobilization. Government’s “Islamophobia” may, in effect, stoke up Islamic mobilization and turn more and more people towards radical Islamic leaders.

  The development of Islam in the Caucasus and in the wider region is a dynamic and contextual phenomenon, a process shaped by various historical and contemporary events. The basic trend that emerges from the analysis is the long dominance of Shiism, continuously challenged by Sunni and distinct Sufi groups and movements, which was weakened after the Russification influences in Azerbaijan and subsequent Soviet rules. In that period, a lessening of intra-religious divisions occurred, and, on the eve of independence, the majority of Muslims were not able to identify themselves as Shia or Sunni. The religious revival that followed has brought competition between local and, most of all, foreign religious actors that engaged in the struggle over defining what does it mean to be a Muslim in the contemporary world. The diverse answers inclined many Azerbaijanis to revive old almost universal antagonisms between Sunnism and Shiism. The competition inside and between these traditions has clearly been turning towards the Sunnis’ lead. If the trend continues, traditionally Shiite Azerbaijan may one day become mostly Sunni.

  Glossary

  aḏān the Islamic call to prayer

  ahl al-bayt lit. “people of the house,” the term is used in reference to the family of Prophet Muhammad

  ahl al-kitāb lit. “people of the Book,” the term designates non-Muslims who enjoyed the status of “protected people” (ahl aḏ-ḏimma) under the Muslim rule

  ahl as-sunna Sunnites

  ākhūnd Persian name for a Muslim cleric; in Azerbaijan it is the title of a graduate of an Islamic academy or university who can be appointed as head of a mosque

  ʿĀšūrāʾ a Shia Muslim festival celebrated on the 10th day of the Muslim month of Muḥarram. It commemorates the martyrdom of Hussein, the grandson of Muhammad in 680 CE. For Sunni Muslims it is a day of fasting

  Ātašgāh (Persian) lit. “home of fire,” a Zoroastrian fire temple

  bid ʿa innovation in religious practice or doctrine

  dār al-ḥarb lit. “land of war,” the term denotes non-Muslim territories where strife for Islam should continue

  dār al-īslām lit. “land of Islam,” the term describes states under the Muslim authority, where sharia is enforced

  ḏikr lit. “remembering,” ceremonial activity of the recitation of God’s name or other short formulas

  ǧizya Islamic tax

  ḫānakā (Persian; in Turkish tekke) a Sufi lodge; in Arabic cultural area zāwiyā

  ḫawāriǧ radical wing of Salafism in Azerbaijan. The term derives from the fundamentalist Kharijite sect that originated in the seventh century

  ḫuṭba public preaching

  iǧtihād independent reasoning and interpretation of Islamic law

  Ithnā ʿashariyya a branch in Shiism marked by a belief in Twelve Imams; widespread in Iran and Azerbaijan

  Jadidism Muslim intellectual reform movement created in the 19th century on the territory of Russian empire. In the religious sphere, it proposed new (ǧadid) methods of Koranic exegesis

  Kaʿba the Muslim shrine in Mecca regarded by the faithful as the holiest site in the world

  kāfir; pl. kuffār unbeliever

  kalaghai popular type of female head covering in Azerbaijan, different from the new

  karbalai hijab style the title of a Shia pilgrim who has visited the holy shrines in Karbala in Iraq

  ketman an Islamic doctrine known also as taqiyya which permits the concealment and dissimulation of one’s religious belief if confronted with the danger of death or injury from persecutors

  khanaqah Sufi lodge

  Kurban Bayram known also as ʿId al-Aḍḥā; Muslim holiday of sacrifice

  maḏhab an Islamic school of law, e.g., Hanafite, Hanbalite, Shafiite, Malikite, Jafarite maḏhab

  marǧaʿ at‐taqlīd lit. “source to imitate,” a term used in regard to Shia authority

  masǧid al‐ǧumʿa Friday mosque

  mashadi title of a Shia pilgrim who has gone to Mashad in Iran

  mawlā; pl. lit. “protector, master, client,” a term typicall
y used to refer to non-Arab

  mawālī converts to Islam

  muftī scholar who issues fatwas; in Azerbaijan, a deputy of the Caucasus Muslim Board

  muhur piece of clay on which Shia Muslim lay their forehead when praying

  muǧtahid in Iran, a representative of higher stratum of Shiite clergy entitled to the interpretation of Islamic law

  murīd in Sufism, follower of a sheikh

  muršid teacher and spiritual master in Sufism

  namaz (in Persian and Turkish), the Muslim prayer

  Novruz (in Persian it means “New Day”); celebration of the New Year on the first day of spring

  pir Sufi teacher, in Azerbaijan—saint’s shrine or sacred place; an equivalent to mazar in Central Asia

  qāḍī judge who renders decisions according to the sharia

  sakkalilar lit. “bearded people,” or garasakkalilar, lit. “black-bearded people,” terms used in Azerbaijan to denote Salafi men.

  salafiyya movement that calls for “purification” Islam of all innovations and for return to the practices of Prophet Muhammad and the first generations of Muslims

  sayyid descendant of the Prophet or other Imams’ families, but also a saint or great religious scholar

  Shakhsey-vakh- in Iran and Azerbaijan, large processions on the 10th day of Muharram to

  sey commemorate the martyrdom of Imam Hussein

  sheikh‐ul‐islam (in Azeri, şeyx-ül-Islam), title of a religious superior in a Muslim country; in Azerbaijan the sheik-ul-islam is the head of the Caucasus Muslim Board and the highest religious leader officially recognized by the state

  taqiyya religious dissimulation; a principle accepted in the Shia theology

  ṭarīqa Sufi order or “mystical path”