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down of the palaces, which occurred several months later. In January the
palaces were still intact.62
The palace treasury at Persepolis, which Tiridates handed over to
Alexander untouched, contained the Achaemenids’ basic reserves of
bullion and other treasures they had accumulated for over more than 200
years. The total value was 120,000 talents, therefore much more than the
treasure at Susa. With time this vast amount of bullion, which had so far
only been thesaurized by the Achaemenids, was converted into coins to
cover the costs of war as well as allow Alexander to demonstrate his
largess towards artists, philosophers, soldiers and courtiers. The king’s
expenditure during his entire expedition east is estimated to have been on
average 7,500 talents a year. The economic effect of putting into
circulation such a massive amount of bullion has frequently been
compared to the effect of the influx of South American silver and gold in
the 16th and 17th centuries, and more often than not the Persian bullion
effect has been estimated to have been greater. Alexander decided to
concentrate all the treasure captured from the Persians in Susa. Some of
the sources mention captured treasure being transported from Persis to
Ecbatana though that could have only happened after the city was taken,
i.e. only after June 330. It is possible that these seemingly contradictory
accounts are due to the fact that some of the treasure was transported to
Susa while the rest was left to cover the costs of ongoing and future
campaigns in Iran. And it would have been that the second batch of
treasure was ultimately transported to Ecbatana. No doubt the decision to
shift the treasure resulted from knowledge that the palaces of Persepolis
would be burned down and therefore could no longer serve as the empire’s
main treasury. The exceptionally responsible mission of transporting the
bullion and other precious items was entrusted to Parmenion. This was a
61 Diod., 17.71.3-8. Schmidt 1953-1970; Walser 1966; Wiesehöfer 1996, pp. 24-26;
Cuyler Young 1988, pp. 108-110; Briant 1996, pp. 183-228.
62 Diod., 17.70, 17.71.3; Curt., 5.6.1-9. Badian 1985, pp. 440, 443; Atkinson 1994,
pp. 110-115; Bloedow, Loube 1997, p. 349; Nawotka 2003b, p. 68.
King of Asia
251
major logistical undertaking requiring 20,000 mules and 3,000-5,000
camels. Some of the pack animals and fodder had to be brought over from
Babylonia and Elam. That is why the transporting lasted two months and
was probably completed shortly before the end of Alexander’s four-month
stay in Fars.63 Persepolis was stripped of all its valuables so thoroughly
that in levels that could not have been subsequently robbed archaeologists
have found no more than twenty-one coins and small amounts of cheap
jewellery. The fact that the Macedonians must have spent so much time
and trouble to remove everything of value from the palaces indicates that
there was already a plan to burn them down.64
In lands he had previously occupied Alexander had always strived to
win the support of the local elites and thus legitimise his authority. This
policy had proved to be successful in Asia Minor, Egypt and Babylonia.
The same was to happen in Iran. After the Battle of Gaugamela Alexander
was proclaimed king of Asia and a similar proclamation could have been
made in April 330,65 therefore during his stay in Fars. As the rightful
successor of the Achaemenids Alexander not only appointed Persian
aristocrats as satraps but also adopted the key elements of Persian attire.
The equivocal nature of this latter issue has been the subject of
controversy among modern historians. The way the king dressed was not a
matter of fashion but of politics. Both the Iranians and the Greeks were
aware that the Great King was surrounded by a complex courtly system of
ceremonies which also included attire worn exclusively by him. By putting
on elements of this royal dress Alexander showed his intention to take
over Darius III’s legacy; this way he demonstrated to the Iranian
aristocracy the legitimacy of the authority he had gained through military
victories. Alexander most probably never wore the entire Persia costume.
However, the major historical sources (Arrian and Vulgate authors)
mention situations in the royal court when Alexander appeared with its
most important items including a tiara, which was generally regarded to be
an emblem of the Persian monarchy.66 It was also then that he founded a
unit of bodyguards modelled on the Persian melophori.67
63 Diod., 17.71.1-3; Str., 15.3.9; Plu., Alex. , 37.4. Keynes 1930, ii, pp. 150-152,
291; Bosworth 1988, pp. 92-93; Callataÿ 1989, p. 263; Bloedow, Loube 1997, pp.
347-352; Le Rider 2003, pp. 310-316; Holt 2003, p. 13.
64 Schmidt 1953-1970, i, pp. 16-78; Borza 1972, p. 235; Sancisi-Weerdenburg
1993, pp. 181-182; Bloedow, Loube 1997, pp. 344-346; Nawotka 2003b, p. 73;
Shabazi 2003, pp. 19-20 and n. 71.
65 Ael., VH, 2.25. Date: Grzybek 1990, pp. 43-44.
66 Goukowsky 1975; Badian 1985, pp. 450-452; Wiesehöfer 1996, pp. 105-107;
Wirth 1993, p. 223; Briant 1996, pp. 90-94. Alexander’s Persian costume: Duris,
252
Chapter V
Symbolic gestures were important to Alexander in Fars as a means of
acquiring acceptance among the Persians and that is why, for instance, he
visited Pasargadae. Located 43 km from Persepolis, this city was founded
by Cyrus after his victory over the Medes as the capital of the land of the
Pasargadae tribe, to which he himself belonged. A palace complex was
built there together a royal garden ( paradeisos). After Darius I had
transferred the capital to Persepolis, Pasargadae remained a place of
investiture for Persian monarchs; the most important edifice there was the
grave of Cyrus the Great. The commandant of Pasargadae, Gobares,
surrendered the city without resistance and Alexander captured another
6,000 talents from that city’s treasury. But the main objective of
Alexander’s mission was to visit Cyrus’s gave and pay his respects. This
visit was described by Aristobulus who accompanied the king on this
expedition.68
However, neither the satrap nominations nor the symbolic gestures
made the intended impression on the Persians. Already Ariobarzanes’s
fierce resistance at the Persian Gate gave a foretaste of the problems that
would be encountered in Fars. The ancient authors report hostilities
between Alexander and the Persian populace and that he had to take
fortified towns by force. The most serious fighting was against the
belligerent tribe of the Mardi, who were closely affiliated to the
Achaemenid dynasty. Alexander led a 30-day campaign against them in
the winter of 330. Traces of these events are found in the Iranian
Zoroastrian tradition, which is the only one to show Alexander in a
decidedly negative light. It alone blames Alexander for Darius’s death, of
trying to destroy the true religion, of extinguishing sacred fires, of burning
the Avesta, of stealing and translating sacred books, of destroying cities, of
&nbs
p; murdering aristocrats and magi and of carving up Ērānšahr (Iran). Though
not all these accusations are equally valid, for instance the Avesta had not
yet been written in Alexander’s time, they do reflect what the ancient
authors also describe as a campaign of terror to break the sprit of
ap. Ath., 12.50; Arr., An. , 4.7.4; Diod., 17.17.5; Curt., 6.6.4; Luc., DMort. , 12.4; ME, 2; Just., 12.3.8; Plu., Alex. , 45.2; Plu., mor. , 329f-330a. Nawotka 2003, pp.
100-101; Olbrycht 2004, pp. 286-293.
67 ME, 2.
68 Aristobul., ap. Str., 15.3.7-8; Arr., An. , 3.18.10; Curt., 5.6.10; Ps.-Callisth.,
2.18.1. Bosworth 1980, pp. 329-330; Briant 1980, pp. 65-72; Stronach 1985, pp.
838-849; Mallowan 1985, p. 418; Wiesehöfer 1996, pp. 26, 32; Tuplin 1996, pp.
88-89.
King of Asia
253
resistance among the Persians in Fars. 69 Yet the desire to acquire
legitimacy in Fars was probably doomed to fail from the start, especially
while Darius III was still alive. The Persians considered themselves to be a
chosen people and therefore their king could only be a Persian, an Aryan
and a member of the Achaemenid dynasty. For the Persians, who viewed
the world largely from a religious perspective, Alexander could only be an
anti-monarch, a rebel against Ahura-Mazda.70
Despite successive defeats Darius was still considered the legitimate
ruler not only in Fars but also in at least some of the countries Alexander
had already conquered. Thanks to extant local sources we know the mood
among some Babylonians. Recorded after the Battle of Gaugamela, the
‘Dynastic Prophecy’ reports Darius’s defeat (at Gaugamela) and the
occupation of Babylon by Hanû (Alexander) but it predicts that the
rightful king would be victorious in the next battle, Babylon would be
liberated and peace and prosperity would return. 71 Nevertheless, for
Alexander the situation was nowhere worse than in Fars. In that region’s
tradition recorded in Ardā Wīrāz-Nāmag book the Macedonians are
remembered as a tribe of dishevelled demons from the land of wrath. Their
king is nicknamed Guzastag (the Accursed) – just like the god of evil,
deceit and darkness, Angra Mainyu. The doggedness of Persian resistance
in the winter of 330 probably explains why in a letter from Aristotle to
Alexander in the summer of 330 there is a suggestion that the Persians,
exceptionally among other Asian nations, should be deported to Europe
and Africa.72
At that time Darius III was some 600 km from Persepolis in Ecbatana
and trying to gather forces for the next battle. The formidable east Iranian
cavalry had retreated from Gaugamela relatively unscathed and Darius
was also counting on the arrival of allied forces from Scythia, so his army
could not be ignored and it would not have been prudent to leave behind a
province that was not fully subjugated and inhabited by a population still
69 Curt., 5.6.11-19; Diod., 17.73.1. Green 1974, pp. 314-320; Atkinson 1994, pp.
118-120; Wiesehöfer 1994, pp. 363-364, 395-397; Briant 2002, pp. 90-92; Shabazi
2003.
70 Eddy 1961, pp. 58-62; Balcer 1978, pp. 126-127.
71 Sachs-Hunger 1988, no. 328, col. v. Grayson 1975, pp. 24-37; Marasco 1985;
Kuhrt 1987, pp. 154-156; Briant 1996, p. 803; Mehl 1999, p. 34; Brosius 2003, pp.
171-172; Shabazi 2003, pp. 15-19. But some see in the Dynastic Prophecy Darius
III as an usurper justly punished: van der Spek 2003, pp. 324-342.
72 Eddy 1961, pp. 12-41; Green 1974, pp. 314-315; Boyce 1982, pp. 12-15, 290;
Plezia, Bielawski 1970, chapter 7 of Aristotle’s letter; Carlier 1995, p. 156;
Faraguna 2003, pp. 116-117; Shabazi 2003.
254
Chapter V
loyal to the Persian king. Once his efforts to appease proved unsuccessful,
Alexander embarked on a campaign of terror which culminated in the
burning of Persepolis. The destruction of the palaces with fire, a sacred
element in the Zoroastrian religion, was supposed break the spirit of
resistance among Persians. The destruction happened towards the end of
Alexander’s stay in Fars, i.e. in May 330.73 That the Macedonians were
conducting an ideological war is confirmed by archaeological findings.
Inside the Persepolis treasury approximately 300 fragments of deliberately
smashed stone mortar were found. Such mortars were used to produce
haoma – a potion used in the Zoroastrian cult. 74 In all probability
Macedonian soldiers destroyed the mortars as an action against the magi
who had been stirring up religious and nationalistic feelings among the
native Persians.
The burning of the Persepolis palaces has been recorded in all the main
historical sources concerning Alexander. The blaze is also confirmed by
archaeological findings. In three edifices – the Apadana, the Hundred
Column Hall and the Treasury – the charred remains of cedar wood were
found in a 0.3-1 m thick layer of ashes, and we know that cedar wood was
used as a building material in Persepolis. The ancient authors give diverse
accounts of the course of events and Alexander’s motives behind the
destruction. According to Arrian, Strabo and the anonymous author of
Itinerarium Alexandri, this was an act of revenge for the burning of Greek
temples by Xerxes in 480, and such was no doubt the official version of
Macedonian propaganda. Diodorus, Curtius and Plutarch give, after
Cleitarchus, a colourful description of how during a drinking party an
Athenian hetaera (courtesan) Thais persuaded a drunken Alexander to do
it. Arrian does not mention this incident as his chief source, the work of
King Ptolemy I also failed to mention it; Thais had been Ptolemy’s
mistress for many years and he would not have wished her to be associated
with this unprecedented act of vandalism. Three buildings were burnt, but
the distances between them and the materials they were built from (brick
walls and clay roofs) precluded the possibility of the blaze spreading
naturally after just one of the buildings had been set alight by drunken
revellers. All three edifices must have been set on fire after some
preparation, which is also confirmed by the lack of valuables found on site.
73 Schwartz 1985, p. 678; Nawotka 2003b.
74 Schmidt 1953-1970, ii, pp. 53-55; Balcer 1978, p. 31; Schwartz 1985, pp. 676-
677.
King of Asia
255
The first torch may have indeed been cast by Thais, but in doing so she
would have been doing exactly what Alexander intended.75
A couple of months later it became apparent that Darius III posed a
significantly smaller threat than had originally been supposed in May 330.
That is why the destruction of the Persepolis palaces – the symbol of
Achaemenid might – turned out to be so costly, not only because of the
obvious material loss but above all because it alienated Alexander from
Persian elites and ordinary Persians alike. In their eyes the Macedonian
was to remain an invader and not the rightful king of Iran.76
5. The death of Darius III
Towards the end of May 330 the Macedonian army set off for Ecbatana,
where Alexander knew Darius III to be. Th
is city (today Hamadan in
western Iran) was the former capital of Media and on account of its
relatively cool climate, being located 1,880 m above sea level in the
Zagros Mountains, it later served as the summer residence of the Persian
kings. Waiting until May before starting the 600-km trek to Ecbatana was
logistically advantageous for much of the route led through the mountains
and it was only in late spring that they were entirely free of snow.
Moreover, the Median harvest began in June, which made it easier to
acquire essential provisions. The Macedonians certainly advanced along
the Royal Road, which ran through the province of Paraitacene in the
upper reaches of the river Araxes. Alexander conquered this province and
appointed as satrap Oxathres (Oxyathres?), the son of Abulites the satrap
of Susa. Next the Macedonian army marched into neighbouring Media. It
was there that they were joined by reinforcements raised in Cilicia,
numbering 5,000 infantry and 1,000 cavalry. These forces had most
probably crossed Mesopotamia directly into Media and not taken the long
route through Persis as Alexander had done a few months earlier. It was in
Media that rumours reached Alexander that Darius had now received
Scythian and Cadusian reinforcements and was preparing for battle.
Therefore, leaving behind his baggage train (including some of the
Persepolis treasure) to be guarded by a large escort, he proceeded with
most of his forces on a forced march to Ecbatana.77
75 Clitarch., ap. Ath., 13.37; Arr., An. , 3.18.10-12; Diod., 17.70-72; Str., 15.3.6;
Curt., 5.7.2-11; Plu., Alex. , 38; It. Alex. , 67. Nawotka 2003b.
76 Nawotka 2003b, pp. 75-76; Brosius 2003, pp. 181-185; Brosius 2003a, pp. 227-
228; Heckel 2009, p. 40.
77 Str., 15.3.6; Arr., An. , 3.19.1-3; Curt., 5.7.12; Ps.-Callisth., 2.19. Engels 1978, pp.
73-79; Seibert 1985, pp. 108-109; Heckel 2006, pp. 186-187.
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Chapter V
However, the rumours turned out to be only partly true. Darius was
indeed counting on the support of his allies and east Iranian vassals.