Beyond NJ 9842

by Nitin A Gokhale

  “Within three hours of landing, we had to evacuate our radio operator, one sepoy Mandal, who suffered HAPE (High Altitude Pulmonary Edema) despite being trained, acclimatised and being fit. So, we had a radio but no radio operator. Of course, it helped since we were supposed to maintain radio silence. So now 29 of us remained at Bilafond La. Within 48 hours, we were down to 28. Another boy died in two days. April, after all is winter on Siachen. Of this lot, 21 of us, I remember got severe frost bites.

  “All this despite the fact that all these boys had come with me to the glacier in 1983, and were very familiar with the precautions that needed to be taken on the glacier. And this despite the fact that Gen Hoon had managed to get us imported snow clothing and equipment from abroad, just in the nick of time. I remember they arrived on the evening of 12 April, barely hours before we were being launched into Operation Meghdoot. Thermal coats, thermal pants, very nice balaclavas, excellent tents, ice axes, goggles, the works were bought from Europe. The weapons however remained the basic Indian Army 7.62 mm SLR. Of course, we had mortars, MMG, missiles, Grad P rockets. Some of the weapons came by air, some came through porters. I remember that at that time we were paying the porters princely sums. They were getting 50 rupees per porter per day, almost equivalent to the porter fee for expeditions to Mount Everest then. But we didn’t mind since they were all local Ladakhis.”

  But, getting to Bilafond La turned out to be the easy part. As the day progressed, the “weather packed up,” as military men would say in the mountains. The visibility was down to zero, it started snowing heavily, ruling out any further helicopter sorties.

  Sanjay Kulkarni and his troop at Bilafond La, June 1984

  “The blizzard hit us even as the two-man Pub tents were being set up. It was damn difficult. At that point of time, the higher authorities must have thought that this was a big mistake. We remained out of contact for three days,” Gen Kulkarni recalls.

  Amidst the blizzard however, the platoon led by Capt Sanjay Kulkarni planted the first Indian flag on Bilafond La on 13 April 1984!

  Operation Meghdoot was now a reality.

  But the job was far from done. The other passes had to be secured before the Pakistanis took counter measures, or tried to attack the small platoon level force at Bilafond La.

  Down below, at the base camp, slight recriminations had started. The Staff in Northern Command and the Military Operations Directorate was sweating. Sending troops in winter on the glacier now seemed murderous.

  Remembers Brig Channa, whose final call it was to send Capt Sanjay Kulkarni and party to Bilafond La on 13 April: “There were many who stared at me with the ‘I-told-you-so’ look. But to be frank, I was still confident that the storm would pass over. And it did. Three days later. The radio silence worked wonderfully. The Pakis came to know about the operation only after we had established and occupied the post at Bilafond La, that too because Sanjay opened the radio to tells us that one boy had died of hypoxia.”

  But, even as Sanjay Kulkarni and his platoon remained out of contact, the ground troops commenced their arduous move on foot from base camp and established Camp I on 13 April itself. Camp II and Camp III were established by 15 April along the route to Bilafond La. Lt Col Pushkar Chand, the Task Force Commander, pushed the Ladakhis and 19 Kumaon to Camp I and then to Camp II. Lt Col Pushkar Chand, who later retired as a Brigadier, was a para-commando and a renowned mountaineer. Speaking to me from his village in Uttarakhand where is settled now, he remembers walking to each and every post in the six months that he remained the Task Force Commander in the initial deployment of Operation Meghdoot.

  “I was actually far away from this action as CO (Commanding Officer) of 1 Vikas regiment then stationed at Kiari. But the Corps Commander (Lt Gen Hoon) personally called me and ordered me to take over as the Task Force Commander, possibly because I was the fittest CO in the area that time,” Brig Pushkar Chand says. Many young officers and jawans who worked with him on the glacier remember him with fondness. “He kept the spirits high in the most difficult circumstances,” remembers a young officer from that time.

  The Cheetah in early days

  Getting essential supplies to Bilafond La

  Four days later, on 17 April when the weather improved, the Air Force flew a record number of 32 helicopter sorties with five available Cheetahs and two Mi-8 helicopters. That day, Sia La was occupied by a platoon of Ladakh Scouts under Maj Ajay Bahuguna. Troops had to be dropped approximately five km east of Sia La. They had to trudge up the treacherous slopes, which made movement extremely difficult because of heavy snowfall during the preceding days.

  As the radio sets opened up—Sanjay Kulkarni had to tell base that one of the soldiers had died of hypoxia—and helicopters started flying again, the Bilafond La platoon had an unexpected visitor: A Pakistani helicopter overhead!

  “When the Pakistanis saw us, they turned. If they had not seen us, they would have probably done exactly the same thing (heli-dropped at Bilafond La). Now they had no chance. They realised we were already at Bilafond La!” Sanjay Kulkarni remembers.

  The improved weather meant that the follow up action to consolidate deployment all along the Saltoro ridge was speeded up.

  Northern Command records of the time show that the link up force established the FLB (Forward Logistics Base) in the general area of Lolofond and Siachen glacier on 18 April and Camp IV on 22 April. Link up with Bilafond La post took place on 24 April, and on the same day Camp V was established. After establishing Camp VI on 26 April, the balance force was divided into two parties, one party established the assault camp for Indira Col and Turkestan La on 29 April, and the other party under Maj NS Salaria of Ladakh Scouts linked up with the Sia La post on the same day.

  The top brass in Northern Command then took stock of the situation.

  By now, Pakistani helicopters and even fighter planes were making reconnaissance sorties over the Saltoro ridge. Indian soldiers were surely visible to them on the key passes. The reaction at GHQ in Rawalpindi can only be imagined! India had beaten them to the top.

  A backlash was inevitable.

  As a first step, for providing air defence cover to counter the Pak air threat, two detachments each of SAM-7 (Strella) missiles were inducted at Sia La and Bilafond La on 22 and 24 April respectively. Simultaneously, two Zu-23-2 guns under 2/Lt Manoj Misra of 126 Lt AD Regiment were airlifted by Cheetah helicopters to the FLB. While these guns were being deployed on 23 April when in fact, Pakistani jet aircraft flew over Sia La, Indira Col and then along the glacier to the base camp. They were certainly on a photo reconnaissance mission.

  Gen Chibber, meanwhile along with Maj Gen Sharma and Maj Gen Amarjit Singh, flew over Sia La and Bilafond La. He subsequently ordered deployment of four ZU-23 guns. Two guns were meant for protection of the Leh Airfield and the two others for the Thoise airfield. One detachment of Grad Peach was also inducted by air at Bilafond La. With the link up of ground troops and induction of AD (air defence) guns, the entire Siachen glacier had been secured.

  Immediately after Operation Meghdoot was launched, Gen Chibber wrote in an official note: “The two main passes were sealed off. The enemy was taken completely by surprise and an area of approximately 3,300 sq km, illegally shown as part of PoK on the maps published by Pak and the USA were now under our control. The enemy had been pre-empted in their attempt to occupy the area claimed by them.”

  The early gunners

  No one, least of all Gen Chibber, would have imagined that the Operation would go down in India’s history as the longest continuous deployment!

  The early participants of Op Meghdoot (top and bottom)

  in their basic clothing

  Capt Sanjay Kulkarni flying out from Bilafond La

  The early landings at Bilafond La

  V

  Staying Put

  “We never thought we would stay there forever”

  Pakistan, stung and surprised by India’s pre-emptive action, launched Operation Ababeel
(Swallow) in response to Operation Meghdoot. Its aim: to try and evict Indian troops from Bilafond La and Sia La.

  The initial plans of Operation Ababeel, planned and war gamed in January 1984, envisaged launching operations through the proven and easier approaches via Bilafond La and Sia La to get on to the Siachen glacier.

  But, once Bilafond La and Sia La were occupied by Indian troops, Pakistan began exploring other ingress routes along the Saltoro ridge, in the general area of Bilafond La and Sia La.

  Indian intelligence reported the formation of the Burzil Force in the 80 Infantry Brigade sector, although the 62 Infantry Brigade was initially supposed to be responsible for conducting operations, since the Siachen glacier was within its operational responsibility. Incidentally, the Headquarters of the Task Force were reported to be located at Khapalu for controlling Operation Ababeel.

  By 15 May, Northern Command had, with the help of the Indian Air Force photo reconnaissance missions and other intelligence assets, gathered enough information about Pakistan’s build up in an attempt to wrest control of the Saltoro ridge. A Northern Command note of the time said:

  “In our appreciation, Pak had formed several task forces to try and wrest back control from India. These were:

  •Hyder Force: Approximately one company minus of SSG (Special Services Group) and one section of NLI (Northern Light Infantry) at location NJ 6299, approximately 10 km south-west of Sia La.

  •Baber Force: One company of SSG and one platoon of NLI, located in Ali Brangsa.

  •Ashgar Force: The force comprising one company of SSG and one platoon of NLI was operating on the Chumik glacier and also patrolling towards the Gyongla glacier at point NK 0069.

  •Hafeez Force: This force of approximately one company was probably operating between the Hyder and Baber forces, with the view of exploiting any gaps/unoccupied dominating heights.

  •Kalander Force: This force, probably trained for infiltration tasks, was inducted in the area in the first week of May 1984, to probably disrupt Indian lines of communications. However, detailed movement/deployment of this force could not be known.

  •Our analysis showed that while SSG soldiers were being used for occupation of defences, NLI troops were used for administrative duties, occupation of base camps, and to act as reserves, or to be deployed for route opening and as combat porters.

  •By the first week of May 1984, Pakistan build up opposite our glacial posts and in the area of Gyong La had increased considerably. There were also intelligence reports of Pakistan’s likely intentions to infiltrate through the gap between the Kargil and Gallies sectors. Our forward troops in this area also reported reinforcement of some Pakistan posts opposite the Kargil sector.”

  INDIAN BUILDUP

  Northern Command and 15 Corps was aware that it was essential to deny Pakistan troops any access across the Saltoro range to the Siachen glacier. With Sia La and Bilafond La under Indian control, Pakistan was making determined efforts to get across the watershed of Gyong La.

  Gen Chibber visited the area of operations on 22 April 1984 and after an extensive aerial survey, gave the following directions:

  A lonely post framed against the vast expanse of the glacier

  (a)Patrolling of all southern glaciers, that is Gyong La, Lagongma, Layogma, Urdolep and Korisa to be carried out by our troops to counter infiltration attempts.

  (b)Enemy will be prevented from establishing any hold on the Saltoro range or areas east of it.

  (c)Patrolling of Teram Sehar glacier to be undertaken immediately.

  Following these directives, Lt Gen Hoon issued instructions to expedite movement of troops to the Saltoro crest line, especially to Gyong La. He also ordered forward movement of back up platoons to the passes both at Sia La and Bilafond La, to dominate the heights astride the passes by regular patrolling. Lt Col Pushkar Chand moved to Forward Logistics Base (FLB) which was reinforced by a platoon each of Ladakh Scouts and 19 Kumaon. Maj Sujan Singh, Officer in-charge (OC), Ladakh Scouts (Karakoram Wing) was made responsible for organising a base camp with two companies of 19 Kumaon and one platoon of Ladakh Scouts, and was also tasked for ferrying stores from the base camp to Camps I, II and III. One company of 19 Kumaon was ordered to move to the crest line at Gyong La.

  Movement of Guns

  One 165 mm IFG Mk I gun sourced from the 108 Medium Regiment was test fired and became operational at the base camp on 10 May 1984. One 75/74 howitzer was dismantled and carried by the troops—a rare feat indeed to deploy a mountain gun at an altitude of approximately 16,000 feet after humping it over miles of rocky and snowy glacier. Two more IFG MK I guns were moved to the base camp and by 26 May, an array of guns had been deployed.

  Occupation of Gyong La by 19 Kumaon

  While the guns were being deployed, one company of 19 Kumaon under Lt Col DK Khanna advanced towards the crest line of Gyong La. The progress of this column was rather slow and by 20 May, after 14 days of marching from the base camp, the troops were still moving in the general area of the administrative base.

  Brig Channa during his aerial reconnaissance of the ridge line had seen a small group of Pakistani personnel in khaki and dark clothing around Saddle 6646. No tents or field fortifications, were however seen. The enemy had apparently secured a foothold on Saddle. The Sector Commander directed CO 19 Kumaon to move towards the crest line at the earliest, and if possible, to engage the enemy by manoeuvring troops to a suitable vantage position, or by physical action. This column reached the line after 18 days of marching.

  The wilderness of the glacier

  Finally, by the first week of June 1984, one company of 19 Kumaon consolidated its position on Gyong La. The occupation of Point 5705, OP Hill, the Ring Countour and the eastern slopes of Point 5965 meant that, the complete area south and west of the crest line came under India’s domination. It wasn’t easy.

  A Northern Command communication of the time noted: “Our maintenance route to Point 5705 lay over very difficult and a crevassed surface. To overcome this problem, troops of 1 Vikas were ordered to open a route through Zingrulma glacier. Namgyal Sangpo gallantly led his boys through a very treacherous route, negotiating a large number of crevasses and a few ice walls. This party constructed a helipad at Point 5615 NL 7145. From this helipad, we were able to ‘manpack’ a 57 mm RCL (recoil less gun) to Point 5705, to engage well entrenched enemy positions built into the rock face at OP II.”

  Meanwhile, to further consolidate the deployment, patrolling of the southern glaciers – Langongma, Lyogma, Urdolep and Korisa – was intensified and efforts made to get on to the watershed. The troops could not get on to the watershed in all places, because of the extremely difficult terrain and ice walls. But, the very fact that troops had reached these areas ensured close surveillance of the glacier.

  Ski troopers, specially drafted from HAWS were patrolling right up to Indira Col and Turkestan La, to ensure surveillance of the likely approaches to Siachen from the North.

  THE FIRST ATTACK

  Sanjay Kulkarni, whose platoon was by now well-established on Bilafond La since getting deployed there on 13 April, remembers the first attack which is seared into his mind, even 30 years later.

  “Although the Pakistanis had spotted us immediately after we got deployed in mid-April, they did not open fire until 25 April. The fire wasn’t effective simply because they were firing from a lower altitude. But we had to be ever vigilant. We couldn’t allow them to climb up to the pass (Bilafond La). So there were zero margins for error. Therefore, I had posted one sentry at the very edge of the pass, about 500 metres from where our tents were pitched. The (listening post) sentry would stand at the farthest point possible to look out for any Pakistani troop movement from below. From that position, the sentry could see at least a km into Pakistan territory. It was monotonous and physically very demanding task in the cold and blizzards. But it had to be done.

  The Ski-troopers at Bilafond La. Shokin Chauhan leading them

  Bilafond La: Th
e sentry posted at the very edge (see arrow)

  spotted the first Pakistani attack

  “We had put in place a system where every hour, the sentry would come and give a report and I would respond by saying, ‘Okay. Or ‘Ram Ram’ or ‘all right’. I used to have a lantern on in the tent so that even in the dark, the soldiers would know that this was the Platoon Commander’s post. I had told them, if I don’t respond, peep into my tent and see if I am dead or alive. For all you know, I could be dead. But, as it is you sleep less at those altitudes, so I would be mostly awake or semi-awake when they came and gave the report every hour. This system paid rich dividends later,” Gen Kulkarni said and went on to describe what happened on 23 June.

  “On 22 June, there was shelling on our posts from the Pakistani side. Mostly 120 mm mortar fire. It also snowed heavily that day. In the early hours of 23 June, Lance Naik Chanchal Singh was on duty as the LP Sentry. That morning around 4.45 am, he spotted some movement about one kilometre away. He immediately shouted ‘dushman, dushman (enemy). But before Chanchal could run back to the post he was hit by Pakistani firing. The firing was effective. He died on the spot, but had managed to alert us. Because of Chanchal and another soldier, Govind Singh on perimeter sentry duty, we were activated immediately. Once they (the Pakistanis) were spotted, it was a matter of getting our act together. When Hav. Sukhbir came rushing and said, ‘Saheb, dushman!’ I asked him, are you sure you are not hallucinating? He said no, sir, Chanchal has been hit! I immediately rushed out and then it was all out firing from our side. They stood no chance once we had spotted them,” Gen Kulkarni recalled. He remembers many Pakistanis being mowed down in that skirmish. “We beat them back and for a full day many bodies lay strewn on the lower slopes,” he remembers.